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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three essays. I look at the role of two different but
critical factors in shaping entrepreneurial outcomes: individual level career history and the
institutional context. My work spans two outcomes in particular: individual decisions to
choose high-tech entrepreneurial activities and the strategies and outcomes of the
entrepreneurial firms that are established.
Following an introductory chapter that overviews the entire dissertation, Chapter Two
discusses the use of alumni surveys as a methodology. The first of my three empirical essays is
Chapter Three, entitled "Cutting Your Teeth: Building on the Micro-Foundations for Dynamic
Capabilities with Edward Roberts, and investigates whether prior founding experience
improves subsequent start-up firm performance. We draw on two strands of psychological
theory - availability and partition dependence - and tie them together with the idea that
variation in managers' cognitive representations of the competitive landscape drives differences
in firm outcomes. The results of the study are consistent with an account where improved
cognitive representations form dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage but appear less
consistent with passive inheritance of search routines as a source of dynamic capabilities. We
examine performance produced by variation in career experience driving differences in
psychological biases.
The second essay, "Who has 'The Right Stuff'? Human Capital, Entrepreneurship and
Institutional Change in China", examines a model distinguishing barriers to entry from barriers
to growth. It exploits a natural experiment to identify effects on individuals at different
locations on a talent distribution. The paper asks whether the 1999 Chinese Constitutional
amendment increased entrepreneurship among those individuals with higher (or lower) levels
of human capital. The type of institutional environment that results in higher quality
entrepreneurs is a question that has not been systematically explored previously. I find that the
greatest increase in entrepreneurship in the post-2000 institutional development was among
individuals at the top of the talent distribution. The findings suggest that entrepreneurship
among high quality individuals is driven less by the relaxation of constraints to entry (which
are relatively easy to overcome) and more by constraints to firm growth.
The final essay chapter is a cross-country comparison of the MIT and Tsinghua datasets.
There are some relatively subtle differences that in combination with the differences in the
environment for entrepreneurial firms and the institutional history of China have led to vastly
different outcomes for the entrepreneurial firms from MIT and Tsinghua. The shorter time
frame in which entrepreneurial activity has been occurring in China resulted in a younger,
smaller set of entrepreneurial firms throughout the country. Similarly, the younger age of
Tsinghua entrepreneurs contributes to a different mix of idea and team sources (fewer from
work experience) that might also partially explain the differences in firm outcomes. While firm
size in terms of employees is roughly similar, the MIT firms are much larger in revenues than
the Tsinghua firms. It is clear that the broader environment exerts a strong impact on the
outcomes of entrepreneurs, their processes, and their firm outcomes.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
The process of commercializing innovation through technology entrepreneurship is
complex and multi-faceted. My research is motivated by the current and future economic
importance of high tech entrepreneurs. The universities, regions, and nations that gain an
advantage in understanding and educating their young people about the process of high tech
entrepreneurship will have an enduring leg up in terms of technological progress, economic
growth and quality of life. The importance of high tech entrepreneurs will only increase as
competition for innovation and economic growth increases. I stand on the shoulders of many in
terms of the attention that human capital, work history and institutions have received. Yet there
are still gaps in understanding the various mechanisms by which these factors impact
entrepreneurial outcomes. While the field has made important progress, unanswered questions
remain, particularly those that may help policymakers and entrepreneurs understand causal
relationships. My work focuses on the role of two different but critical factors in shaping
entrepreneurial outcomes: individual level career history and the institutional context. The
research I am engaged in spans two outcomes in particular: individual decisions to choose high-
tech entrepreneurial activities and the strategies and outcomes of the entrepreneurial firms they
establish.
This dissertation is composed of three independent essays that examine various aspects
of high tech entrepreneurship. The common thread throughout my dissertation research is that
it essentially examines three specific mechanisms through which we may see a relationship
between pre-founding experience and entrepreneurship. First, entrepreneurs may benefit from
the cognitive frameworks or skills gained during a previous start-up and may therefore
experience higher performance in the next firm that they start. Second, the institutional
environment may shape the types of individuals who decide to engage in entrepreneurship.
Third, my comparative study of MIT and Tsinghua entrepreneurs and their firms reveals that
much is similar in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their start-up process
factors. Nonetheless, some relatively subtle differences, in combination with the differences in
the environment for entrepreneurial firms and the institutional history of China, have led to
vastly different outcomes for the entrepreneurial firms from MIT and Tsinghua.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the use of alumni surveys as a methodology for creating
entrepreneurship databases and review important aspects of the two primary surveys used in
this dissertation, those of MIT and Tsinghua alumni. In Chapter 3, Edward Roberts and I look
at evidence for a model where multi-functional experience (in this case, founding a firm)
results in a more accurate cognitive map of the industry. This paper investigates whether prior
founding experience improves subsequent start-up firm performance via more accurate mental
models of the industry landscape. Distinguishing the effects of higher ability individuals
selecting into serial entrepreneurship from this more nuanced story requires detailed data on
each firm started by an entrepreneur, regardless of its success or venture capital funding. I
exploit such data from the MIT Founder's Survey (Hsu, Roberts, Eesley 2007) to analyze
multiple measures of performance with (and without) individual fixed effects as a control for
underlying individual-level factors such as skill or persistence. While not definitive (micro-
level data on mental models would provide direct evidence but is difficult to obtain), the results
provide tentative evidence consistent with our model.
Chapter 4 forms a transition to the remaining chapters by recounting the history of
China's development and reforms since 1978 that are specifically related to entrepreneurship.
Next, I discuss some of the theoretical frameworks that have been useful in international
research. The challenges faced by entrepreneurs are particularly salient in developing countries
yet we know much less about high tech entrepreneurship outside of the United States and
Europe. There is an increasing focus on international research and exciting results can be
expected from the novel theoretical issues which data on entrepreneurship in other countries
uniquely enlighten.
Chapter 5 examines a model distinguishing barriers to entry from barriers to growth. It
exploits a natural experiment to identify effects on individuals at different locations on a talent
distribution. The paper asks whether the 1999 Chinese Constitutional amendment increased
entrepreneurship among those individuals with higher (or lower) levels of human capital. The
type of institutional environment that results in higher quality entrepreneurs is a question that
has not been systematically explored. The results have implications for our theoretical
understanding of the interplay of institutional and individual factors in entrepreneurship, as
well as important policy implications given the desire of governments to encourage high impact
technology entrepreneurship.
The final chapter compares the MIT and Tsinghua data on founders and their
entrepreneurial outcomes. We find that much is similar in terms of the characteristics of
entrepreneurs and the start-up process factors between the MIT and Tsinghua alumni.
Nonetheless, there are some relatively subtle differences that in combination with the
differences in the environment for entrepreneurial firms and the institutional history of China
have led to vastly different outcomes for the entrepreneurial firms from MIT and Tsinghua.
The shorter time frame in which entrepreneurial activity has been occurring in China resulted in
a younger, smaller set of entrepreneurial firms. Similarly, the younger age of Tsinghua
entrepreneurs contributes to a different mix of idea and team sources (fewer from work
experience) that might also partially explain the differences in firm outcomes. The mix of
funding sources and proportions of firms relying on technological innovation are strikingly
similar. While firm size in terms of employees is roughly similar, the MIT firms are much
larger in terms of revenues than the Tsinghua firms.
The difficulty in studying the institutional drivers of changes in the distribution of talent
drawn into entrepreneurship is two-fold. First, one needs a context with an exogenous change
in institutions. Second, obtaining detailed data on human capital levels for a comparable 'at-
risk' set of individuals is difficult. For this study, I collected original data through a survey
sent to all alumni of Tsinghua University (Beijing), including data on graduates from 1947 to
2007, along with interviews in the People's Republic of China during the summer of 2007.
This is the first large scale dataset of technically trained Chinese entrepreneurs and the first
alumni survey abroad. To study how different institutional environments may differentially
impact the propensity for entrepreneurship among more talented individuals, a differences-in-
differences approach is implemented. The data include panel data on income along with
detailed work history and educational information.
In conventional analyses, lowering barriers to entry releases pent-up entrepreneurship
among those with entrepreneurial ability, but who were previously constrained. My paper
argues that reforms lowering barriers to growth encourage those of higher ability to choose
entrepreneurship over wage work through an increase in expected returns. I find that the
greatest increase in entrepreneurship in the post-2000 institutional development was among
individuals at the top of the talent distribution. The findings suggest that entrepreneurship
among high quality individuals is driven less by the relaxation of constraints to entry (which
are relatively easy to overcome) and more by relaxation of constraints to firm growth.
Taken as a whole, the essays in this dissertation provide a step away from the prior
literature's attempts to define entrepreneurship and its drivers. Instead, I provide a view into
the differences between entrepreneurs and evidence that the broader environment, specifically
the institutional-level, can play a role in drawing into entrepreneurship those individuals who
are more likely to innovate and to perform highly as entrepreneurs. The second chapter
identifies a particularly important subset of entrepreneurs, those that have prior start-up
experience, and identifies a novel theoretical driver of why they are so important in the
economy. The fourth and fifth chapters go into greater detail in how the institutional
environment and individual entrepreneurs interact to produce innovative firms.
Besides being important for our theoretical understanding of entrepreneurial decisions
and firm heterogeneity in outcomes, the question of what is the optimal training for potential
entrepreneurs has great practical importance both for engineering and science students planning
entrepreneurial careers and for investors making critical investment and co-founder decisions.
My work differs from prior literature in these areas in three ways: 1) by looking more at
individual factors; 2) by using natural experiments to disentangle confounding factors; and 3)
by examining how the institutional context may alter the links between human capital and
entrepreneurship. In general, my research on firm performance examines individual level
factors and idea quality effects on entrepreneurial performance. It is unique in distinguishing
effects on different stages of performance, disentangling prior founding experience from
underlying ability and again in examining different institutional contexts.
The overarching, fundamental questions which drive my research are: What determines
the direction (and rate) of innovative activities? and What explains the heterogeneity in the
ability of new firms to commercialize breakthroughs in science and technology? Most of the
strategy and management of innovation literature on these questions has focused on the rate of
innovation and typically in large, established organizations. However, much of the
commercialization of breakthrough innovation in new markets occurs through entrepreneurial
firms (Roberts 1991). An area that has received some prior attention is the role that human
capital and work history play in both the sources of entrepreneurs and in determining their
performance (Beckman and Burton, 2008, Beckman, Burton, and O'Reilly, 2007, Burton and
Beckman, 2007, Lazear 2004). I am particularly interested in how higher ability individuals
may be encouraged to become entrepreneurs by shifts in policy and the institutional
environment, and in the strategic direction and performance of their new ventures.
The specific ways in which pre-founding work experience and human capital impact
entrepreneurship, and how these mechanisms may be different across countries and institutional
contexts, are still far from clear. The types of educational and career experiences that are
important for entrepreneurship are still vague in the literature. Besides being important for our
theoretical understanding of entrepreneurial decisions and firm heterogeneity in outcomes
(Murray 2004, Burton, Sorensen, Beckman 2002), the question of what is the optimal training
for potential entrepreneurs has great practical importance both for the students planning
entrepreneurial careers and for investors and founders making critical recruiting and co-founder
decisions.
Conclusion and Future Research
The most important lessons that motivate my dissertation research are two-fold. First,
we have only just begun to understand the connections between levels of individual (and team)
human capital or ability and the dynamics of firm founding. Entrepreneurs are a very
heterogeneous group and yet implications from the current literature are mainly of a one-size-
fits-all type. Second, if we hope to better understand the commercialization of innovation via
entrepreneurship, we must do better at identifying causal mechanisms, rather than examining
correlations where multiple interpretations are possible.
To mitigate the success bias inherent in past research I have used a methodology of
unique surveys (of university alumni). The studies comprising this dissertation are not without
limitations and frequently they raise more questions than they answer. The research would be
of questionable value if it did not stimulate further thinking and areas for future research.
To summarize, I am particularly interested in how individuals may be encouraged to
become high tech entrepreneurs by shifts in policy and the institutional environment, and the
strategic direction and performance of their new ventures. My future research is motivated by
two views: 1) there are fundamental differences in identifying, building and managing a high
tech enterprise compared to running established firms or self-employment; and 2) high tech
entrepreneurship is becoming a career choice and the entire process is worthy of systematic
study. See Figure 1 for a conceptual model where primarily the lower left-hand corner is the
only area to have received much scholarly attention. It is my hope that this dissertation
contributes to our understanding of the process of creative destruction that drives
entrepreneurial success, technological progress and ultimately, economic growth (Schumpeter,
1934).
Figure 1
Model of the Entrepreneurial Career
Level of Human/Social/Financial
Capital Necessary
Angel activity may
overlap at any point or
may lead back to
entrepreneurship.
# of (shadow) opportunities
available increases
AngeWC
Investor
,' Successful / skilled
entrepreneurs may skip
' levels or choose to stay
at'lower" levels.
Some overlap in skills and contacts, some
are unique.
Increases in human, social, and financial capital-
Learning, building network, large time lag on average.
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Chapter Two:
Alumni surveys as a data collection methodology
Discussion of alumni surveys, their use and limitations'
Existing Alumni Survey Datasets
The use of alumni surveys as a data collection methodology for empirical studies of
innovation and entrepreneurship is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since limitations of data
access have traditionally been a key bottleneck in the progress of systematically understanding
the process of the commercialization of new ideas through entrepreneurial firms, it is
worthwhile to consider the advantages and disadvantages of this method. By way of
introduction, this chapter will first discuss the few existing alumni surveys that have been used
to yield insights into entrepreneurship. Through these examples the types of questions that an
alumni survey is well-suited to answer become more clear. The following section will use
these examples, along with the author's own experience with the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) alumni survey dataset and in designing and executing the first alumni
survey overseas, at Tsinghua University (Beijing, China), to discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of the alumni survey methodology. The Tsinghua survey is an interesting
example since it was designed to allow comparisons with the MIT survey, but also to be an
extension and improvement over that survey using the experience of working with the MIT
data. In addition, the Tsinghua survey faced the challenges of needing to be translated and
tailored to the Chinese context as the first non-U.S. alumni survey. Finally, along with
We use the term "alumni" throughout to include both male alumni and female alumnae.
providing the survey instruments, I will offer some lessons learned that hopefully provide
guidance to others interested in developing their own alumni surveys.
Type of Questions Appropriate for Alumni Surveys
The first formal studies of technology-based entrepreneurship were conducted in the
1960s (Roberts, 2004; 1991), and since then most of the academic literature on research
universities examines faculty entrepreneurs, university spin-offs, and technology transfer (e.g.,
Dahlstrand, 1997; DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Etzkowitz, 1998; 2003; Nicolaou and Birley,
2003; Vohora et al., 2004). The university's entrepreneurial influence can be seen as
extending to its students as well. Far greater than the numbers of new ventures founded by
university faculty and staff are those created by alumni who received their technical and/or
managerial training and exchanged ideas with faculty while at leading research universities.
The role of universities in fostering entrepreneurship via students and alumni still needs much
systematic analysis, particularly as related to changes over time (Roberts & Eesley 2009).
It is widely recognized that one of the key institutions in the education of world-class
technologists and scientists is the research/technology university. Research universities are
important institutions not only for educating technologists but also for providing a setting for
students and faculty to exchange ideas on entrepreneurial opportunities. In the U.S., alumni
from leading research universities are responsible for numerous new ventures. Not only do
professors educate students in the classroom and the lab, but the university also provides a
social setting for the exchange of potentially valuable commercial ideas among faculty,
students, and external visitors/speakers. Before turning to the MIT and Tsinghua surveys, it
may be helpful to look at the other comparable alumni surveys.
Bill Barnett and Stanislov Dobrev (2005) collected a Stanford alumni database by
surveying the alumni of the Graduate School of Business in 1997. This survey includes only
MBA alumni and they received 5,283 completed (or partially completed) surveys for a
response rate of 43 percent.2 The dataset includes general demographics, career histories,
including job changes, the features of previous job positions and the organizations where they
were employed. The authors used interpolation where possible to handle missing values and
excluded the rest of the surveys. By this method, only 2,692 surveys were complete. The
authors examined the distribution of basic demographic characteristics between the full sample
and the final sample after excluding missing cases and found no detectable bias. However, it is
still unclear whether there is bias between the final sample and the underlying population.
Their theory and data distinguish between self-employment and founding a new organization.
One advantage of the dataset is the ability to observe a wide range of entrepreneurial firm ages.
This wide variance was important for their questions about how demands from the environment
and work roles shift as organizations grow and age. The mean firm age was 7.4 years and the
mean employee size was 468.
Edward Lazear (2004) also used this dataset to ask whether entrepreneurs tend to be
generalists or specialists by matching the data with student transcripts and looking at the pattern
of their MBA coursework and career history. Dobrev (2005) also uses these data to ask
whether there appears to be evidence for social "flocking" behavior in choosing careers in
finance or consulting.
2 Lazear (2004) notes that the response rate may have been even higher if one takes into account that
some individuals were very old and others may no longer have been alive to receive the surveys. This
rate compares well to previous organizational surveys: Kelly and Dobbin (1999) and Dobbin and Sutton
(1998) reported 45 percent response rates; Milliken, Martins, and Morgan (1998) reported 18 percent;
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985), 35 percent; and Blau, Falbe, McKinley, and Tracy (1976), 36 percent.
Josh Lerner (2009) used Harvard Business School "class cards" that students complete
on matriculation to provide data on 6,000 HBS students and the sections that they are in. The
students received a survey at graduation where they were asked to indicate the jobs that they
are entering, including entrepreneurship. The authors used these data to determine whether
being in a section at HBS with former entrepreneurs influenced the likelihood that graduates
would become entrepreneurs in their initial jobs after graduation. They find that having
entrepreneurial classmates actually deters potential entrepreneurs, but it appears to be true for
those HBS alumni who were most likely to fail had they become entrepreneurs. The results
indicate a type of screening mechanism for bad business ideas.
Finally, Ron Burt (2001) collected a survey of women alumni of the Chicago GSB in
2000. Eight hundred alumni responded to the survey and the authors used both a second-wave
non-respondent survey of 1,000 non-respondents and the school's alumnae database to check
for non-response bias. The only bias detected was that women no longer in the labor market
(retirees and housewives) were less likely to respond to the survey. Burt uses the survey to ask
questions about how women use their personal and professional networks.
MIT Survey
In 2001, MIT administered a survey to all 105,928 alumni. The alumni could complete
the survey online or return the hardcopy version. Most respondents (85.96%) completed the
web version of the survey. This survey generated 43,668 responses. The 7,798 alumni who
had indicated that they had founded a company were sent a survey in 2003 and 2,111 founders
completed that more detailed survey, representing a response rate of 25.6%. 3 The survey
3 Table 7 in Chapter 6 shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed) characteristics of
the responders and non-responders are the same statistically, for both the 2001 and 2003 surveys.
packet included a personalized letter, signed by the MIT President, the questionnaire, and a
postage-paid envelope with address labels. Examining the firm names and founding years, we
identified and dropped 44 duplicate observations where multiple cofounders reported on the
same firm. Industries covered include aerospace, architecture, biomedical, chemicals,
consumer products, consulting, electronics, energy, finance, law, machine tools, publishing,
software, telecommunications, other services, as well as other manufacturing. Each founder
reported information on up to five firms which he or she had founded up to the date of the
survey, yielding a total of 3,698 firm observations. Further details of the survey and descriptive
statistics are included in Chapters 3 and 6. Copies of the survey instrument are included in the
Appendix.
This dataset has been reported on previously (Roberts and Eesley, 2009; Hsu, Roberts,
Eesley 2007). Hsu, Roberts and Eesley (2007) analyze major patterns and trends in
entrepreneurship among technology-based university alumni since the 1930s by asking two
related research questions: (1) Who enters entrepreneurship, and has this changed over time?
and (2) How does the rate of entrepreneurship vary with changes in the entrepreneurial business
environment? The findings are based on merging the datasets joining MIT alumni and founder
information from the 2001 and 2003 surveys (by matching anonymous ID numbers). New
company formation rates by MIT alumni have grown dramatically over seven decades, and the
median age of first time entrepreneurs has gradually declined from about age 40 (1950s) to
about age 30 (1990s). Women alumnae lag their male counterparts in the rate at which they
become entrepreneurs, and alumni who are not U.S. citizens enter entrepreneurship at different
(usually higher) rates relative to their American classmates. New venture foundings over time
are found to correlate with measures of the changing external entrepreneurial and business
environment. Details of the survey respondents and additional descriptive data and empirical
results are provided in the following chapter as well as Chapter 6. Roberts and Eesley (2009)
use these data as well to examine the role of MIT alumni entrepreneurs in the U.S. economy,
the types of companies MIT alumni create and the MIT entrepreneurial ecosystem that has
contributed to these outcomes.
Tsinghua Survey
Visiting MIT Sloan on a Fullbright scholarship, Professor Delin Yang of the School of
Economics and Management at Tsinghua University was informed about the research
generated out of the MIT alumni survey. When invited, he responded enthusiastically about
doing a similar survey with Tsinghua University and served as the connection to the Tsinghua
Alumni Association. He gained approval and support from them and from the President's
office at Tsinghua to implement an alumni survey there.
I took the MIT survey as an initial template and created the initial draft of the Tsinghua
survey so that there would be some overlap for comparison between the two surveys. Next,
MIT Sloan doctoral student Yanbo Wang and I expanded the Tsinghua survey to include new
questions and to tailor it more to the Chinese context. Delin Yang and Yanbo Wang translated
the survey into Mandarin Chinese and then the survey was translated back into English by a
separate person to verify the translation. The survey was pre-tested with 50 individuals (non-
Tsinghua alumni) and found to take too long to complete. We shortened the survey before
having the final version printed and entered into the online survey software.
The survey was sent to all Tsinghua University alumni who had an address on record (a
total of 30,000 according to the alumni association). Like the MIT dataset, the Tsinghua
dataset includes alumni across all schools at Tsinghua. The respondents could mail back the
paper copy or complete the survey online. A total of 48.6% of the Tsinghua respondents
completed the web version of the survey and the rest sent back the hardcopy. In the initial
section, completed by all alumni, a question was asked about participation in founding a firm.
Specifically, alumni were asked if they participated in founding a company, "where founding
indicates that you were present at the start of the company and other founders would consider
you a co-founder." We also asked about privatizing a state-owned enterprise since this is also
considered to be "entrepreneurship" in China. Those responding positively to either question
were asked to fill out the Tsinghua Founders Survey section. We also asked a question about
whether the individual had gone overseas to work or go to school. Those who responded
positively to that question were directed to fill out the "Returnee" section of the survey. The
survey packet included a personalized letter, signed by the Tsinghua University President, the
questionnaire, and a postage-paid envelope with address labels. A total of 2,966 surveys have
been received online and via paper and email (including 718 entrepreneurs).4 Of the 2,966, we
eliminate (for certain analyses) the 144 alumni who responded from outside of China since
changes in policies in China should have less effect on them. The response rate is on the low
side.5 Fortunately, we have some data on non-respondents to the Founder's survey and can use
these data to test for differences in observables between respondents and non-respondents to
reduce the concern for bias. This will be described in more detail below.
We asked 45 questions about prior firm founding history and the entrepreneur's most
recent start-up including: revenues, industry category, work experience, relationships among
4 The results include 963 alumni responses received via the online survey and 2,003 responses received
via email or hardcopy.
5 Organizational surveys often have low response rates, particularly those of top management members.
While low responses rates can introduce bias, we examine specifically whether there is systematic bias in
respondent characteristics (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, & Thompson, 1994). Response rates to surveys of
managers in China have been in the 30-40 percent range (Peng & Luo, 2000; Tan & Litschert, 1994). In
the U.S., response rates for entrepreneur surveys are often lower than those for managers.
the cofounders, sources of entrepreneurial ideas, timing and sources of financing events,
commercialization strategy changes, causes of failure, exit routes, revenues and number of
employees. 6 This survey was used for Chapter 5 of this dissertation to ask how the institutional
environment affects the types of individuals becoming entrepreneurs.
The previous alumni entrepreneurship surveys have primarily been used to ask
questions about the factors that lead certain individuals and not others to become entrepreneurs.
These factors have included their educational and work history as well as their social networks
and the institutional environment they exist in.
Asking questions about the individual choice to become an entrepreneur is natural for
an alumni survey since the question requires data on individuals at risk of becoming
entrepreneurs. New firm foundings are rare events, making sampling from the population at
large difficult and expensive. Sampling from a university alumni population that is likely to
experience entrepreneurship limits the generalizability, but improves the odds of obtaining
unbiased data in sufficient sample sizes to make inferences.
University Entrepreneurship
There is a large literature on university entrepreneurship, defined in the more narrow
sense above to include only faculty or technology from a particular university rather than the
entrepreneurial alumni. Anne Miner and colleagues (2006) on have a recent review of the
6 In addition to the survey data, the Tsinghua data includes extensive notes from interviews with 42
people (including entrepreneurs, investors, and government officials). The interviews included 26
Tsinghua alumni entrepreneurs, 2 Tsinghua staff (TLO, Science Park), 5 Chinese venture capitalists
(VCs), 2 Government officials, 3 Other Chinese entrepreneurs (non-Tsinghua), 2 MIT Alumni (non-
entrepreneurs), and 2 Tsinghua alumni (non-entrepreneurs). Unfortunately the interview selection
procedure could not be randomized. The Tsinghua Alumni Association set up interviews for us and we
specifically asked to talk with high-tech entrepreneurs and some who were not successful. Undoubtedly
our interview population is weighted towards more successful entrepreneurs and those whose ventures are
more high-tech than the average alumni. In addition, the majority of our interviews were in Beijing,
though some were in Shanghai and Xi'an as well.
research on "university linked start-ups". There are also a few alumni surveys that have not
asked about entrepreneurship specifically, but have asked typically about career histories.
There is a tradition of using this methodology to ask other questions.
Advantages and Disadvantages
A survey of alumni has the advantage of being a well-defined population, not selected
based on success in entrepreneurship or in traditional employment. Such a survey allows us at
least six key advantages over existing datasets. First is the long time horizon in terms of many
decades of graduates. The second advantage is having the control over the survey instrument to
include measures not available in existing public datasets such as Census data (in our case, this
included multiple measures of whether the firm was using an innovation strategy) and third is
less success bias than existing datasets which include only firms that have survived, chosen an
initial public offering of stock or received venture capital funding. The fourth advantage is
having a well-defined, relatively homogeneous set of individuals at risk of entrepreneurship to
ask questions about what leads individuals to entrepreneurship. Next, an alumni survey has the
advantage of surveying a population with ties to a particular university and that bond is likely
to encourage higher response rates than a more anonymous survey. Finally, the alumni survey
can be an effective tool for generating data on entrepreneurship outside of the United States or
in developing economies. In some cases, it would also provide access to pre-entrepreneurship
measures of performance such as grades or honors received from the university.
The number of decades of graduation years covered by an alumni survey results in a
very large number of observations and the ability to examine trends over time in education,
career histories and entrepreneurship. The MIT and Tsinghua surveys resulted in respondents
who graduated in the 1930s all the way up to graduates from 2001 (MIT) and 2007 (Tsinghua).
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The entrepreneurial alumni founded firms (frequently at a lag after graduation) but over a
similarly large span of decades.
Having control over the survey instrument allows the survey author to tailor not only
the independent variables to her/his interests, but also the definition of entrepreneurship.
Researchers using existing large scale databases are restricted usually to examining self-
employment or defining entrepreneurship as those filing a Schedule C on a U.S. Federal tax
return. These very broad definitions blend together doctors and lawyers with their own
professional practices with those who have employees and are raising significant external
capital for more risky ventures. Alumni surveys allow us to define entrepreneurship more
precisely, a feature that is likely to be important if we believe that self-employment differs from
what many typically think of as founding a new firm.
Many entrepreneurship studies in the past have been criticized for including only firms
that were currently in existence and thus were the firms that had survived. More recent studies
have used the Thomson VentureXpert database of firms funded with venture capital. In
contrast with these databases, the MIT and Tsinghua alumni surveys resulted in a sample not
selected based on entry or successful entry into entrepreneurship. Alumni surveys offer a
methodology that suffers to a lesser extent from the survival bias inherent in prior methods.
The MIT and Tsinghua surveys (in contrast with VC databases) include a great deal of variety
across both industry sectors (spanning service and manufacturing industries) with varying
degrees of technological reliance, firm sizes, operating years and outcomes. Using alumni
surveys allows us to capture data on the majority of entrepreneurial firms that never attempt or
are not successful in raising venture capital funding.
The fact that the respondents to an alumni survey had very similar educational
experiences at a common university allows for some degree of uniformity. This feature is
attractive since other methods result in a very heterogeneous sample of individuals and
ventures, making meaningful comparisons and analysis more challenging. While such a sample
is not necessarily representative of the entire spectrum of self-employment (e.g., Blau, 1987;
Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987; Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003), our focus is on the changing
nature of entrepreneurship among technically-trained graduates. Responses also can permit
comparison between those from the university who followed entrepreneurial paths and those
who did not, providing a built-in control group.
Understanding the differences in entrepreneurship associated with premier universities
in advanced economies and those in developing economies is important for at least four reasons.
First, it informs public policy to understand the relative intensity and types of entrepreneurship.
This is important both for policy makers in developing countries as well as those in advanced
economies seeing increasing competition on the horizon. Second, international variation helps
to inform the debate about underlying drivers of entrepreneurship and the environmental
influences on entrepreneurial behavior. Thirdly, differences in country rules, regulations,
cultures and histories may well permit analyses of impacts of such differences upon the rate
and consequences of entrepreneurial activity. Finally, focusing on entrepreneurial behavior
emerging from specific universities helps to inform university administrators regarding relevant
factors they may be able to influence to affect entrepreneurship among the students and alumni.
However, data on entrepreneurship across countries is rare and has proven difficult to
systematically collect.
Drawbacks
The drawbacks of using an alumni survey as a methodology will depend on the precise
research question being asked. However, in interpreting the results from alumni surveys, it is
useful to keep in mind three data-related issues: representativeness, response rates and self-
reporting. The first issue is the extent to which inferences made from particular alumni datasets
apply to entrepreneurship in general. The data for this dissertation come from alumni of very
prestigious academic institutions in the US and in China. While what happens to these alumni
is of interest in itself because of the stature of these institutions, we should consider the ways in
which this particular sample may or may not be representative of the general population if
effects on the general population is what the research question is attempting to answer. It is
important to note that these are alumni and therefore the sample is not limited to those currently
associated with these universities or to technology coming from the universities. While these
individuals have all passed through these schools for either an undergraduate and/or graduate
degree, they have had diverse experiences before matriculation, while at the university, and
since graduation. Therefore, while there is no doubt that individuals in the sample are relatively
homogeneous in some respects, they are quite different in others.
We do not claim generalizability across the spectrum of entrepreneurial activity;
however, we believe that the Tsinghua and MIT samples represent an interesting and important
population of individuals. National samples of entrepreneurship may be more representative of
entrepreneurship broadly defined, but probably not of technology-based entrepreneurship.
Moreover, comparing national samples of entrepreneurship is challenging, as data sampling
strategies vary depending on the subject matter of study (compare, for example studies of self-
employment [e.g. (Blau, 1987)] and manufacturing [e.g. (Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson,
1988)]). With these caveats in mind, we note that there are very few datasets of entrepreneurial
activity, especially for technically trained individuals, so in this sense the present study
represents a step forward.
A second issue is possible response bias. For example, graduates who started a
company but were unsuccessful may well not have reported these failed firms, either by
omitting them from their responses or by not participating in the study at all. We also have the
same individual reporting on themselves, the firm, and also the firm's performance. Alumni
surveys as they have been implemented so far have the disadvantage of collecting data from
only one founder. While that founder might offer some information on the other founders, it is
preferable in future surveys to ask for contact information for the other founders. The co-
founders can then be sent a survey in a second survey wave that would allow the collection of
information from them as well as verification of the initial founder's responses. Next, there is
the issue of self-reporting. Older respondents, especially those who have started multiple
companies, may display a memory bias in which some companies, possibly those which were
relatively unsuccessful, are not reported. This may lead to the appearance that younger
entrepreneurs are starting more (though less successful) firms on average. Similarly, if cultural
attitudes toward entrepreneurship have indeed changed over the years, younger entrepreneurs
may have been more likely to respond to the survey and to indicate that they had founded a
firm. Older entrepreneurs may also have been less likely to respond to a university survey due
to the sheer number of years since their time as a student if such alumni ties weaken over time.
The potential drawback of response bias can be anticipated and addressed both by using
methods known to reduce response bias and by assessing response-bias and using statistical
approaches (such as weights) to correct for it. One approach to assessing non-response bias
involves extrapolation. This method is useful when trying to determine the direction of bias
and a survey of non-respondents or archival methods cannot be conducted (Lehman 1963,
Donald 1960, Pace 1939, Rogelberg, Luong ). It rests on the assumption that individuals who
respond less readily resemble non-respondents, so a common method is comparing
characteristics of respondents who answered quickly with those who answered following a
reminder or stimulus at a later time. Response bias is explored more systematically for the
MIT and Tsinghua surveys in Chapter 6.
We have already seen from the existing examples of alumni surveys that this method is
often used to ask questions about career dynamics. One drawback of this methodology is in
testing theories of career dynamics that operating through social exchange or population
ecology. In this case, there is a need to balance between the necessity of collecting complete
population data to account for both "leaders" and "followers" in social processes and the time
and expense required to gather such data (Dobrev, 2005). If the alumni sample is truly
representative of the underlying alumni population on all dimensions that are of theoretical
importance, then this is less of an issue.
Although one limitation of alumni survey data is that it is typically cross-sectional in the
sense of coming from a survey given at one point in time, on the other hand our MIT and Tsinghua
respondents graduated from the university and founded companies over an impressive span of time.
There is also no reason why alumni surveys could not be performed annually to form a panel data
structure, with the caveat that there may be selection issues in terms of who elects to stay in the
survey for multiple years.
Finally, alumni survey data balances these drawbacks with the strong advantage of
generating a representative sample of alumni not selected based on entry (or successful entry)
into entrepreneurship. The university alumni sampling methodology imposes some desirable
homogeneity on certain dimensions, such as levels of human and social capital relative to more
general but more heterogeneous samples of entrepreneurs. However, there may be a trade-off
between the higher rates of occurrence of entrepreneurial events in certain alumni populations
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and sufficient variation in certain social attributes of individuals. The extent that this drawback
is a concern will depend on the specific research questions, the alumni sample, and the social
attributes being hypothesized about.
One final difficulty common to alumni surveys that can be dealt with but should be
anticipated is that there is temporal right-censoring in that we cannot know who of the more
recent graduates will become entrepreneurs (or repeat entrepreneurs if we are examining that)
or how their firms will perform at later stages of their existence. This right-side censoring is
especially an issue given the frequently long lag from graduation to first firm founding, as well
as the potential long lives of the new companies that are founded. Similar difficulties are
encountered with research on insurance and medical malpractice where there is a long lag
between an event and the resolution of a court case. We use statistical methods in the
regression analyses to adjust our estimates for this right-censoring.
Lessons Learned
The design and implementation of the Tsinghua survey is an improvement and
extension of the MIT survey. Many lessons were learned through the experience of the MIT
alumni survey that were incorporated into the Tsinghua survey. Further lessons were learned
from the extension of the alumni survey methodology into the international context with
Tsinghua University. The Tsinghua dataset is one of the first systematic large-scale records of
high-tech entrepreneurial activity in China.
The MIT alumni founder dataset was designed and executed before my arrival at MIT
by a committee that included staff of the MIT Alumni Association, their consultant who was an
economic geographer, Professor Edward B. Roberts and David Hsu (who at the time was a
post-doec at MIT Sloan). The fact that such a large group with diverse interests was designing
the survey led to some difficulties and frustrations from a research point of view. A size
constraint that was imposed on the survey instrument forced the omission of many questions
preferred by the academic researchers. The Tsinghua survey improved on this dimension since
we had complete control over the survey design. The MIT survey was also performed in two
waves while the decision was made to conduct the Tsinghua survey in a single wave. The
advantage to first surveying all alumni and then sending a separate survey to founders is that
the overall size of the initial survey instrument is reduced, providing a higher response rate.
The disadvantage is that there is a large drop-off in respondents between the first and second
waves.
After beginning to work with both the MIT and Tsinghua datasets, it has become
apparent that we lack data that the literature has presented as important. For example, we do not
have parental or family background information, including parental careers, religion or wealth.
We do not have good measures of the skills or variety of roles played by the alumni prior to
their becoming entrepreneurs. We also lack information on cognitive characteristics of the
entrepreneurs, opportunity costs they might have perceived in becoming entrepreneurs, and
information on their motivations in starting their firms. These deficiencies constrain our areas
of current analyses while providing good opportunities for future research direction. For the
present dissertation chapters, we regard these factors as unobserved, and to the extent that they
are randomly distributed between founders and non-founders, the regression estimates are
consistent. There is an inherent trade-off, common to all survey methodologies between asking
more questions, thus lengthening the survey, and obtaining a higher response rate.
The experience of designing and implementing the Tsinghua survey also resulted in
lessons on doing alumni surveys in an international context.
Comparison with other methods of generating entrepreneurship databases
The other methods for generating entrepreneurship databases have tended to rely on
surveying existing small or young firms, leading to survivorship bias, or utilizing secondary
data sources such as the U.S. Census, the Longitudinal Business Database, or the Dun &
Bradstreet database of private firms. These large-scale databases have an advantage in being
generally representative and having a large number of observations. However, they typically
define entrepreneurship as self-employment.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor used adult population surveys in one of the only
cross-national surveys of entrepreneurship. However, the GEM survey used "the widest
possible definition of entrepreneurship" and has been faulted for the varying implementation of
the surveys differing across countries.
The Dun & Bradstreet database has been used for entrepreneurship since it is one of the
only public databases covering private firms. However, it gives little information on the
founding team or the entrepreneurial process. The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) used the Dun
& Bradstreet database as a sampling frame to conduct yearly waves of surveys to ask much
more detailed questions about the founders and their ventures. This is an exciting database that
should yield answers to many questions in the coming years. The KFS screened 32,500
sampled businesses (the response rate was 43%) to identify 4,930 eligible new businesses
which have been followed up with to form a unique panel dataset (Ballou et al, 2007; Barton
and DesRoches, 2007).
The Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC) sampled by firm, not founder
(e.g., Baron, Burton and Hannan, 1996). The sampling criteria were that the firm was founded
between 1983-1995 and had at least 10 employees at the time of the interview. Due to this size
constraint, they have a success-biased sample, however the data have been useful in multiple
studies that have asked questions about the relationship between the founding team, work
history, and new firm fundraising or outcomes such as an initial public offering.
No research methodology is perfect and each has its own advantages and drawbacks.
Thus, it is important to choose the correct methodology for the question being asked. Until
now, alumni surveys as a methodology to ask questions about the transition from employee to
entrepreneur and about the entrepreneurial process have been a growing research approach that
is likely to continue in the coming years. Alumni surveys offer several attractive properties,
including the ability to relatively cheaply and systematically gather entrepreneurship databases
both in the U.S. and abroad.
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Chapter Three:
Cutting Your Teeth: Building on the Micro-Foundations for Dynamic
Capabilities
(with Edward B. Roberts)
Why do some firms outperform others over significant periods of time? Evidence
appears to contradict the predictions of economic theory that over time, competition and
imitation will eliminate differences between firms. The question of why firms are different
from one another and what differences are relevant for competition has puzzled researchers.
Extending earlier efforts to disaggregate the influence on business-unit profits of industry,
corporate-parent and market share effects, scholars have examined the influence of firm-level
effects (Schmalensee, 1985). Examining lower levels of analysis shows that industry-level
effects are approximately half as important as business effects in determining business-unit
profits (Rumelt, 1991, McGahan and Porter, 1997). Yet, with the exception of work on top
management teams and entrepreneurship, much less work has looked at the influence of even
lower levels of analysis (including individuals) on performance (Higgins and Gulati, 2006,
Johnson, 2007, Mollick, 2008). Why do some firms outperform others even when in the same
industry? Specifically, we extend the microfoundations of strategy (Gavetti, 2005) and seek to
answer the question: When organizations are putting together new bundles of routines and
capabilities, what determines who puts together the more valuable and difficult to imitate
bundles?
Resource-Based View and Evolutionary Theory
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm has been a central theoretical framework
for explaining heterogeneity in firm performance. Differences between firms in the resources
and capabilities they have gathered through superior information or luck generate differences in
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firm performance (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). Competitive advantage is
sustained to the extent that competitors can be prohibited from replicating or substituting for
the key valuable resources. Other scholars have put forth specific isolating mechanisms such as
path dependence, social complexity, causal ambiguity and firm specificity that keep resources
from being easily imitated (Rumelt, 1991, Hatch and Dyer, 2004, Dierickx and Cool, 1989,
Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). Scholars have begun to theorize more explicitly about dynamic
processes that allow some firms to produce more valuable combinations of resources. Much of
this literature has revolved around the concept of dynamic capabilities and typically refers to a
firm's coordinating and combining processes that allow it to reconfigure its competencies or
bundles of routines and resources to better fit changing environments (Teece, Pisano and Shuen,
1997).
Drawing on evolutionary economics, the existing conceptions of the sources of dynamic
capabilities have been guided by relatively passive, inertial mechanisms of incremental, local
search. The main conceptual framework that has guided work in the literature is variation,
selection, and retention of higher order routines that guide local search processes for more
valuable bundles of capabilities and resources. Less is known about how managers may
actively choose which bundles will be more valuable than others. Similarly, we lack a theory
for why the managers of firms become motivated to change the bundles of routines and
capabilities in certain ways and for how they know in what directions to change them. Zott
(2003) develops theoretical propositions that local search drive choices between imitation and
experimentation that result in differences in timing of implementation, costs of deployment,
and learning (resource deployment costs decreasing over time). While this moves our
understanding forward, we still lack a psychological foundation for identifying where
differences arise in cognition or beliefs about the future value of routines, resources or
capabilities. As Gavetti (2005) points out, routine-based theories of managerial behavior have
long been thought by scholars to be entwined with more cognitive logics (March and Simon,
1958, March and Olsen, 1976). We build on the theoretical framework for the psychological
foundations of capabilities' development laid out around cognition by extending the theory to
propose mechanisms by which differences in cognition emerge. We then empirically test
whether these differences result in performance differences among firms (Gavetti and Rivkin,
2007, Gavetti, 2005). Prior work has shown that individuals with firm-specific human capital
can be a source of competitive advantage (Hatch and Dyer, 2004). Our contribution is to use
psychological foundations to show how even industry-specific (not firm-specific)
representations embedded in individuals can function as a difficult to imitate dynamic
capability, guiding firms to build competitive advantages.
This paper addresses the gap in our understanding of the sources of dynamic
capabilities by conceptually linking the individual and firm levels. Extending the line of work
that recognizes that strategy exists in managers' minds and arises from their cognitive theories
about the world (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007, Huff and Jenkins, 2002, Porac, Thomas and Baden-
Fuller, 1989), we suggest a novel mechanism through which dynamic capability arises from
improved cognitive maps of the industry landscape. We assert that improved cognitive maps of
industry trends and causal relationships come from specific types of industry experience and
guide the recombination of resources, routines and capabilities. We respond to calls in the
literature for a research agenda to build the behavioral foundations of our understanding of the
causal mechanisms driving the evolution of capabilities as well as the sources of inertia that
dynamic capabilities are meant to overcome (Gavetti 2005).
Theory: Evolutionary Theory and Bounded Rationality
When organizations are in the act of assembling new bundles of routines and
capabilities, what determines who puts together the more valuable and difficult to imitate
bundles? Is it passively inheriting better local search routines/processes or is it actively finding
more valuable bundles through more accurate cognitive maps of the competitive environment?
The recognition that an impossibly large set of information about the world is required for a
strictly rational conception of the decision making process led to the concept of bounded
rationality to label this constraint on individuals (Simon, 1955). Two research streams emerged
around mechanisms for dealing with the constraint of bounded rationality. One emphasized a
history-dependent, experiential route of discovery, specialization via local search and the
development of stable routines (Herriott, Levinthal and March, 1985). However, some scholars
began to point out important limitations and difficulties arising from local search experience
(Gavetti and Levinthal 2000, Levinthal & March, 1993). Instead, they emphasized an approach
considering the imperfect cognitive representations that limit the link between choices and
intended consequences. Studies exploring various decision biases have been numerous
(Camerer, 1995, Nisbett and Ross, 1980, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, Kahneman and
Lovallo, 1993, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982, Fox and
Hadar, 2006). Managers face numerous biases as they attempt to understand the competitive
environment and its trends in enough detail to search for an effective strategy and cluster of
resources that will provide competitive advantage (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). Representations
have been identified by prior research as important in shaping decision making as well as focus
and interpretation (Huff and Jenkins, 2002, Fiol and Huff, 1992, Walsh, 1995, Simon, 1991,
Weick, 1995, Narduzzo, Rocco and Warglien, 2000). The idea that CEOs and members of the
top management team have variation in the complexity of their "cognitive maps" of the
industry is not new to the literature (Calori, Johnson and Sarnin, 1994). We extend and build
on prior research that has suggested that differences in managerial cognition lead to variation in
strategic decisions (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000, Adner and Helfat, 2003, Holbrook, et al., 2000).
The current paper responds to calls in the literature recognizing the need to integrate
psychological theory and the determinants of less biased representations under the cognitive
foundations of dynamic capabilities.
Gavetti and Rivkin (2007) examine the choice of search mechanism by managers and
theorize that the use of specific choice mechanisms is driven by environmental ambiguity
(reduced with industry maturity) and firm inertia (increased with firm age). However, less
attention has been devoted to the psychological biases and determinants of finding more
valuable clusters of resources and capabilities within specific search strategies. Within
cognitive search, what mechanisms lead to more accurate representations of the competitive
environment and accumulation of more valuable capabilities? Gavetti (2005) further develops
cognition as a micro-foundation for the development of capabilities by delineating a model
where managers' cognitive representations of their environment drive organizational search and
capability development. He examines the role of the location of an individual within an
organizational hierarchy and theorizes that action generates information which contains signals
about the environment and the relationships between actions and outcomes. These signals are
then passed up the hierarchy and depending on the divisional structure and the similarity in
product lines, individuals at the top or bottom of the hierarchy may develop more accurate
cognitive representations. More accurate representations help guide the organizational search
for more valuable combinations of capabilities.
Psychological Theory and Competitive Advantage
In addition to the location in an organizational hierarchy, other factors are likely to
either bias cognitive representations or yield more accurate ones and more profitable
combinations of capabilities. Psychological theory offers several alternative mechanisms that
help to build our understanding of how to integrate individual-level psychological factors with
firm-level dynamic capabilities and competitive advantage. Cognitive representations can be
thought of in terms of NK models where sets of decisions correspond to different performance
levels or peaks (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). They can also be thought of in terms of the
subjective probabilities that individuals give to various events or the relationships between
actions and the likelihood of specific outcomes. These representations can be inaccurate or
overly simplified in several ways.
First, we know from work on availability heuristics that instances that can be easily
recalled or scenarios that can be constructed with ease tend to bias the judged probabilities of
such events upward from reality (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). People with less domain
knowledge tend to rely on the ease of recollecting instances, whereas domain experts tend to be
biased as well by the number of cases that come to mind (Ofir, 2000). Either way, the bias
produced is in the same direction and has been found in multiple studies (Ofir, 2000, Fischhoff,
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1978, Russo and Kolzow, 1994, Dub6-Rioux and Russo, 1988, van der
Pligt, J., Eiser and Speark, 1987). The availability heuristic has been used to explain the
"pruning bias" where individuals are given a set of categories containing reasons why, for
instance, a car might fail to start (or why a business might go bankrupt). When the researchers
"prune" categories and absorb them into the residual category, respondents appear to distribute
the probability from the pruned categories across the remaining ones rather than add it to the
residual category. Pruning bias can also be explained by a different bias known as partition
dependence (Fox and Clemen, 2005). Partition dependence is the term given to the
phenomenon where assessed probabilities given by individuals for events can vary substantially
with the way that the researcher partitions the categories. The phenomenon is similar to
framing, the psychological bias where decisions have been shown to be influenced by the way
in which alternatives are presented (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Psychological theory and
research typically attempt to identify universal, generalizable, systematic biases in human
decision-making rather than to identify which individuals may be more or less prone to biased
perceptions and decisions. Similarly, in theories of dynamic capabilities and resource-based
view, no individual has a more accurate cognitive representation of the competitive landscape
than anyone else. However, given the prior research in psychology cited above it seems likely
that some managers may hold more accurate and/or less biased cognitive maps or sets of
subjective probabilities than others. This is particularly true if different demographic
characteristics or work experiences lead to less bias in cognitive representations.
Individuals have varied educational and career experiences that may result in more (or
less) biased perceptions, representations and thus strategic decisions. A rapidly growing area
of literature examines prior career experience (Beckman and Burton, 2008, Boeker, 1989,
Haveman and Cohen, 1994, Haveman, 1993, Phillips, 2002). A large section of this work has
been interested in the knowledge, aspirations, skills, or routines that employees inherit from
their firms (Agarwal, et al., 2004, Ciuchta, et al., 2009). However, employees may gain more
than just task knowledge, skills or routines from their firms, they may also acquire cognitive
representations of the competitive environment which have varying accuracy. A key question
is whether variation in career experiences might give rise to variation in the extent of the
psychological biases that affect perception and decision-making.
Lazear (2004) argues that an important determinant of entrepreneurship is the breadth of
an individual's curriculum background and number of different jobs. While the paper argues
that leaders and entrepreneurs need a variety of skills, the study raises the question of the
mechanism behind the correlations. If those who work for smaller firms are gathering more
general skills as a result of taking on broader job responsibilities then this might allow them to
identify and execute on more valuable business opportunities (Phillips and Sorensen, 2007,
Wagner, 2003, Wagner, 2006).7 Another interpretation is that more varied job role experiences
are a source of diverse perspectives on the industry and more varied sources of signals from the
environment.
This benefit from a wide range of functional experiences could be due to the more
diverse signals from the competitive environment that the individual receives as much or more
than it is due to a diverse set of skills or routines. An individual working on a single functional
area may take actions and scan the environment for relationships between those actions and
outcomes that form the basis for her beliefs about the competitive environment. Daft and
coauthors (1988) have shown that scanning the environment is an important activity for
company performance. Recent work experience that is heavily focused in a single, narrow
functional domain can result in more focused attention on a subset of the competitive
environment (for example, technology, to the neglect of shifting markets). The result is more
detailed partitioning of that sub-area while other functional areas of the landscape become less
evenly partitioned and detailed in the cognitive representation. The other areas are less
7 Others have suggested that some individuals may have a taste for variety which drives both varied labor
experiences and the pursuit of new business opportunities (Astebro and Thompson, 2007).
available to the mind in search and decision making over what capabilities will result in
competitive advantage over time. More detailed partitioning of one sub-area leads to
underweighting the probability and importance of constraints and negative events from other
functional areas. In this way, strategic search and the bundles of capabilities a manager
chooses to develop are likely to be optimized for one domain. The individual for whom
cognitive partitions are more detailed in one area and constraints related to that function are
more accessible will be resistant to strategic options that may fit constraints elsewhere but are
less ideal in the domain where they have years of work experience.
However, for an individual, such as a founder or CEO who has responsibilities and
decision rights that span multiple functions, the scope of scanning and monitoring the
relationships between actions and outcomes in the industry must be much wider. While depth
may be lost, a sense of the landscape of the competitive environment through multiple
functional lenses (i.e., marketing, technology, finance, etc.) develops and must be integrated.
Work experience that includes responsibilities simultaneously spanning multiple functional
areas is particularly important for ongoing competitive advantage. The reason is that for
individuals who rotated through functional roles one at a time over multiple years, their
cognitive representations of customer trends or relevant technological shifts in the industry are
likely to be several years out of date if they held those positions many years in the past. For the
purposes of using cognitive maps to search for bundles of resources that will be valuable in the
coming years, current beliefs and knowledge of industry trends is necessary. An individual in a
position to perceive industry trends and constraints through multiple functional lenses in an up-
to-date fashion will have more accurate cognitive representations of trends and a greater
likelihood of identifying groups of capabilities that can be developed to profit from those trends.
Similarly, in academic fields, a lay-person can read the most recent scholarly articles, but
without actually participating in research, making decisions on projects and getting feedback at
conferences, it is difficult to develop a sense for the direction that the field is headed and to
anticipate shifts that will be important (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Figure 1 represents the
linkages.
If communication is imperfect across individuals, then there should be benefits to
diverse functional experiences within the same individual rather than across a team. Prior work
supports the idea that there are imperfections in communication across groups, incurring
process costs that reduce efficiency and group output (Kurtzberg and Amabile, 2001, Steiner,
1972). The idea that individuals and teams with more diverse information may outperform
others has not been connected systematically to psychological theories or to differences in
mental models (Taylor and Greve, 2006). All else equal (including team size and conflict),
teams with more cognitive diversity tend to be more creative and have higher performance
(Milliken and Martins, 1996, Chatman, et al., 1998, Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1999, Harrison,
et al., 2002, Williams and O'Reilly, 1998). When diverse experiences and cognitive approaches
are combined in a single individual, the knowledge becomes more integrated. In addition, the
coordination and access problems characteristic of teams are not present, yielding higher
performance. The counter argument is that the diverse team members are likely to have higher
expertise and knowledge in each of their areas of functional diversity. Then, despite the
communication effect, overall team benefits might be higher.
Hypothesis la: Individuals with more diverse experiences and a greater span of functional
decision rights will build more accurate cognitive representations, resulting in assembling more
valuable combinations of resources/capabilities.
Simon (1955, 1991) proposed that decision makers should be modeled as bounded
rational and as satisficing rather than as strictly rational and maximizing utility. Central to the
idea of bounded rationality is the fact that humans have limitations to their memory and
reasoning capabilities. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), most notably, as well as many
others have probed the heuristics and systematic biases that result from dealing with these
cognitive limitations. If natural human limitations to cognitive functions such as memory or
information processing drive these responses to bounded rationality, then we expect that
individuals with greater cognitive capacity should be less constrained. With less of a constraint
on information processing, biases and heuristics may not need to be relied on as heavily and
more detailed perceptions and less biased cognitive maps would result. These cognitive maps
may take the form of subjective beliefs about the probabilities of certain outcomes given
specific actions on behalf of the firm. If there is sufficient variation in the population of
managers in information processing capacity, then these differences may be large enough to
lead to differences in the success rate of strategic search for clusters of capabilities that yield a
competitive advantage.8 Individuals who are less constrained in memory and information
processing may take more away from prior experience and build more extensive mental models,
allowing them to see more opportunities for how to recombine resources than others. Similarly,
Shane (2000) shows how prior knowledge and experience shapes opportunity recognition.
Previous work has already shown that subjective probabilities over events and outcomes that
are internally inconsistent or poorly calibrated can result from limitations to human memory
and information processing capacity (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982, Gilovich, Griffin
and Kahneman, 2002).
8 Research on information technology adoption (also a method for improved processing of information)
has also shown that IT improves firm productivity, particularly when coupled with organizational changes
to take advantage of it (Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2002)
Hypothesis ib: Individuals with higher information processing capacity will build more
accurate cognitive representations, resulting in guiding their firms to assemble more valuable
combinations of resources/capabilities.
In psychology, a transfer effect is the beneficial impact of a prior event on the
performance of a subsequent event (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002). The similarity between
the characteristics of events influences the probability of positive outcomes from transfer
(Argote and Ingram, 2000). The probability of negative outcomes can increase when events are
dissimilar yet lessons from prior experience are applied anyway (Finkelstein and Haleblian,
2002). We suggest that a distinct but related mechanism to transfer effects occurs between
individual representations and the organizational levels of analysis. Typically transfer effects
involve learning a skill in one context but with a loss of performance when the skill is wrongly
applied in a different context. However, different from learning specific knowledge or a skill,
even if transfer is perfect, cognitive maps honed on one competitive landscape will lead to
errors when brought to guide firm strategy in a new landscape. One can have a nearly perfect
map of one country but it is of no use in discerning the topography of a different country.
Previous literature argued that an individual can bring transfer effects, perhaps in the
form of routines from prior founding experience to the benefit (or detriment) of a new
organization's performance, depending on the similarity of industrial contexts (Cohen and
Bacdayan, 1994, Zander and Kogut, 1995). As Gavetti and Rivkin (2005) indicate, the
problem in the case of forming strategy by analogy is that strategy development requires both a
breadth of prior experience (which may not be available) and a good fit between the relevant
dimensions of the current, novel situation and the prior situation.9 Inferences may be
misapplied or the wrong inferences may be drawn from the beginning (Finkelstein and
9 Indeed, Henderson and Clark (1990) argue that if the environment is characterized by demands for
innovations in the firm which do not match the organizational architecture of the manager's prior
experience, learning by analogy may prove difficult.
Haleblian, 2002). Along these lines, we argue that cognitive representations developed in one
context will not aid strategic search in a substantially different context. Furthermore,
examining the impact of the similarity of experience will allow us an additional test of whether
higher performance for subsequent firms is a result of improved representations or of higher
skill levels. Unless higher skill individuals tend to remain in the same industrial context, better
performance for those with experience in a similar industry compared to those with prior
experience in a different industry supports better cognitive maps as the correct mechanism.
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals who remain in similar contexts will build more accurate cognitive
representations, resulting in guiding their firms in assembling more valuable combinations of
resources/capabilities.
Whether an event turns out as a success may influence what knowledge about the
competitive landscape the individual takes away from a previous experience and how she or he
applies that knowledge to future situations (Cyert and March, 1963). Politis (2005) argues that
prior experiences of success or failure may condition the mode of learning from experience.
Prior success can show a path forward, but it may not spur much additional thought about why
the success occurred. McGrath (1999) emphasizes that failure can have positive benefits by
increasing the search for new opportunities. Failure can create greater variety in actions as the
individual searches for strategies to reduce uncertainty (March, 1991). Starbuck and Hedberg
(2001) review the cognitive and behavioral research on how success impacts learning, and
identify a number of interesting mechanisms at work. Yet their review shows the difficulty in
formulating compelling arguments for success/failure having a straightforward impact on levels
of learning. We elect not to hypothesize about failure directly since identifying failure is often
difficult. For example, is it a failure to shut down a firm quickly rather than to continue it when
a better idea is identified? The literature appears somewhat mixed on whether more knowledge
is gained from success or failure. However, prior arguments have neglected one important
mechanism that yields improved cognitive representations from success experience, but not
from failure. When an individual experiences significant success others often come to that
person to seek their advice or involvement in new opportunities. This is less true for those who
have failed. The flow of other individuals proposing new ideas not only increases the number
of opportunities examined but may increase the detail and accuracy of representations through
a sharp increase in the signals of trends in technology, competitors, and/or markets. It is clear
that individuals do learn from failure as well as success and that learning from failure can
enhance survival (Kim and Miner, 2007). Yet those who have failed lack this rich source of
improvements in their cognitive map that may be more important for identifying new
capabilities over and above just surviving.
Hypothesis 2b: Individuals who have experienced success will build more accurate cognitive
representations, resulting in guiding their firms in assembling more valuable combinations of
resources/capabilities.
If we fail to find support for these hypotheses then it casts doubt on cognitive
representations as a source of dynamic capabilities, or at the very least, the theoretical link
between multi-functional career experience, representations, and competitive advantage.
Empirical Strategy and Setting
Finding a setting where we can empirically isolate the impact of cognition separately
from the inheritance of routines or resources is challenging. Beyond the inherent difficulties in
assessing the quality of cognitive representations, attempting to test our hypotheses in a sample
of existing large firms would be problematic for several reasons. One is that the original
founders who guided the initial conditions and strategic search when inertia was lower may no
longer be around to respond to questions. Second, the selection mechanisms may be far from
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clear as to which managers are assigned to which projects and how much of the performance of
those projects is due to the formal or informal control of managers in specific locations in the
hierarchy. Using existing public firms only also introduces survival bias. Finally, transfer of
resources or existing capabilities from other business units in the firm makes it challenging to
identify the effects that interest us. These challenges mean that no dataset will be ideal along
all dimensions; however, a novel survey allows us to make empirical progress, particularly on
individual-level data and multiple measures of firm performance where prior work has largely
relied on simulation analysis.'l
The idea of organizational inertia is that elements of the organization are surprisingly
resistant to change once established early in the life of the organization (Baron, Hannan and
Burton, 1999, Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The closely related idea of imprinting is that both
environmental conditions at founding and strategic decisions made by the founders early on are
not easily reversible and leave a lasting imprint on the firm's subsequent development
(Stinchcombe, 1965, Romanelli, 1989, Romanelli, 1991). For example, it has been shown that
subsequent top manager backgrounds and later functional structures can be predicted by the
founding team's prior functional experiences and initial organizational functional structures
(Beckman, Burton 2008). In addition, the initial incumbents in functional positions appear to
imprint those positions in certain ways that are strong enough to condition the likelihood that
the subsequent holders of those positions may leave for other firms (Burton and Beckman,
2007). These studies provide evidence that founders bring blueprints or models that then shape
the future directions of the firm (Baron, Burton, Hannan 1999). Other evidence shows that
10 Simulations can be extremely valuable for clarifying theoretical insights yet may lack external validity
or generalizability.
resources accrue to individuals and firms based at least partly on the structural positions of their
former employers (Burton, Sorensen and Beckman, 2002).
In the model of Gavetti (2005) cognitive representations then guide search mechanisms
and become important initial conditions that imprint the future directions of development for
the company (Baron, Hannan and Burton, 1999, Stinchcombe, 1965). Furthermore,
organizations are known to become less plastic as they age (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) so the
cognitive maps available to managers in the beginning stages of developing a new business line
or new venture are vital since hiring individuals with higher quality cognitive representations
after inertia has set in will have less of a payoff. If more accurate cognitive representations of
the competitive landscape function as dynamic capabilities that improve firm performance, then
this is a source of competitive advantage which other firms clearly would not be able to imitate.
It is impossible for competitors to go back in time and replace the founders with others who
had different experiences and beliefs about the competitive landscape.
Data and Methods
At the founding of a new firm, resources are limited and existing firm capabilities are
non-existent, allowing us to better isolate the impact of routines and cognition imported via the
founders from prior work experience. The founders are a key input at the beginning stages of a
firm and other work shows the importance of founders in framing the initial conditions for
strategic search (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007). We argue that the main difference is that founders
who have had prior experience in a small, entrepreneurial firm are more likely to have utilized
general skills and to have had a wider range of responsibilities compared to individuals in
larger firms who typically have had more narrow functional roles. Prior work has already
shown that entrepreneurs and leaders appear to invest in more general human capital and
diverse experiences relative to others (Lazear, 2004)."
Our identification strategy begins with the selection of the setting of company founders
as a more narrow and ideal empirical sample to test our hypotheses because of the factors
discussed above. In particular, it better allows us to isolate the impact of routines vs. cognition
from the complicating factors of existing firm capabilities and resources that would otherwise
impair the identification of the effects we hypothesize about in other settings.
We take advantage of both differences between those who have and have not had the
experience of founding a firm as an indicator of cross-functional experience. Those who have
worked in established companies are much more likely to have worked in a single functional
domain at a time (unless they were CEO), whereas we know that those who were founders
almost surely had work experience that crossed functional boundaries while founding the firm.
We also take advantage of differences between those with multiple episodes of cross-functional
work experience (multiple firm foundings) as compared with those who have only had one
experience. Those individuals with more cross-functional experience compared to those with
less offer another identification strategy. If an episode of cross-functional experience is
thought of as the treatment effect, then we look both at differences between the treated and
untreated as well as difference between those individuals with more episodes of the treatment
effect compared to those with fewer. Finally, we use the panel structure of data on firm
foundings over time to rule out several alternative explanations that remain plausible after the
initial analyses. In particular, a strong advantage of our setting will be that we can provide
" We expect that those who have been CEOs would similarly build more balanced cognitive maps as a
result of their multi-functional experience. However, they also have much higher opportunity costs
relative to most employees so that would simultaneously influence the performance of the projects they
select to pursue.
evidence that we are not seeing a selection effect rather than the treatment effect. The panel
structure of the founder data where we have entire founding histories allows the use of
individual fixed effects for those who have founded more than one firm so that we can control
out the possibility that more persistent or higher ability individuals choose to found more
firms.
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We use a novel survey administered in 2001 to all 105,928 alumni from a prestigious
research- and technology-based university in the United States to generate a sample of firms
where we have detailed information on founders as well as on firm performance. This survey
generated 43,668 responses. Out of 7,798 alumni who had indicated that they had founded a
company, 2,111 founders completed more detailed surveys in 2003, representing a response
rate of 25.6%.13 Examining the firm names and founding years, we identified and dropped 44
duplicate observations where multiple cofounders reported on the same firm. Industries
covered include aerospace, architecture, biomedical, chemicals, consumer products, consulting,
electronics, energy, finance, law, machine tools, publishing, software, telecommunications,
other services, as well as other manufacturing. Each founder reported information on up to five
firms which he or she had founded up to the date of the survey, yielding a total of 3,698 firm
observations. On average, 1.79 firms were founded per individual, or 3.85 firms per individual
who founded more than 1 firm. The founders were also asked for the total number of firms
they had attempted to found over the course of their career and 80 indicated having founded
12 The individual fixed effects allow us to rule out the selection effect (time-invariant individual
characteristics) in going from fewer episodes of treatment to more, but not in going from no treatment to
treatment (no cross-functional experience to one prior founding). A Heckman selection model might help
with the latter concern, however we lack the requisite exclusion restriction (something correlated with
entrepreneurship but not with performance) required for this identification approach.
13 Appendix A of this chapter shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed)
characteristics of the responders and non-responders are the same statistically, for both the 2001 and 2003
surveys.
more than 5 firms (up to 11). The average number of firms per individual by this measure is
2.13 so we appear to have captured data on the vast majority of firms. To provide still more
information about these companies including current sales, employment, industry category and
location, this new database was further updated to 2006 data from the records of Compustat
(for public companies) and Dun & Bradstreet (private companies). 14 For consistency in the
country and institutional context, the 1,121 firms that were founded outside of the U.S. were
dropped from the analyses reported in this paper. Information on sales was adjusted for
inflation to constant dollars.
Although teams of multiple co-founders are more likely to start a new firm, as well as
be more successful in their firms (Roberts, 1991), we only have complete founder information
on prior startup experience for one entrepreneur from each team. Previous findings of strong
homophily among founding teams indicate that the prior founding experience of one
entrepreneur may be a good proxy for that of the team (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter, 2003) and the
results are robust to using only the single-founder teams and to using all co-founded teams. To
eliminate concerns of biases in the Dun & Bradstreet data, the analyses are also run on only the
subset of firms for which the founders provided more detailed revenues and employee data
(each multi-company founder chose only one firm to provide more detailed data). Although we
lose the panel structure, this sub-sample also provides us with more detailed information on
control variables and increases the confidence in our results. Due to skipped survey items and
missing data we allow the final number of observations to vary by the analysis in order to
utilize all available data. Meaningful numbers of foundings begin in the 1950s, therefore we
14 Successful matches were found for 80% of the company names in the D&B database. A firm is
included in the Dun & Bradstreet database when it needs to obtain a credit rating. An analysis of Dun &
Bradstreet's coverage compared to other sampling sources for small businesses concluded that there was
not a bias towards larger firms (Aldrich, et al., 1989).
restrict our analysis here to firms founded from 1950-2001. A key feature of this dataset is its
long time horizon allowing us to analyze almost entire careers.
Dependent Variables. Because our focus is on measuring the performance effects of
variation in the cognitive representations that come from work experience, we use revenues,
acquisition, IPO, employees, and lag between foundings as the dependent variables. No single
outcome measure is ideal. 15 Using acquisitions has the drawback of not observing the
valuation of the acquisition as compared to the valuation at the time of funding. Similarly,
using IPOs does not identify the valuation of the firm at the time of the IPO, or the post-IPO
performance of the stock, or the personal financial benefits to the founders or the initial
investors. Both IPOs and acquisitions apply only to a subset of foundings, not to all of them,
whereas revenues are a common goal of all companies. Many studies use the fact of an IPO as
a measure of success (Gompers, et al., 2006, Shane and Stuart, 2002). But far more firms
experience acquisitions rather than exit via IPOs. It is important to recognize that performance
is multidimensional in nature (Chakravarthy, 1986). The limitation of using the fact of IPO or
acquisition is that both of these are sensitive to the industry, the economic environment, and the
founders' desire to retain control. It is best to consider multiple performance measures, which
is why we look for (and find) robustness with various measures. The variable Log Revenues is
the revenue for the most recent fiscal year in operation as reported by the entrepreneur. We
adjust for inflation (2001 $) and take the natural log of this measure for our dependent
15 Profit might be a better indicator, but we lack adequate profit data to use that measure. The pair-wise
correlation between employee size and log revenues was -0.024, so we do not believe revenue is picking
up only size effects. Organizational performance of firms is likely to be a noisy proxy for a more accurate
cognitive map. Nonetheless, because the prior work experience of the founders is a major input for a new
venture, organizational performance is a relevant and appropriate objective measure. Performance can be
seen as a very conservative test. For it to be detected, cognitive maps must be more accurate in such a
way as to impact performance in a large sample of organizations.
variable. 16 Out of 2,111 firms, 1,370 survey respondents reported revenues for their firms
ranging from $0 to $2.56 billion (mean = $34.6 million, median = $1.12 million).' 7 Lag
Between Subsequent Firms is the number of years from founding one firm to founding the next
firm. We use acquisition in event-history models as well.
Independent Variables. We use independent variables related to the characteristics of
the founder and the nature of the prior experience, as well as a number of controls. The key
independent variable is our proxy for the number of diverse (simultaneous) functional
experiences and a greater span of functional decision rights, the number of start-ups previously
founded, which is coded as the ranking of the current firm in terms of whether it is the first firm,
second, third, and so on (mean = 1.61), founded by a given entrepreneur. 18' 19
16 Adjusting for inflation is not entirely necessary since year dummies are used; however they were
already calculated for use in descriptive statistics.
17 To alleviate concerns of response bias where defunct firms might be non-responders, we examine the
proportions of firms "in operation", "acquired", and "out of operation" in the group reporting revenues
(1,424 observations) and the group of non-responders (687 observations) to this question. Our concerns
are alleviated in finding that the proportions are roughly equivalent with 68.5% of those reporting
revenues still in operation and 62.3% of the non-responders still in operation. 10.9% of the reporting
firms were out of operation whereas that number is 18.8% for the non-responders. 19.7% of the reporting
firms had been acquired, whereas 18.8% of the non-responders had been acquired.
18 A total of 3,156 alumni indicated that they had started multiple companies, of whom 960 completed the
survey for a multi-founder response rate of 30.4%. A total of 1,107 single-firm founders responded to the
survey giving a 21.8% response rate out of the 5,086 single-firm alumni founders. Some of these 1,107
single-firm founders may later become multiple entrepreneurs. However, as we are looking at the effects
of prior founding experience on current firm performance, this is not a problem for our current research.
19 If the majority of learning relevant to founding occurs in work experience or life experience outside of
prior foundings, then we should find that the number of prior firms lacks explanatory power. Because
firms develop at different paces in different industries and the wisdom of early decisions is often not
known until the founders have experienced some sort of exit event (if ever), we propose that the number
of new ventures, rather than years with a single venture, is a more suitable proxy for the amount of prior
experience. Another problem with using the number of years of experience is that it implicitly penalizes
an entrepreneur who quickly took a firm successfully to acquisition or IPO. Similarly, with focus on the
repetitive task, pilots might be expected to learn from the number of flights or take-offs and landings, not
from the number of miles flown. Firemen should be expected to learn from the number of fires put out
and police officers from the number of arrests made, not the amount of time on a particular fire or with a
particular suspect. Managers cannot truly gauge the ultimate success of their actions until the final
outcome is known.
Individuals also differ in their starting human capital and in particular in the number of
years of education they have received. Advanced education may result in better information
processing capacity as well as in other acquired knowledge and capabilities. An alternative that
is consistent with our account is the signaling argument where an advanced degree signals the
individual as a "high type" who is a quicker learner with lower costs of educational attainment
(Spence, 19 7 3).2 o While using educational attainment as a measure of cognitive ability is
problematic, disentangling the two is extremely challenging as other authors have noted
(Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). Cognitive ability and years of education have been
found in numerous studies to be highly correlated, so using education as a proxy for cognitive
ability is reasonable (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). We include dummy variables indicating
whether the individual's highest degree was a Bachelor's degree , Master's degree or Doctorate.
As a measure of success experience, we use Prior IPOs, the number of previous IPOs for an
entrepreneur's previous firms. The variable Prior Acquisitions is a count of the number of a
founder's prior firms which have been acquired. Although survival is often used as a
performance measure, survival exists among underperforming firms (Gimeno, et al., 1997).
Capturing the similarity of the industrial context, Same 2-digit SIC code is a count of the
number of prior startups that have the same 2-digit SIC code as the current firm. Different 2-
digit SIC code is a count of the number of prior startups with a different 2-digit SIC code as the
current firm. SIC and VEIC codes were matched from the Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar
database and from VentureXpert. VEIC codes were converted to SIC codes with a previously
used matching scheme (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005).
20 Previous work has also shown a link between education as human capital and the performance of young
firms (Bates, 1990, Fairlie and Robb, 2008, Baumol, 2004, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Fairlie,
Woodruff 2007, Dunn, Holtz-Eakin 2000; Roberts, 1991). Roberts (1991) shows a curvilinear
relationship between education level of high-tech entrepreneurs and their firms' overall performance, with
Master's degree recipients doing best.
Control Variables. Some of our analyses use a set of industry dummies as controls for
the coarse industry segment within which the firm competes (such as biotech, software, and
electronics). The variable Age at Founding is the entrepreneur's age when the firm was
founded. We control for the age of the startup, as measured by Operating Years from founding
to the year for which revenues are reported. A set of year dummies, one for each year from
1950-2001, captures temporal changes in the economy. Initial Capital is the natural log of the
amount of initial capital raised (adjusted to 2001 dollars, roughly defined as capital raised
within the first year after founding). 21 VC Funded is equal to 1 if the individual reported raising
funds from venture capital firms.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The number of observations varies due
to missing observations on the survey items. Table 2 shows median inflation-adjusted revenues
and Panel B shows the lag between founding firms. The trend from median revenues of
$836,000 for first firms to $7.27 million for 5th (or more) firms lends support the general thesis
that firms created by those with more start-up experience are more successful. The table also
reassures us that we are not simply capturing differences between any prior experience and no
prior experience. Although Table 2 suggests a decrease in the lag between firms across
subsequent ventures, the differences are not statistically significant.
21 There is some uncertainty around the way that respondents interpreted the time frame and some may
have waited for a funding event to found the firm. Although the measure is admittedly not ideal, it is the
best proxy available, particularly for non-venture capital backed private firms, which are most of the
firms surveyed.
Results
Multivariate Regressions on Firm Performance
We use multivariate regressions beginning with a baseline model followed by results
controlling for factors that may be confounding the results including: 1) time-invariant
individual fixed effects and 2) specific firm characteristics, social networks, and fundraising.
We then further reinforce the results by testing whether better representations may function as
dynamic capabilities and speed the timing of events as suggested in previous work (Zott, 2003).
Baseline regressions
To test the influence on firm performance of different types of prior experience we use
a variant of a production function modified to better fit the case of younger firms. Traditionally
we would write an equation of the form:
Y=F(K, L, X) (1)
where Y is the current period performance, K and L are capital stock and quantity of
labor, respectively, and X is a measure of experience. The Cobb-Douglas production function
is widely used, but in the case of private firms, output and capital in particular are extremely
difficult to measure for a number of reasons. 22 Cognitive representations of the industry
resulting from varied prior experience of the founders are considered an "input" into the firm
formation process in the sense that a more accurate cognitive representation increases
performance (controlling for the level of labor and capital) by acting as a dynamic capability.
First we use the baseline multivariate regressions shown in Table 3. The specification of the
regression model is as follows:
22 For a start-up firm, having raised external capital at all has been viewed by prior literature as a signal of
performance and thus can be criticized as endogenous to the performance that we are interested in
measuring.
Yit = D('x it) (2)
where yit is a measure of firm performance, and the vector xit includes our demographic and
firm level variables including the number of prior foundings. Subscripts indicate a founding
year and 2-digit SIC code. Individual fixed effects are not included in this baseline set of
models. Each column uses a different performance measure as the dependent variable
including revenues (3-1), acquisition (3-2), initial public offering (3-3), employees (3-4), and
operating years (3-5).
Insert Table 3 about here
In Model 3-1, the prior founding experience variables are not significantly associated with
higher revenues. The number of employees and firm age are included as controls, so this is an
analysis of firm productivity. Male gender and advanced degrees are significant. Model 3-2
shows that the number of prior start-ups that had been acquired is positively and significantly
related to the likelihood that the current firm is acquired. However, starting a new firm in the
same 2-digit SIC code is negatively associated with the likelihood of acquisition. Having a
male founder, greater numbers of employees, older firms, and being located in Massachusetts
or California are also correlated with higher likelihood for an acquisition. In Model 3-3, none
of the key independent variables are associated with the likelihood of an IPO. But again,
greater numbers of employees, older firms, and being located in Massachusetts or California
are correlated with higher likelihood of an IPO. Looking at the number of employees as the
dependent variable, Model 3-4 shows that the number of prior firms in the same industry is
associated with a larger firm size. Finally, Model 3-5 shows that with more prior founding
experience, individuals appear to close subsequent firms more quickly. This is consistent with
more accurate cognitive maps revealing to the founders more quickly that the opportunity can
no longer be successfully executed (or increasing opportunity costs of running an
underperforming firm with higher levels of start-up experience).
Controls for Individual Effects
Although intriguing, these results are not conclusive, mainly due to the lack of controls
for time-invariant individual level differences which may be correlated both with the likelihood
of founding additional firms and with performance. An alternative explanation for why
performance might appear to improve with prior founding experience is that those who choose
to start a second firm have higher skill levels than those who choose to start only a single firm
(Gompers, et al., 2006). If on average those who start multiple firms are also more persistent or
more talented than those who start only one firm, then we would also observe average
performance improvements as lower skill individuals return to wage employment. We exploit
the panel structure of the data, which includes observations of multiple firm foundings for
many individuals, to implement a regression including individual fixed effects to control for
time-invariant factors from the individual influencing performance.23 Also, conditioning on
one firm founding, the results should not show performance improvements with prior founding
experience if underlying skill or persistence is the only component. If there is an improvement
in the accuracy of cognitive maps leading to competitive advantages (in addition to differential
skill levels), then conditioning on high persistence (more than one firm founding) we expect to
continue to observe higher performance with prior foundings.
23 These may include individual-level factors such as ability or persistence which without individual fixed
effects would exert an upward bias on estimates of learning-by-doing and also factors such as a
preference for variety or for multiple "lifestyle" businesses or the inability to hold down wage
employment which would exert a downward bias in studies lacking observations on multiple firm
foundings.
The results in Table 4 drop the unchanging individual characteristics for education,
location, and gender and instead exploit the multiple observations on individuals to include
individual fixed effects that capture time-invariant differences in individuals which may
include higher underlying skill, persistence, family wealth, or preferences for variety, all of
which are likely confounding the earlier estimates. Again, Model 4-1 finds that the prior start-
up experience is not associated with higher revenues. Model 4-2 shows that once individual
fixed effects are included, higher levels of start-up experience are strongly associated with a
higher likelihood for acquisition. However, the coefficient on the number of prior start-ups
which were acquired is strongly negative and significant, indicating that having a prior start-up
decreases the likelihood that the current firm will be acquired (perhaps because these founders
have either started lifestyle businesses or they are aiming for an IPO). In Model 4-3, the
number of prior acquisitions is statistically significant and shows a higher likelihood of an
initial public offering for the current firm. None of the prior experience measures in Model 4-4
are associated with a greater number of employees. Model 4-5 looks at survival and finds that
whereas those with more prior foundings survive longer, but those with more prior firms that
were acquired have lower survival. Again this is consistent with a story that prior experience
improves survival with a moderating effect of prior success that causes individuals to be
quicker in shutting down bad firms.
Insert Table 4 about here
Controls for Detailed Firm Characteristics
The analysis thus far is supportive of hypothesis la. However, using the panel data we
lack information on certain control variables which may be important as resource differences
such as the amount of capital raised, the number of co-founders and whether the firm received
68
venture capital funding. It may be that those with prior founding experience are better able to
raise capital or to attract more co-founders. Controlling for the amount of initial capital also
partially alleviates concerns that personal wealth may be driving the results. Survey
respondents chose one firm to answer more detailed questions regarding the number of co-
founders, initial capital, and other aspects of the firm. The following regressions take advantage
of these controls and the fact that we know where this firm is located in the ordering of firms
founded for each individual (first firm, second, and so on).
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here
We condition on having founded at least one prior start-up and run the regressions
shown in Table 5. Model 5-1 shows that controlling for founder age, education, the number of
cofounders and initial capital raised, the number of prior firms which went through an
acquisition is positively and significantly associated with higher revenues. The result is also
robust to using just the total number of firms founded. The same result holds in Model 5-2 for
the likelihood of acquisition and in 5-3 when a hazard rate model is used rather than a probit.
Model 5-4 uses the fact of IPO as the dependent variable and finds that the number of prior
IPOs is related to the likelihood of IPO for the current firm. In addition, teams with more
cofounders are more likely to have an IPO. Teams with more cofounders also have more
diverse sources of information and potentially more diverse cognitive representations on which
to triangulate. The amount of initial capital is also correlated with performance, though a
reasonable interpretation is that the more promising start-ups were able to raise more money.
While an account based on social networks is not counter to our theoretical arguments,
one alternative explanation we attempt to control is the possibility that individuals are gaining a
larger social network as they found successive firms. If larger networks are enabling
individuals to gather diverse signals and build more accurate mental models of the environment,
then this account would be largely consistent with our main argument, only via an alternative
mechanism for work experience. 24 The same results held when we constructed the sample to
include only sole founders (not founding teams), eliminating one potential avenue through
which a larger social network could improve subsequent firm performance. Individuals starting
a firm in the same geographical location where they started a firm previously are likely to enjoy
greater networking benefits. Prior work has shown that most communication is with those in
closer physical proximity (Allen, 1977). Testing the impact of prior experience from startups
formed in the same location as compared to those formed in a different location should allow us
to a certain extent to disentangle this social network effect. Number Same State is the number
of prior startups by the entrepreneur in the same U.S. state as the current startup. Number
Different State is the number of prior startups in a different U.S. state from the current startup.
If the benefit from prior experience disappears for foundings in different locations then this
supports the idea that we are observing primarily a social network effect (or that there are
performance-influencing differences in the characteristics of those entrepreneurs who change
locations). In Table 6, we start with a baseline model (6-1) which tests the effect of the number
of startups founded on the revenues of the current firm with age at founding, Bachelor's degree,
Master's degree, as well as the controls included. The effect of prior founding experience on
revenues is positive and significant.
24 Networks can also grow with traditional wage employment, so a truly alternative story would need to
build in theory explaining why the type of network that develops after a firm founding differs in ways that
are relevant from networks that large company employees may develop. In terms of funding Wang
(2008) shows that networks do not significantly affect investor decisions at the evaluation stage.
In Model 6-2, the coefficient on number in the same state is significant and shows that
these prior firms each contribute positively to the current firm's revenues. Prior startups in
different states lack a significant impact on the current firm's revenues. This effect may
support the social network benefits explanation as opposed to the one we are advancing;
however, it may be due to the smaller sample size of founders changing states. The total
number of founders shifting states between the current startup and the prior founding is 172 and
the number that we know remained in the same state is 382. Model 6-3 shows that the number
of prior startups in the same 2-digit SIC code is associated with higher performance and the
coefficient is significant. In Model 6-4 we find that the number of prior acquisitions has a
positive coefficient and is significant but the coefficient on prior IPOs is not significant (there
were only 84 prior IPOs linked to 72 different founders). Since there is a moderate degree of
pair-wise correlation between these various counts of prior experience, we ran these as separate
models. Model 6-5 includes an interaction term showing that those with Master's degrees
benefit more from each multi-functional experience. Model 6-6 show that the results on the
number of multi-functional (start-up) experience hold even when the number of functions
(marketing, engineering, etc.) on the founding team are controlled.
Cox Hazard and Multivariate Regressions Controlling for Timing
Table 7 begins to explore the idea suggested in the literature that firms with dynamic
capabilities (founders with better cognitive maps in this case) may be able
more quickly to execute on opportunities. 2 5 The specification of the Cox (1972) model is as
follows:
25 A finding of more quickly executing the start-up process is consistent with either finding a higher
quality idea or with learning how to design a company (or to filter ideas) for a more rapid exit. The
analysis here is robust to using both the Breslow method for ties and the exact marginal-likelihood
method.
A(t X)= o (t)exp(Xfl) (3)
where the vector X includes our founder and first firm experience characteristics. (t I X) is
the rate at which firms will be acquired at any particular date, given that they have not been
acquired up until that point in time. Equation (3) specifies the hazard rate as the product of two
components: a function of the spell length (i.e. delay time since founding the firm), A; (t) or
baseline hazard, and a function of the observable individual and firm characteristics, denoted
by the vector X. The model estimates the probability of an acquisition in a given year
conditional on not having been acquired up until that time period. This model is appropriate
for data like ours where right-side censoring is a problem because the timing of events is taken
into account. Subjects start being at risk at the year of founding and the dependent variable is
the event of an acquisition. Values above 1.0 represent increases in the hazard of acquisition
and values below 1.0 represent decreases. Results indicate that number of prior startups
(Model 7-1), prior acquisitions (Model 7-2), prior startups in the same 2-digit SIC (Model 7-4)
all significantly increase the likelihood of an acquisition. Both the coefficients on the number
of prior foundings in the same state and in a different state (Model 7-3) increase the likelihood
of acquisition and are significant at the 10% level.
Insert Table 7 and 8 about here
Table 8 uses multivariate regression to test systematically the relative speed of going
through the startup process. This model should be interpreted carefully due to right-hand
censoring, though year fixed effects address this concern. Attention should be focused upon
relative differences in lag length from founding to founding rather than on the fact of a shorter
lag. The models use the lag from founding to founding as the dependent variable, but the
results are also robust to the use of the lag from closing one firm (whether by closing,
bankruptcy, acquisition, or IPO) to founding the next one. The specification is that the lag is
generated as follows:
E[yit I x] = kit = exp(P'xit) (4)
where yit is a measure of lag, and the vector xit includes our demographic and firm level
variables including the number of prior firms. Thus, each of our models predicts the lag
between subsequent firms given a founding year and industry category. Because the lag is
measured in years and is a count variable that is always positive, we use Poisson-based
econometric estimation methods. The expected lag is an exponential function of a vector of the
founder's prior founding experience and other characteristics x. We note that by construction
this analysis limits the sample to those with more than one startup.
Model 8-1 shows that prior acquisitions and prior IPOs are associated with shorter lags.
Shorter lags indicate that there has been less time (a quicker process). Those with Master's
degrees have a shorter lag than those with just a Bachelor's. Model 8-2 adds a term interacting
age and prior experience. Both variables remain significant and the interaction term is
significant and negative. This indicates that older entrepreneurs show a greater reduction in lag
as a result of prior experience. In Model 8-2 the number in the same state has a large
significant impact on reducing lag, and the number in a different state significantly increases
the lag. In Model 8-4 we find that the number of prior startups in the same 2-digit SIC code is
associated with a greater decrease in lag than the number in a different 2-digit SIC code (both
coefficients are significant).
Robustness and Limitations
Starting a firm in a recessionary market can reasonably be expected to be a different
context than starting a firm during a boom time. As a further robustness check, Table 9 shows
regression results matching the founding year of the first start-up attempt with various
measures of the economic environment. The results are consistent with the idea that
representations of the industry built during unusual economic conditions may be less helpful
when the environment shifts to a more stable condition. The results show that the subsequent
firms have lower revenues if the first firm was started during a recession (as measured by the
National Bureau of Economic Research recession index).
There are a few alternative accounts worth noting. There is a possible alternative
mechanism that founders who have a heightened salience that comes from having a larger stake
to lose in the firm build more accurate cognitive models. There is also a large literature on
learning-by-doing including Spence (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Jovanovic and Lach
(1989), Rosen (1972) and Cabral and Riordan (1994) among many others. Increases in
productivity with cumulative production experience have been demonstrated in numerous
manufacturing settings where activity is highly repetitive (Rapping, 1965, Irwin and Klenow,
1994, Gruber, 1994, Thornton and Thompson, 2001). The learning curve slope has been found
to have a high degree of variance across organizations (Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson, 2001,
Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano, 2001). If learning has an impact on competitive outcomes,
then the question arises about the specific mechanisms of this effect - skill development or
improved representations. Another stream of literature has examined the extent to which
learning-by-doing may spillover outside of the firm (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980, Levin and
Reiss, 1988, Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen, 1993 (Ingram and Baum, 1997). Most of the
literature treats knowledge as a kind of firm-specific good (Hatch and Dyer, 2004, Huckman
and Pisano, 2006), but there can also be task-specific rather than firm specific human capital
which may then be transferred outside of the firm (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004) as well as
internally (Thornton and Thompson, 2001). Empirical work outside of economics has begun to
explore learning from rare events with intriguing, yet mixed results (Denrell, 2003, Kim and
Miner, 2007, Zollo and Singh, 2004; Baum and Dahlin, 2007). Some have suggested that
learning rates may be higher in slightly heterogeneous settings (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002,
Schilling, et al., 2003). However, it seems unlikely that the results are explained entirely by
individuals learning the generic set of skills required for founding a firm. If this were the case,
then we would expect those skills to transfer to different industries and across states. 26 We
would also expect that conditioning on one founding experience, individuals would have
picked up most of these entrepreneurship-specific skills and would benefit less from subsequent
experiences. Nonetheless, future work should more directly test the idea that functional work
experience leads to differences in biases and cognitive maps relative to multi-functional
experience.
Conditioning on at least one prior firm founding addresses the problem that some of the
entrepreneurs with a single founding may be lifestyle entrepreneurs who are starting a firm with
26 The entrepreneurship literature is beginning to focus on the process of learning among entrepreneurs.
Politis (2005) has an extensive review and synthesis of the research on entrepreneurial learning. Analyses
of the impact on performance of founding experience have varied, with some showing no effect (Alsos,
1998, Westhead and Wright, 1998) while others show performance advantages for multiple entrepreneurs
(Gimeno, et al., 1997, Stuart and Abetti, 1990). Although they argue against a learning interpretation, the
work most closely related to this article is that by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006). The
authors argue that a large component of success in entrepreneurship and venture capital can be attributed
to skill rather than luck and show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are more likely to
succeed than first time entrepreneurs. However, the Gompers et al. sample is limited to founders who
received venture capital financing. Thus the authors lack data on the much larger proportion of prior
foundings that were not VC funded. Furthermore, many more successful start-ups undergo acquisition
rather than IPO as opportunities to go public vary with the economic environment and by industry even
more than do the opportunities to be acquired. Therefore, the Gompers et al. analysis may be missing
many actual prior successes which would tend to bias their estimates. If, and to what extent, small
samples of experience result in learning that can be applied successfully in later comparable situations
remains to be established.
little intention to grow or sell it. The current data also may suffer from a self-report bias as
both the dependent and some of the independent variables were reported by the entrepreneur.
Although we observe a wide range of outcomes and firm sizes, it is likely that we do not
observe every startup firm attempted by the entrepreneurs. Individuals who have founded more
than one firm showed a slightly higher response rate than one-time only founders and this may
have influenced our results. We also cannot ascertain their reasons for deciding to start a new
firm or where to locate it. Perhaps current firm performance is lower for individuals changing
states because expectations or a reputation for success or failure alter the decision to move
locations.
The lowest quality entrepreneurs may be dropping out of the sample. The concern is
partially addressed by research in process that examines the determinants of starting a
subsequent firm.27 Gompers et al. (2006) also find higher performance for those with prior
entrepreneurial experience but critique a learning explanation based on findings that founders
with prior success (defined as an IPO) are more likely to be successful (IPO) than first time
entrepreneurs. Our estimates in Table 4 control for individual fixed effects and should control
for individual differences in time-invariant underlying ability or persistence. A skill vs. luck
story where skill is constant over time requires explanation for why revenues appear to
continue to increase (and variation decrease) with the number of prior start-ups (successful or
not) even when conditioning on at least one prior start-up. Our data do not come from a
random sample from the entire population. Nonetheless, the fact that all the respondents are
alumni of a prestigious research- and technology-based university reduces the concern that
there are large differences in wealth, skill, or initial human capital.
27 The middle range of performers (in terms of revenues) are most likely to start a subsequent firm,
whereas both low and very high levels of revenue are associated with a lower likelihood of a subsequent
firm (Authors, working paper).
Conclusion: Do firms gain a competitive advantage through dynamic capabilities in
the form of improved cognitive representations?
Do firms gain a competitive advantage through dynamic capabilities in the form of
improved cognitive representations which the founders acquired via prior work experience?
The results support the main thesis of the paper that the answer is yes, they do. Our primary
proposition, Hypothesis 1 a, that individuals with more diverse experiences and a greater span
of functional decision rights will build more accurate cognitive representations, resulting in
assembling more valuable combinations of resources/capabilities was supported. Hypothesis
lb was that those with higher information processing capacity will build more accurate
cognitive representations. The results in Table 6, Model 6-5, show that those with Master's
degrees benefit more from each founding experience, appearing to develop more accurate
cognitive maps via less constraint from bounded rationality. The results appear to support
Hypothesis 2a, that individuals remaining in similar contexts (SIC code, economic environment
and geographic location) benefit more from multi-functional experience. The most relevant
results here are the relative differences where the reduction in lag for each prior founding
experience is reversed for those starting a firm in a different state and there is a greater lag for
those changing industrial contexts. Hypothesis 2b was that founders would build more accurate
cognitive representations from prior experiences of success. The data tend to support this
hypothesis. 28 Model 4-3 indicates that the number of prior acquisitions has a significant
positive impact on the likelihood of an IPO. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility that
more accurate representations result from failure, yet other mechanisms such as a tarnished
reputation affect performance via impact upon potential recruits, financiers and even suppliers
28 Prior IPOs or acquisitions may be viewed as successes, and are by many other authors, though this
largely depends on the valuations achieved.
and customers. The regression results in Table 7 and Table 2 show that prior experience in
start-up settings improves the ability to more quickly to go through the entire process of finding
an opportunity, assembling the resources and capabilities to develop it and executing on it.29
The overall pattern of results, under a number of different specifications and measures, appears
to provide robust evidence consistent with an account where experience with a broader set of
responsibilities and functional decision rights leads to more balanced representations to guide
strategic decisions.
However, what explains the lack of significant results in Tables 3 and 4 on the revenues
(and employees) measures? One explanation may be that many high-tech firms do not achieve
revenues (or ramp up hiring) for the first several years while their focus is on R&D. 30 This
interpretation is supported by the significant results for acquisitions and by the results in Table
5 where we find that the number of prior acquisitions is significantly associated with higher
revenues once we include controls for the amount of initial capital and venture capital funding.
Differences in the accuracy of cognitive representations, particularly concerning trends
and shifts in the competitive landscape may also be a reason why individuals voluntarily leave
firms. Individuals may choose to move to other firms or start their own new ventures when
disagreements arise, when they see opportunities others do not, or when the existing firm seems
incapable of exploiting quickly due to inertia or loss of plasticity (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005;
Klepper, 2007). Prior work has suggested that the original founders of the firm may leave,
having learned either something about the process of founding a firm, or about their own ability
or efficiency which then affects strategic choices in the subsequent firm (Jovanovic, 1982).
29 Prior work shows that founding experience aids in raising capital quicker (Hsu, 2007).
30 For many firms undertaking an innovation strategy, significant sales do not occur until after they have
been acquired and a larger firm then deploys its complementary assets to drive production and sales
operations.
The current paper makes its contribution in examining a different cognitive spillover
mechanism: Where individuals appear to transfer to a subsequent firm more accurate
representations as a result of the prior founding experience. Our account also provides a
complementary theory of why managers and entrepreneurs may leave and go outside of their
firms to work for others or to start their own ventures. Most organizations tend to become
more rigid over time. If individuals within the same firm can develop substantially different
cognitive representations of the competitive landscape due to differences in types of experience
and the accumulation of psychological heuristics/biases, then individuals can begin to have
fundamental disagreements with the organization. Furthermore, due to the inertia and rigidity
of the existing bundles of capabilities, it becomes increasingly difficult to move the
organization to a new set of resources and capabilities that individuals perceive will provide
competitive advantage according to their representations of the competitive landscape. Some
individuals leave for new organizations due to increased rigidity in bundles combined with
cognitive maps drifting away from the increasingly small set of recombinations possible within
the firm or from an inability to convince others to select their bundles of capabilities.
In conclusion, we have developed and tested a model that links psychological theory to
dynamic capabilities and heterogeneity in firm performance. Variation in career experiences
leads to variation in the extent of known psychological biases such as availability and
partitioning dependence, and then variation in the extent of these biases results in differences in
cognitive representations that function as a dynamic capability providing a map to future
bundles of resources that will provide a performance advantage.
Figures and Tables
FIGURE 1
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log revenues 1264 14.05 3.08 0.03 21.66
Acquired 1840 0.19 0.39 0 1
IPO 1790 0.11 0.32 0 1
Lag between 1502 12.11 9.41 0 50
Number of Firms 2058 1.61 1.30 1 11
Prior Acquisitions 2067 0.13 0.42 0 3
Prior IPOs 2067 0.04 0.23 0 3
Prior Same SIC 1473 0.02 0.14 0 2
Prior Different SIC 1473 0.02 0.18 0 3
Prior Foundings in the Same State 2067 0.38 0.90 0 8
Prior Foundings in a Different State 2067 0.23 0.79 0 7
Age Founded 1807 39.65 10.59 18 83
Age Founded Squared 1807 1684.19 920.07 324 6889
Bachelor's degree 2000 0.43 0.49 0 1
Master's Degree 2000 0.41 0.49 0 1
Operating Years 1837 14.34 11.30 0 74
Industry 1600 9.77 4.34 1 16
Number of Cofounders 2056 1.05 1.22 0 4
VC funded 1691 0.13 0.34 0 1
Log initial capital 1264 11.91 2.72 0.28 21.02
Functional Diversity of Team 1964 1.23 0.48 1 3
TABLE 2 Revenues and lag across ventures
Panel A - Likelihood of Exit Events and Revenues (in 2001 dollars)
5 firms
and
Firm Rank 1st firms 2 nd firms 3 rd firms 4 th firms higher
(N=5 56) (N=1 82) (N=84) (N=2 1) (N=36)
Median Revenues ('000s) 836 1,784 924 1,181 7,274
Standard Dev. ('000s) 153,000 117,000 130,000 10,800 21,200
Panel B - Lag (from graduation and from the prior firm founding)
5 th firms
and
Firm Rank Ist firms 2 nd firms 3rd firms 4 th firms higher
(N=761) (N=241) (N=150) (N=71) (N=31)
Lag Between Subsequent Firms
(years) 14.02 7.95 7.38 6.99 6.71
Lag St. Dev. 9.78 6.90 6.73 5.42 6.37
TABLE 3 Productivity regressions
LN(REVENUES) PR(ACQUIRED) PR(IPO) LN(EMPL) LN(SURVIVAL)
Independent Variables (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) (3-5)
Num. of start-ups founded
Num. prior acquired
Num. same 2 digit SIC
Age at founding year
Gender ( =male)
Masters
Doctorate
ln(emp)
In(firm age)
MA
CA
Constant
Year F.E.
SIC F.E.
Individual F.E.
R-squared
Num. of obs.
(0.206)
(0.328)
(0.456)
0.025 (0.013)
1.179*** (0.648)
0.237*** (0.287)
-0.183* (0.409)
1.752 (0.292)
0.539 (0.076)
-0.546* (0.332)
-0.177 (0.346)
-13.826 (3.467)
YES
YES
NO
0.2164
1294
0.040
0.396***
-0.239*
(0.051)
(0.087)
(0.125)
0.012*** (0.004)
0.404** (0.202)
-0.016
-0.192*
0.055***
0.173**
0.330***
0.389***
(0.076)
(0.102)
(0.019)
(0.057)
(0.081)
(0.092)
0.002
0.084
-0.014
(0.069)
(0.116)
(0.161)
0.001 (0.005)
0.372 (0.289)
0.170*
0.117
0.188***
0.358***
0.260***
0.440***
1.422 (1.347) 2.543***
YES YES
YES YES
NO NO
0.160 0.228
1997 1760
(0.103)
(0.130)
(0.025)
(0.097)
(0.104)
(0.123)
0.066
0.160
0.442***
-0.012***
0.582***
0.305***
0.181
0.532***
0.214**
-0.030
(0.994) -3.290***
YES
YES
NO
0.150
2092
(0.057)
(0.103)
(0.143)
(0.004)
(0.153)
(0.086)
(0.121)
(0.074)
(0.098)
(0.102)
-0.028*
0.058
0.014
0.006
0.059
(0.016)
(0.024)
(0.034)
(0.001)
(0.052)
0.040 (0.028)
0.111 (0.036)
-0.021
0.010
(0.030)
(0.033)
(0.626) 1.412*** (0.198)
YES
YES
NO
0.622
2217
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
-0.269
0.121
0.396
TABLE 4 Productivity analysis including individual fixed effects
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
00
TABLE 5 Effects of prior founding experience (Conditioned on having founded at least one
prior startup)
Dependent LN PR PR
variables REVENUES (ACQUISITION) (ACQUISITION) PR(IPO)
Independent Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 5-3 Model 5-4
variables OLS Probit Cox Hazard Probit
Founder char.
Age at founding
Number of
Cofounders
Prior Exper.
Char.
Prior
acquisitions
Prior IPOs
Controls
Bachelor' s
degree only
Master's degree
Operating Years
Initial Capital
VC funded
Industry
segments
Year dummies
Constant
Log-likelihood
X2-Statistic (or
R-sq.)
p-value (or
Prob>F)
Number of obs.
0.002
(0.014)
0.056
(0.118)
0.417**
(0.212)
0.132
(0.361)
-0.078
(0.438)
0.433
(0.430)
0.067*
(0.039)
0.411***
(0.070)
-0.089
(0.462)
YES
YES
13.642***
(3.446)
0.432
0.000
347
-0.001
(0.011)
0.024
(0.079)
0.389***
(0.145)
0.350
(0.252)
0.548*
(0.309)
0.478
(0.312)
-0.043 *
(0.025)
0.111*
(0.049)
0.519*
(0.304)
YES
YES
-1.281
(1.655)
-124.3
125.1
0.000
345
0.999
(0.012)
2.057***
(0.784)
1.987*
(0.775)
1.003
(0.089)
1.529**
(0.227)
1.117
(0.268)
0.859***
(0.016)
1.209***
(0.069)
1.653*
(0.518)
YES
YES
-371.78
138.18
0.000
439
0.009
(0.014)
0.192***
(0.096)
0.099
(0.195)
0.427*
(0.244)
0.046
(0.428)
0.087
(0.429)
0.048
(0.042)
0.115*
(0.063)
-0.140
(0.366)
YES
YES
dropped
-78.9
65.9
0.008
222
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.*** **, and * indicate
TABLE 6 Revenues OLS
Founder characteristics
Age at founding
# of startups founded
Bachelor's deg.
Master's degree
Master's X # of startups
founded
interaction
Characteristics of the
Prior Exper.
# Same State
# Different State
Same 2 digit SIC
Different 2 digit SIC
Prior acquisitions
Prior IPOs
Controls
Functional Diversity of
Founders
Operating Years
Initial Capital
Used VC
Number of Cofounders
Industry segments
Year dummies
Constant
0.238*
(0.096)
0.125
(0.104)
1.675**
(0.614)
0.153
(0.623)
0.445**
(0.189)
0.408
(0.341)
-0.011
(2.710) (2.747)
0.346 0.311
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
-0.015*
(0.009)
0.296***
(0.066)
0.298
(0.254)
0.402
(0.252)
-0.013
(0.009)
0.298
(0.256
0.402
(0.255)
-0.019
(0.012)
0.586+
(0.335)
0.508
(0.334)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.346
(0.255)
0.434+
(0.254)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.119***
(0.033)
-0.027
(0.132)
0.054
(0.132)
-0.016*
(0.009)
0.195**
(0.087)
0.361
(0.253)
0.036
(0.330)
0.242**
(0.126)
0.059***
(0.017)
0.395***
(0.035)
0.245***
(0.073)
YES
YES
12.247***
0.073***
(0.022)
0.368***
(0.047)
0.357***
(0.097)
YES
YES
8.989**
0.062***
(0.017)
0.402***
(0.036)
0.249***
(0.073)
YES
YES
12.430**
(2.715)
0.291
0.061**
(0.017)
0.393***
(0.036)
0.256***
(0.073)
YES
YES
12.331
0.063***
(0.017)
0.370***
(0.040)
0.479*
(0.283)
0.260***
(0.073)
YES
YES
12.256**
*
(0.094)
0.041***
(0.009)
0.181***
(0.021)
0.343**
(0.146)
0.127***
(0.042)
YES
YES
0.856
(1.466)(2.692)
0.353
(3.013)
0.362
ions
TABLE 7 Cox hazard rate regressions
Dep. Variable = Acquisition year
(subjects start being at risk at year of
founding)
Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios
Independent variables Model 7-1 Model 7-2 Model 7-3 Model 7-4
Founder char.
Age at founding 0.989 0.955** 0.969 0.965
(0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029)
# of start-ups founded 2.224* *
(1.444)
Number of Cofounders 1.551 1.563 1.489 1.578
(0.492) (0.527) (0.470) (0.928)
Prior Experience Char.
Prior acquisitions -- 2.011*** -- --
(0.370)
Prior IPOs -- 1.777
(0.759)
# Same State -- -- 1.255** --
(0.171)
# Different State -- -- 1.333** --
(0.234)
Same 2 digit SIC -- -- -- 37.621**
(56.90)
Different 2 digit SIC -- -- -- 3.675
(3.015)
Controls
Bachelor's degree only 0.968 0.959 0.827 0.491
(0.423) (0.425) (0.374) (0.308)
Master's degree 0.720 0.702 0.673 1.508
(0.316) (0.315) (0.298) (0.667)
Operating Years 0.901*** 0.884*** 0.902*** 0.856***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029)
Initial Capital 1.151** 1.116 1.141** 1.209
(0.093) (0.091) (0.092) (0.153)
VC funded 3.116** 2.988** 3.048** 3.428**
(1.633) (1.553) (1.597) (2.637)
Industry segments YES YES YES YES
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR chi2 77.95 88.85 77.85 76.07
(df) 21 22 22 22
* **, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively;
hazard ratio and standard errors reported; 374 firms, 53 events and 6,167 obs.
TABLE 8
Poisson regression using lag to next ft
Dep. Variable
Independent variables
Founder char.
Age at founding
Age Interaction w/ exp.
Age at founding2
Number of startups founded
Prior Experience Char.
Prior acquisitions
Prior IPOs
# Same State
# Different State
Same 2-digit SIC code
Different 2-digit SIC code
Controls
Initial Capital
Bachelor's degree only
Master's degree
Industry segments
Year dummies
Constant
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R-squared
)unding
Lag from founding to founding
(N=587)
Model 8- Model 8- Model 8- Model 8-4
1 2 3
0.201***
(0.012)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.334***
(0.036)
0.484***
(0.070)
-0.012**
(0.006)
0.243***
(0.041)
0.109***
(0.041)
YES
YES
2.555***
(0.453)
0.000
0.353
0.067***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.001)
-0.084**
(0.032)
0.060**
(0.022)
0.009*
(0.006)
0.288***
(0.041)
0.137***
(0.042)
YES
YES
-0.268
(0.382)
0.000
0.464
0.082***
(0.003)
0.022***
(0.002)
0.511'**
(0.086)
0.011**
(0.006)
0.287***
(0.041)
0.121***
(0.042)
YES
YES
-0.904**
(0.397)
0.000
0.466
0.197***
(0.014)
-0.002***
(0.0001)
-1.039***
(0.159)
-0.706***
(0.108)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.349***
(0.047)
0.147**
(0.047)
YES
YES
-3.011***
(0.474)
0.000
0.502
I I
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Negative coefficients represent a shorter lag.
TABLE 9 Impact of economic environment during the first founding
Independent variables I
NYSE at first founding year
NBER Recession Index at first founding
year
VC disbursements at first founding year
Num. of prior startups founded
Same SIC
Held Patents
Age at Founding
Number of cofounders
Operating Years
Ln(initial capital)
VC funded
Mass. Located
California Located
Industry segments
Year dummies
Observations
Adj. R-squared
Dep. Var.=Ln(Revenues)
4.61E-10**
-3.384*
-0.033
0.831***
2.543***
1.352***
-0.022*
0.283***
0.067***
0.349***
0.452
-0.108
-0.042
YES
YES
629
0.392
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(0.000)
(1.883)
(0.028)
(0.306)
(0.893)
(0.349)
(0.012)
(0.095)
(0.023)
(0.051)
(0.360)
(0.271)
(0.307)
Appendix A
Comparison of Key Demographic Characteristics by Survey
Variable
Male
Engineering major
Management major
Science major
Social sciences major
Architecture major
Non-US citizen
North American (not
US) citizen
Latin American citizen
Asian citizen
European citizen
Middle Eastern citizen
African citizen
Variable
Male
Engineering major
Management major
Science major
Social sciences major
Architecture major
Non-US citizen
North American (not
US) citizen
Latin American citizen
Asian citizen
European citizen
Middle Eastern citizen
African citizen
Responded to 2001
survey
(N=43,668)
0.83
0.48
0.16
0.23
0.05
0.06
0.81
0.13
0.13
0.33
0.30
0.05
0.03
Responded to 2003
survey
(N=2,111)
0.92
0.52
0.17
0.17
0.06
0.09
0.82
0.17
0.19
0.22
0.31
0.08
0.04
Did not respond to
2001 survey
(N=62,260)
0.86
0.47
0.15
0.23
0.06
0.08
0.82
0.11
0.12
0.34
0.26
0.08
0.05
Did not respond to
2003 survey
(N=6,131)
0.92
0.47
0.21
0.18
0.05
0.09
0.81
0.14
0.19
0.24
0.32
0.07
0.04
t-stat for equal
means
10.11
-4.49
-5.75
0.37
4.07
11.82
3.77
-4.14
-1.44
1.45
-5.08
6.32
6.25
t-stat for equal
means
0.12
-3.63
4.17
1.09
1.18
1.06
-1.36
-1.34
0.13
0.73
0.38
-0.59
0.17
Note: bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Chapter Four:
Entrepreneurship and China: History of Policy Reforms and Institutional
Development
"The storm center of the world has shifted ... to China, whoever understands that mighty
Empire ... has a key to world politics for the next five hundred years."
--U.S. Secretary of State John Hay, 1899
China is like a sleeping giant. And when she awakes, she shall astonish the world.
--Napoleon Bonaparte, 1803
One of the greatest untold secrets of history is that the 'modem world' in which we live is a
unique synthesis of Chinese and Western ingredients. Possibly more than half of the basic
inventions and discoveries upon which the 'modern world' rests come from China. And yet few
people know this. Why?
--Robert Temple - The Genius of China. 3, 000 Years of Science, Discovery and Invention, 1986
Four thousand years ago, when we couldn't even read, the Chinese knew all the absolutely
useful things we boast about today.
--Voltaire: The Philosophical Dictionary, 1764
Introduction
Why is it that we see one country create numerous R&D intensive companies and start-
ups while another remains full of farmers, and a third is full of small proprietors, cottage
industries, and retail firms? Why do countries follow such divergent development paths and
how do individuals' occupational choices interact with government policies and institutional
reform? These are large questions which will likely occupy sociologists, economists, political
scientists, and politicians for decades to come. This paper has a more modest goal of tracing
the evolution of China's transition from planned to market economy by examining the
institutional and policy reforms believed to have had an impact on private business over the
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years. Rather than the traditional route of first discussing theories and then the empirical
results attempting to adjudicate among them, I first lay out the history and more recent changes
in China related to innovation and entrepreneurship in particular. Then I focus more on
theoretical frameworks which can help guide our thinking about explaining the forces in the
environment impacting Chinese private entrepreneurship over time. At this point there is
relatively little empirical work in China, but where I can locate empirical tests of the theories, I
incorporate them into this section.
Historical Policy Changes and the Impact on Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship was all but eliminated after Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist
Party won the Chinese Civil War and founded the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Whyte
and Parish, 1984). New opportunities have opened up as China has undertaken the (quickly
progressing, but as yet incomplete) shift from redistributive bureaucracy to open markets (Nee,
1996). Entrepreneurs have played a strong role, beyond what reformers may have initially
expected, in building the market economy, from breaking state monopolies to supplying new
jobs (McMillan & Woodruff, 2002). From 1989 to 2004 the compound annual growth in the
number of newly registered private sector businesses in China has been 29% vs. 1% in the
United States (State Statistics Bureau). From 1978 to 2004 the number of people employed in
private business went up by 300 times in China.
Insert Figure 1 here
Clearly, policies and institutions have been changing rapidly, but relatively little
analysis has been done on the impact on entrepreneurship and firm strategy in China to
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determine whether China is likely to upgrade to more R&D intensive entrepreneurial activity
(Cull & Xu, 2006; Nee, 1998; 1992; 1996; Peng & Heath, 1996; Steinfeld, 2007).
Two general features of China's reform have been gradual, local and sectoral
experimentation along with partial reforms or what has been referred to as a dual-track
approach (Gregory, Tenev, & Wagle, 2000). The Chinese economy was organized regionally
(as opposed to centrally like the Soviet Union) since about 1958. Due to the regional nature of
China's political system and reforms, institutional change and economic development has not
been uniform across China (Nee, 1996). Since 1980, promotions and tax revenue were tied to
local economic development ("eating from separate kitchens", orfenzao chifan), government
officials at the local level had strong incentives to bend the rules and become creative with
local policy towards private firms. Thus, a reform may be tried out in one province and years
later be copied in other provinces or adopted centrally. Certain geographic areas, such as
Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces have a long history of private enterprise and as discussed below,
certain areas were targeted for early experiments in market reforms. The details varied by
province, but one example of a revenue sharing agreement with the central government that
provided incentives for experimentation in local policy was that after Guangdong province paid
a fixed amount (perhaps 1 billion yuan) to the central government, it could keep the rest,
making local governments residual claimants on any local economic development. Contracts
of this form became widespread after 1988 and were expanded to sub-provincial governments
as well (Qian, 1999). While this set-up led to incentives for local government officials to
experiment and to bend the rules, it also fragmented the Chinese market for firms by largely
preventing trade and economic ties between regions. Local governments had apparent
incentives to keep all business and suppliers local rather than cooperating with other regions.
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The dual-track approach began in 1979 in the rural areas with two-tier pricing. It has
since been extended to other sectors through various forms as a reflection of the early belief
that private business served as a complement to state-ownership as a way to deal with
unemployment. The dual-track policies also satisfied the central government's concern that
development proceed in a way so that protests would not endanger its political survival. The
view of politicians was to develop in a way that would "leave no one worse off than before"
(Shirk 1993, pp. 130, 137, 334; Laffont and Qian 1999; Lau, Qian, and Roland 1997).
However, this approach may have also stunted the growth and development of the private
sector by continuing to protect the interests of state-owned enterprises. Thus, the transition
from a planned economy to a more open market economy has been gradual with certain
punctuated periods of significant progress.
Deng Xiaoping issued a reform report in 1975. In 1978, Deng launched the 'Four
Modernizations' reform program to deal with the economic crisis after the Cultural Revolution
by stimulating economic growth.31 Market oriented reforms in China began in earnest in
December of 1978 with the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 1 th Central
Committee (Gregory, Tenev, & Wagle, 2000). In July of 1979, commune and brigade
enterprises were allowed to enter non-agricultural industries. The State Council permitted
these activities under the "Regulation on Some Questions Concerning the Development of
Enterprises Run by People's Communes and Production Brigades," which also granted
provinces the right to give 2-3 year tax holidays for new commune and brigade enterprises. As
a result, light industry grew extremely rapidly from 1979 up through 1984 (Wong, 1988).
Private entrepreneurship began to re-emerge in China with the legitimation of township and
31 See Young (Young, 1995) for a comprehensive background on private business and economic reform
in China from 1978 to the mid-1990s.
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village enterprises (TVEs) to de-collectivize agriculture. The vast majority of TVEs were
completely private. 32 These enterprises were sometimes collectively owned by local
governments but primarily had entrepreneurial incentives for their managers who were free to
react to prices and choose product lines. Commune and brigade enterprises had long existed
prior to this time period in the rural areas and were renamed in March of 1984 as TVEs. By
1988, total rural enterprise output had increased by five times compared to 1983. By 1990,
TVEs accounted for 20 percent of China's gross output (Liao and Sohman, 2001).
From 1978 to 1988, the Chinese government began to allow the entry of foreign
invested firms along with opening to foreign trade and investment. One stream of literature has
examined the institutional drivers of FDI and some of its unintended economic consequences
within China (Huang, 2003; Huang, 2004a; Huang, 2004b; Huang, 2006). Some scholars argue
that financial integration and particularly foreign direct investment (FDI) is another mechanism
that contributes to economic growth in developing countries (Alfaro & Charlton, 2007).
Investment by "co-ethnic networks" appear to have been particularly large over the years, with
59% of the entire stock of FDI between 1978 and 1999 being supplied by three ethnically
Chinese economies - Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (Huang, Jin, Qian, 2008). Besides
providing capital, these ethnic ties can also perform institutional functions which would
otherwise be performed by a government in a more developed country, but are typically lacking
in developing economies. These institutional functions include contract enforcement and
dispute resolution (Huang, 2008; Tong, 2005).
Despite this opening of the economy to foreign trade and investment, domestic private
enterprises were still subject to ideological biases which largely limited them to rural areas only
32 Confusion has arisen since the Chinese definition of TVEs is as rural firms, whereas Western
academics assume the term refers to ownership (Huang, 2008).
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(Qian, 2000). For many years that focus on FDI led to a consequent discrimination against
domestic private firms, which increasingly were allowed to exist, but whose growth was stifled
by various practices. Initially, the private sector in China almost solely consisted of individual
businesses, employing seven people or fewer (the same as in the European Communist
countries), referred to in Chinese as getihu, which were unregulated. On April 12, 1988,
entrepreneurship became legal again in China. The First Plenary of the Seventh People's
Congress approved Article 11 of the 1988 amendment to the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China, which "permits the private sector of the economy to exist and develop
within the limits prescribed by law." Three additional regulations were issued by the State
Council providing protection for the private sector and specifying rights and obligations (Zhang
and Ming, 2000). In June of 1988, the government issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private
Enterprise (TSPE) stating that a unit with privately owned assets that hired more than eight
employees was regarded as a private enterprise (saying qiye). This document officially
permitted entrepreneurs to hire more than eight employees. The cutoff of eight employees is
said to have come from Marx who theorized that a business at that size could support an owner
who can begin to exploit labor (Whiting, 2001 Power and Wealth in Rural China). Large
private firms had existed as early as 1981, however it was impossible for the party leadership to
officially recognize them at that time (Young, 1995). After June of 1988, firms could either
register as getihu, and be given permission to employ more than eight people, or they could pay
an administration fee and obtain a collective license to a state or collective unit. The latter
category were called "red hat" firms since to avoid harassment, they put on a hat of collective
ownership, even though they were essentially privately owned (Gregory, Tenev, & Wagle,
2000). Red hat firms continue to exist to this day in China, making interpretation of
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government issued statistics difficult. Using a sample of 300 villages surveyed, it's estimated
that there were 500,000 getihu, or private firms at the end of 1988 (Zhang & Liu, 1995).
Economic reform was put on hold in 1989, however. Inflation and corruption as well as
the political uproar from the Tiananmen Square incident allowed conservatives to gain more
power and to implement from 1989-1990 an "austerity program" throughout much of the
country. Credit was sharply cut to rural enterprises and total employment in TVEs fell by 3
million between 1988 and 1990 (People's Daily, March 23, 1990). There was relicensing of
private operators and a major tax collection drive among private enterprises. There was even
discussion of recollectivizing agriculture and recentralizing financial power and investment
away from the provinces and local governments. Debate within the country grew as jealousy
and outrage emerged over the high incomes of business owners and the exploitation of workers
(Young, 1995). The new boom period of private sector development in China began after
Deng Xiaoping's "South Touring Talk" in early 1992. Motivated by the economic slowdown
(4.4% and 3.9% GDP growth in 1989 and 1990) and the gridlock within the central government,
Deng Xiaoping made stops in several special economic zones, which would be sympathetic to
his views in the Southern part of the country, to give speeches about further economic reforms.
It worked and economic reforms were re-started beginning with the removal of price caps on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May of 1992. Interviews suggested that many were inspired
after these talks that as Deng reportedly said, "it is glorious to be rich" and decided to try to get
rich quick through entrepreneurship. Other sources deny that the "glorious to be rich" part of
the speech was ever actually made. Up to this time, economic activity between businesses and
with the government was done primarily by "particularistic contracting" on a one-off fashion.
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The government had largely failed to establish a rule-based market system, and up to now had
not addressed ownership and property rights issues (Qian, 1999).
After Deng Xiaoping's speeches, the Fourteenth Party Congress in September of 1992
indicated that the goal of economic reforms in China was a socialist market economy. While to
Westerners, this may sound insignificant, for China it was a bold statement about the
relationship between the state and private sectors. Next, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth
Central Committee issued the "Decision of Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist
Market Economic Structure" in November of 1993. The decision moved the country towards a
reduction in ownership discrimination between state and privately owned businesses. It also
showed the intention to turn large state enterprises into more independently run companies and
to sell off the smaller ones, known as grasping the large and releasing the small (zhuada
fangxiao) (Young, 1995). Finally, this decision emphasized the importance of coordination
among reforms to create more of a rule-based system and less particularistic contracting (Qian,
1999). Following this important decision, a series of reforms were passed covering foreign
exchange, taxes, the monetary system, the financial system more broadly, and a streamlining of
government bureaucracy (Qian, 1999).
While the intention was announced much earlier, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises began on a large scale in 1995.33 By the end of 1996, 11.5 million workers were
laid off and 50-70 percent of SOEs had been privatized (Qian, 1999). In September of 1997,
the Fifteenth Party Congress made a large rhetoric shift in referring to private ownership as an
important component of the economy and state ownership as a pillar of the economy. They
also indicated that public ownership could be realized through joint stock corporations with
33 Transformation of ownership (zhuanzhi) or "restructuring of ownership" (suoyouzhi gaizao) are used in
China in place of the term "privatization" (Qian, 1999)
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many owners investing. Through a twist of careful wording, they were essentially condoning
the private ownership of corporations.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), like the U.S. National Academy of Science,
is the country's most prestigious research institution. The objective of the Knowledge
Innovation Program (KIP) program was to re-create the CAS by redirecting resources towards
creating 30 internationally recognized research institutes by 2010. The long term goal was to
have five of those research institutes become recognized as world leaders. The Knowledge
Innovation Program was passed in 1998 and in order to re-direct resources to create a handful
of world-class institutes, between 1998 and 2005 the number of Chinese Academy of Sciences
research institutes was scaled back from 120 to 89 (Ma, Dali 2006). While the research
institutes were being reformed, changes were also occurring to build venture capital as a
financial intermediary. Much of this occurred due to the influential role of Deng Nan, the
daughter of Deng Xiaoping, who was the number two official in the CAS. Her visits to the U.S.
and to MIT in particular, exposed her to high levels of institutionally encouraged technological
entrepreneurship, which she hoped to emulate in China (Roberts, 2009).
The development of venture capital in China is discussed in further detail in the section
on reforms in the financial system. Without repeating that section, it is worth noting that also
in 1998 reforms were passed promoting venture capital and private equity investment. The
State Council approved a government document, Several Opinions on Establishing a Venture
Investment Mechanism, released November 16, 1999 jointly by the Ministry of Science and
Technology and the State Development and Planning Commission. The document offers
guidelines for venture capital regulation in China and states that: "A healthy venture capital
investment system is important to propel the establishment of a country's technology
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innovation system, promote national economy and comprehensive national capacity, and
realize leapfrog development for China."
Since 1998, the Chinese government has invested more than $16 billion of its funds in
state-owned venture capital funds. The local governments in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, have
passed regulations granting favorable conditions for venture capital. The Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation has also eased the entry of international venture capital
firms.3 4
Building on the statements issued in 1997 redefining the relationship between the state
sector and the private sector, on March 15, 1999, the Second Plenary of the Ninth People's
Congress approved an amendment to the Constitution. The Amendment put the private sector
on the same legal footing as the public sector for the first time. It was reported that
immediately after the amendment, local governments started to relax restrictions on private
enterprises (People's Daily, April 9, 1999). The Innovation Fund for Technology Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was passed in 1999 to provide a new mechanism of funding to
encourage the development of technology-based entrepreneurship. A significant landmark
occurred when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. It is not clear,
however, the impact that this particular event may have had for entrepreneurship in the country.
Most likely, the most direct effect may have been a signal of improved intellectual property
protection in the coming years. The broader economic impacts were more diverse since many
reforms led up to the admission into the WTO and many reforms followed that on the whole
34 In February of 1996, Sohu.com launched the first internet search company in China. It is also reported
to have been the first internet company funded by venture capital
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Zhang accessed 4/17/2009). The rise of Sohu and its listing on the
NASDAQ along with the U.S. dotcom boom was noted in several of my interviews with entrepreneurs as
a source of inspiration for their own ventures.
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appear to have boosted trade and economic growth. This increased economic activity would
indirectly aid entrepreneurs.
The pre-1999 time period can be characterized by an institutional environment that
begins to support entrepreneurship via legitimization, less stringent discrimination against
private ownership, economic zones with lower tax rates and foreign investment reform 35 and
privatization of SOEs. One exception to the claim that the earlier period focused on providing
legitimation is that it was only in 2002 that the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of
China allowed private entrepreneurs to join the Communist party.
During the more recent (post-2000) period, the institutional environment can be
characterized as one that more directly supports the growth of start-ups, particularly those that
have the potential to be high growth and are technology-based. The changes in the institutional
environment in this period are distinguished by the proliferation of science parks and
technology business incubators as well as associated tax incentives for R&D and licensing
activities. Overall, there is an emphasis on reforms in the tertiary education system with the
stated long-range goal of an economy driven by advances in science and technology.
For example, in 2006, the government adopted the Medium and Long Term Science and
Technology Strategic Plan to plot the course of science and technology policy in the coming
years (OECD Review, 2007). Overall, there is a dearth of scholarly work (in the English
language journals) on the more recent reforms related to entrepreneurship in China since 2001.
In many ways this is a shame since many diverse programs and changes appear to be occurring.
For a review of 68 English language articles published on entrepreneurship in China, see work
by Yang and Li (2008). Rather than continuing with the details of the most recent reforms, I
35 Foreign investment would have gone mainly to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than to start-ups.
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next turn to several more specific, but important topics: regional differences, science policy,
higher education and the financial system, before discussing relevant theoretical lenses.
Regional Differences: Coast/Inland, Special Economic Zones and Science Parks
Scholars have produced a large literature on the economic geography of China,
particularly the coast-inland regional disparities. Much of this work portrays China as being a
highly fragmented regional market (Young, 2000). More recently, Naughton (2003) has used
interprovincial commodity trade data to show that the regions are more economically integrated
than expected and rapidly growing more so. It is true that Guangdong and Fujian have enjoyed
special treatment due to their geographical location dating back to 1979 when they were
permitted to open up and reform ahead of other regions within China. The central government
established Xiamen in Fujian Province, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong
Province (near Hong Kong) as special economic zones in 1980 (Qian, 2000). Essentially, these
zones were allowed to become market economies while the rest of China maintained central
planning. The special economic zones had a special policy (teshu zhengce) and institutional
environment more conducive to free markets, such as the authority to approve foreign
investment projects up to $30 million, lower tax rates, and the encouragement of private
entrepreneurship. In 1992, special privileges were extended to most cities along the Yangtze
River. Even inland cities that did not have special economic zones created "development
zones" and granted them tax benefits (sometimes without central government approval).
In his book on IT enterprises in China, Segal (2002) studies the four cities: Beijing,
Shanghai, Xi'an, and Guangzhou. He notes that differences in the relationship between the
local governments and the private or hybrid quasi-private enterprises were the drivers of
growth in the IT sectors. In the cities where state-owned and foreign companies successfully
won the attention of the local government, the private firms and thus the overall IT industry in
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those cities suffered. On the other hand, when local policies were favorable for indigenous
private firms, conditional on past institutional arrangements (to be discussed further below)
they tended to prosper.
To encourage the entry of high-tech firms and spur innovation, local and national
governments in China have developed an extensive number of science and industrial parks.
China currently has six thousand industrial parks and 58 national-level science parks (Cai,
Todo, and Li-An Zhou, 2007). Established in the geographic area of Zhongguancun in the
northwestern section of the Haidan District in Beijing, the Zhongguancun Science Park (the Z-
Park) was the first of many science parks now set up throughout China. The Z-Park was
established in 1988 and is today the largest national science park in China. It is affectionately
known as China's "Silicon Valley," and in 2003 contained over 12,000 firms, and a total
employment of 480,000. Many high-tech multinational enterprises (MNEs) such as Google,
Panasonic, Motorola, IBM, Microsoft and Nokia have offices in the Z-Park and MNEs
accounted for 12 percent of the firms in the park in 2003 (Cai, Todo, and Li-An Zhou, 2007).
The majority of construction was finished on the Tsinghua Science Park (affiliated with
Tsinghua University) by 1999 and it was one of the first national university science parks in
China.
As an example of the type of benefits and incentives to locating in these science parks,
the government offers Z-Park firms several advantages. One is that corporate income is taxed
at 15 percent instead of the normal rate of 33 percent (but now only for a limited time period).
For the first three years new entrants are exempt from corporate income tax altogether. In
addition, traditionally in China a system of household registration (hu kou) has been enforced
for regulating the mobility of people across locations. School and housing subsidies are not
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available for a person who does not have hu kou in a locality. However, to attract talent from
other parts of China and back from overseas, the government allows employees in the Z-Park to
obtain Beijing residence. Even more preferential policies were granted in 1999 by the
government. These included reduction of sales taxes on technology transfer, R&D
expenditures, services, and consulting activities.
One should not get the idea that all of the regional policies in China have been
conducive to entrepreneurship of course. A strong industrial policy adopted in Shanghai in the
mid-I 980s appears to have largely suppressed the long history of entrepreneurship in that
coastal city and economic hub (Huang, 2008). Shanghai illustrates the complexity of
entrepreneurship as it had many aspects going for it, including a highly developed legal system
(Guthrie, 1999). However, under mayors Jiang Zemin (who became Premier of China) and
Zhu Rongji, (who was Minister of Industry) from 1985 to 1991, the city embraced a
development plan starting in 1987 which put restrictions on private businesses and directed
investment towards foreign-invested and state-owned firms. The result of this policy is one of
the lowest rates of entrepreneurship and smallest levels of household business income across
China (Huang, 2008 Working paper).
History of China's Science Policy
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China adopted a Soviet style public research
institute-centered innovation system where firms concentrate on production and public research
institutes (PRI) focus on science and technological innovation with transfers between the two
coordinated by government bureaucrats at various levels (Law, 1995; Xin & Normile, 2008).
The Chinese Academies of Science, local governments, and various industrial ministries
oversaw research in China via the state research institutes (Liu & White, 2001). In general
terms the OECD has claimed that roughly four eras of Science and Technology policy reform
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have elapsed since the "open door policy" began in 1978. Overall, China's science and
technology reforms can be viewed as moving away from a PRI-centered system to more of a
firm-centered innovation system (OECD Review, 2007). Scientific research was dramatically
affected by the Cultural Revolution, however, and order was not restored until 1978 when the
national science congress in Beijing announced a development guideline for science and
technology (Hong, 2008). In 1984, the Chinese patent law was enacted and the Chinese
Intellectual Property Press began keeping a dataset of patent information since 1985. 1985 was
a key year for Chinese science and technology reform. The Central Committee of the
Communist Party passed a resolution on structural reform of the science and technology system
and indicated the move away from the former Soviet system (Motohashi & Yun, 2007). After
this reform, in the mid-1980s in order to push research units and universities toward serving the
market and economic results, government research funding was significantly cut. Cutting the
budget continued from 1986 to 1993, when there was an annual decrease of 5% per year in
government research funding (Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai, 2003), p. 24). As a result of this decline
in funding, some universities started their own enterprises as a source of funding. In 1991, the
central government made this practice official, even though university-owned start-ups
generated 1.8 billion RMB in sales that year. That number increased to 37.0 billion RMB by
1999 (Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai, 2003).
Other significant reforms in the mid-1980s were the passing of the National Key
Technology R&D program in 1984, and the creation of the National Natural Science
Foundation in 1986. In 1986, a group of scientists convinced the state that China was missing
out on scientific and technological commercialization opportunities and the central government
passed the 863 Program to encourage entrepreneurship through technology development zones
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(Zhang, Li, & Schoonhoven, 2008). During the 1990s the special privileges associated with
these zones spread to most cities along the Yangtze River and beyond to the coastal provinces.
Essentially, these zones were allowed to become market economies while the rest of China
maintained central planning. The special economic zones had an environment more conducive
to free markets, such as the authority to approve foreign investment projects up to $30 million,
lower tax rates, and the encouragement of private entrepreneurship.
Higher Education
China differs from other low wage countries in focusing on tertiary educational
development rather than primary or secondary education as a development strategy. Initially,
Chinese universities were set up Soviet-style, such that different universities specialized in
different areas (e.g. life sciences, engineering), rather than the system we are accustomed to in
the West where each university has almost every academic department (Law, 1995; Xin &
Normile, 2008). In the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution shut down higher education altogether
and universities only opened again in the late 1970s. In June of 1981, to develop and increase
enrollment of science and engineering students at 26 leading universities, the World Bank
approved a $100 million loan to China and the University Development Project (part of the
International Development Association) made another $100 million credit available (NY Times,
June 25, 1981).
While the details of history are often more complicated than the narratives which get
retold, it may be helpful in this case to paint a finer-grained picture of what China's universities
and science policy environment were like leading up to 1999 and in the period since then. The
1990-1999 period can be characterized by an institutional environment that supports
entrepreneurship via lowering barriers to entry including legitimization, economic zones with
lower tax rates and reform and privatization of SOEs.
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Over the past ten years, the major trends in higher education in China have been
merging universities and expansion of enrollment, decentralization, diversification and moves
to establish world class universities, privatization, and internationalization. University
enrollment (broadly defined by the Ministry of Education Statistics) has ballooned from under
three million in 1995 to over 18 million students enrolled in 2007 (Figure 2). According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, restricting the definition to four year colleges and
universities, the total number of graduates has gone from 830,000 in 1998 to just over three
million in 2005. Since 1999, the number of undergraduate and graduate students has grown at
nearly 30% per year. However, evidence indicates that quantity has been expanded at the
expense of the quality of the graduates (Gereffi, Wadhwa, Rissing, & Ong, 2008).
Insert Figure 2 here
Ministry of Education of China; National Bureau of Statistics
The Chinese government appears to be using education policies as a mechanism to
maintain high economic growth via skill upgrading (Li, Whalley, Zhang, & Zhao, March 2008).
A national forum decision to encourage the consolidation of institutions and decentralization in
December of 1994 caused another wave of change in the universities. The percentage of
national universities went from 51% to 9% between 1995 and 2002 as decentralization moved
centrally controlled universities to the jurisdiction of local governments (Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai,
2003). Consolidation was particularly rapid between 1999 and 2006 when 60% of the 431
consolidations between 1990 and May of 2006 occurred (Li, Whalley, Zhang, & Zhao, March
2008). For example, in major cities, four or five smaller universities could move to improve
their ranking by consolidating into a single university. Beijing Medical University was
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incorporated into Peking University in 2000 and the Central Arts and Design College was
incorporated into Tsinghua University. The State Education Commission (SEdC) launched the
"Reform Plan of Teaching Contents and Curriculum of Higher Education Facing the 21st
Century" in 1994, establishing 211 large projects and nearly a thousand sub-projects to improve
teaching and curriculum in higher education institutions. In 1995, Phase I of "Project 211"
was initiated and since then $2.3 billion has been spent on Project 211 mainly for infrastructure
and curriculum development with the goal of identifying 100 top educational institutions in
China for improvement. The plan covers infrastructure and teaching ideology, content,
curriculum structure and methodology. In 2000, Phase II of Project 211 was launched, and
Phase III is planned for 2008.
Another active year for new science and technology programs was 1998. This was the
year when the ministry of education devised Project 985. The plan was originally targeted at
Peking (Beida) University and Tsinghua University in order to strengthen existing research and
to catalyze new areas for research. Phase I of Project 985 began in 1999 (with funding grants
to Peking, Tsinghua, Fudan, Zhejiang, and Nanjing Universities) and was expanded to over 30
universities. Tsinghua University and Beida University each received $225 million and Beida
used these funds to establish its Institute of Molecular Medicine (Xin & Normile, 2008). Phase
II of the project was approved to run from 2004-2007 and Phase III begins in 2008. As
mentioned earlier, the Knowledge Innovation Program was passed in 1998. In the following
years, this reform resulted in over 14,000 new academic appointments as the Chinese Academy
of Sciences was reformed and established as the backbone of the innovation system with the
goal of 30 internationally recognized institutes. Also in 1998, the 100 Talents Program was
also established to provide incentives for young, talented scientists who were educated abroad
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to return to China and also for those in China to remain with the CAS. The last major change
was in August of 1999 when a National Innovation Congress, organized by the central
government, announced an act promoting high-tech industries and promoting the
commercialization of innovation. Local governments also incorporated the promotion of
technology commercialization in their local science policies after this act was passed as well
(Liu & White, 2001).
During this time period, from 1985 to 2004, analysis of Chinese patent data and co-
patenting trends between universities and firms shows evidence of decentralizing of knowledge
flows and some localizing trends in the sense of local firms and universities patenting more
with each other than only with universities in Bejing (Hong, 2008). Hong (2008) interprets this
finding as resulting from decreased central planning and coordination across regions by the
central ministries as greater levels of control were released from central ministries to local
governments and their universities. Li and coauthors claim that pre-1999 there was a focus on
increasing the quantity of enrolled students, whereas post-1999 there has been an increased
emphasis on quality of research and teaching (Li, Whalley, Zhang, & Zhao, March 2008).
Since 1999, there have been changes not only in the enrollment and funding levels for
universities but also in the academic contracts. New academic contracts tend to use annual
publication quotas and not to offer tenure (Li, Whalley, Zhang, & Zhao, March 2008). Often
faculty members are required to publish three articles in international journals each year and
their employment can be terminated if this goal is not met. Citations to articles as well as
international rankings and cooperative projects are also tracked and these are sometimes tied to
funding at the university or department level.
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Government funding for higher education is program based and heavily skewed towards
the top ten universities. Since 2001, tuition and fee payments (not government funding) have
provided over 50% of total education expenditures. 36 In absolute levels, the amount of funding
for education has increased significantly over the past 10 years (from RMB 226 billion in 1996
to RMB 981 billion in 2006). The top 11 universities that were funded in the first phase of
Project 985 received over 17 billion RMB in government funding in 2004 (Li, Whalley, Zhang,
& Zhao, March 2008). However, when scaled as a percentage of GDP, it has remained
constant at just under 3% and when normalized for the large increases in enrollment, it has
actually declined to $672 per student in 2005 (from $847 per student in 1998) (Xin & Normile,
2008). The result is that universities have been forced to borrow large amounts of money from
the banks. A report in 2007 indicated that 72 top national universities have $4.5 billion in
outstanding loans. Exacerbating the situation, many local governments have reportedly failed
to match central-government funding as they are required to do. Another source of funding for
higher education in China has been commercial activities organized by the universities
themselves. While the total number of these university-owned firms has decreased, their
profits have increased and the amount of funding flowing back to the universities has increased
slightly from 1.5 billion RMB in 1998 to 1.75 billion RMB in 2004 (Li, Whalley, Zhang, &
Zhao, March 2008). In an effort to remedy what is seen as a short-term problem of funding
shortfalls, the ministry of education has limited growth in admissions to 5% each year. In order
to address the problem, the government has returned to the prior approach of sending graduate
students overseas. The China Scholarship Council was established in 2007 and funded with
$1.3 billion to pay for 5,000 scholarships to Western universities a year for Chinese students,
with the requirement that they return to teach in China.
36 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005)
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In 2006, the 11th 5-year plan set goals to improve the quality assurance system, improve
the national college entrance exam and recruitment, stabilize admissions and make the funding
system sustainable, as well as to strengthen Projects 211 and 985 (Whalley & Zhou, 2007). On
Sept. 11, 2006, China adopted Project 111, which aims to recruit 1,000 prominent academics
from overseas to help create 100 "subject innovation centers" in China.37 As further targeting
of the development of a select group of world-class universities, only those universities which
were included in Project 985 and 211 may participate.
In general, much has been made of the amount of money being spent and the goals to
create world-class universities in China. Since 2000 there has been a strong increase in
academic hiring efforts, wages and an overall upgrading of equipment and facilities in the top
Chinese universities. However, pinning down exact numbers and digging deeper, one can see
that there are still large financial hurdles to be overcome.
Intellectual Property
It has been estimated that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States lost $2
billion of revenues due to intellectual property violations in China.38 In 2006 alone copyright
piracy in China resulted in $2.2 billion of US trade losses (International Intellectual Property
Alliance, 2007, p96). Thus, intellectual property protection disputes and negotiations between
the U.S. and China have been contentious and spirited (Yu, 2006).
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese patent law was enacted in 1984 and the Chinese
Intellectual Property Press began keeping a dataset of patents since 1985. Figure 3 shows the
growth in domestic patent grants up to 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics, China). In 1993,
37 http://english.hanban.edu.cn/english/China/181075.htm
38 Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998
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China passed a patent law bringing it into compliance with the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), however, enforcement has been up to local
officials and has been a different matter. By the late 1990s, the Chinese central government had
realized the positive effects of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery, Nelson, & Sampat, 2001),
and was under pressure to improve intellectual property rights in order to join the World Trade
Organization (WTO). The Ministry of Education announced in April of 1999 a Chinese
version of the Bayh-Dole Act, allowing universities to own patents on inventions resulting from
government funding (Ministry of Education, 1999; Hong, 2008). Nonetheless, intellectual
property rights enforcement has been singled out by the American Chamber of Commerce in
China as an exception to the otherwise strong implementation of World Trade Organization
(WTO) obligations in China (Branstetter & Lardy, 2006).
Figure 3 here
Effects of Multinationals
One concern about the large amount of FDI in China is that multinationals and foreign-
invested firms might be crowding out domestic entrepreneurial firms (Backer & Sleuwaegen,
2003; Huang, 2003). Cai, Todo, and Li-An Zhou (2007) suggest that the R&D done by
multinational firms in China has stimulated the entry of domestic firms. The authors interpret
their findings to show that potential indigenous entrepreneurs benefit from the diffusion of
multinationals' advanced knowledge and technology by providing evidence that domestic firms
do more R&D as a result of knowledge spillovers. Increases in domestic entrepreneurship in
their dataset do not appear to be tied to multinationals' production activities or domestic firms'
R&D activities. The authors are careful to correct for endogeneity concerns through use of
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. However, their estimation relies
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on the assumption that the lagged regressors can be used as instruments since they are
predetermined and should not be correlated with the contemporaneous error term. This
assumption is tenuous if there is autocorrelation between the lagged and contemporaneous
regressors. While the data have the advantage of the detailed records of the Zhongguancun
Science Park (the Z-Park), this is the largest and oldest science park and may not be
representative. Nonetheless, the results do concur with prior studies (Backer & Sleuwaegen,
2003; Gorg & Strobl, 2002). In particular, the results also are supported by the case studies of
Taiwan, Israel, and Ireland reported in Breznitz (2007) that countries can effectively pressure
MNCs to locate R&D activities within the country.
China's Technical and Entrepreneurial Labor Market
Despite the fact that the U.S. share of the world's science and engineering graduates is
rapidly declining (the U.S. share is expected to drop to 15% of the world share by 2010) and
the greatest growth is in China, the vast majority of the related literature on entrepreneurship
and innovation focuses on the U.S. and Europe (Freeman, 2005). 39 Further, it is clear from
work in institutional economics and cross-cultural psychology that the levels and modes of
entrepreneurial activity should be affected by the surrounding institutions, norms, and legal
systems (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Licht & Siegel, 2006). High-tech
entrepreneurship and innovation in transitional and developing countries are rarely part of the
scholarly dialogue of the field (Lu 1997, Lu, 2000 are notable exceptions). Puga and Trefler
(2005) in the course of their discussion on the rise of incremental innovation in low-wage
countries point out that much of our current thinking is influenced by Vernon's (1966) product-
cycle model where products are developed in rich countries and moved off-shore to low-wage
39 In 1966, 71% of science and engineering PhD graduates were U.S.-born males, 6% were U.S.-born
females, and 23% were foreign born (Freeman & Shen, 2004).
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countries. However, massive changes are under-way in international trade and development.
China went from almost no science and engineering doctorates in 1975 to over 9,000 science
and engineering PhDs in 2003 (Freeman, 2005). However, once the quality of the engineering
graduates is taken into account, these numbers may be much lower or less comparable to U.S.
numbers (Gereffi, Wadhwa, Rissing, & Ong, 2008). Nonetheless, at that rate of growth, by
2010 China will produce more technically-trained doctorates than the U.S. So while the current
state of scientific research in emerging disciplines such as stem-cell research may be marginal,
China is an up-and-coming player with a burgeoning pool of talent even in areas that are
cutting-edge in the U.S. (Murray & Spar, 2006). Nonetheless, in the short term, the massive
expansion of university graduates, especially since 1999 has led to a sharp increase in
individuals with high educational levels relative to the number of job positions (Li, Whalley,
Zhang, & Zhao, March 2008). This has created problems in absorption and unemployment
which some speculate has led to the efforts to expand graduate education enrollment to prevent
protests over high unemployment levels.
In the 1980s many SOEs fired or let go significant numbers of employees to privatize or
create new firms since they could no longer financially support them (Steinfeld, 1998; Young,
1995). Many of these employees were in sales and marketing functions. In addition, reforms
in the 1980s aimed to develop mechanisms to link managerial careers in SOEs to firm
performance and to enhance the authority of SOE managers (Groves, Hong, McMillan, &
Naughton, 1995; Naughton, 1995). These reforms created a managerial labor market where
managers in poorly performing firms were more likely to be replaced and auctions were used to
find new managers whose pay was linked to sales and profits (Groves, Hong, McMillan, &
Naughton, 1995). A bankruptcy law for SOEs was passed in 1986 to provide, for the first time,
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a path for SOEs to declare bankruptcy and a path through which they could go out of business
rather than being continually supported by the state.
Such changes are happening rapidly especially in China's policies regarding property
rights and institutions with important and as yet rarely documented implications for firm
strategies, innovation and entrepreneurship (Cull & Xu, 2006; Nee, 1998; Nee, 1992; Nee,
1996; Peng & Heath, 1996; Steinfeld, 2007). Interestingly, China's new private entrepreneurs
appear to have different values (Holt, 1997) and some influence on the political process and
debate within the country (Roberts, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1997). Greater property
rights protection and greater fairness (less corruption) in 33 emerging markets in Europe has
been found to increase new firm founding and firm growth rates (Desai, Gompers, & Lerner,
2003). However, their analysis shows that the institutional effects appear to be of second order
in more developed economies. In post-Soviet and formerly-Communist countries, insecure
property rights have been argued to be more inhibiting to entrepreneurship than capital
constraints (Frye & Shleifer, 1997; Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 1999; Johnson, McMillan,
& Woodruff, 2000; Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002; Shleifer, 1997). Chinese
entrepreneurs have been shown to use specific strategies such as political participation and
philanthropy to overcome limited property rights protection and constrained access to bank
loans (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006). Obukhova (2007) finds that depending on their training and
overseas work and educational experiences, Chinese entrepreneurs engaged in two different
entrepreneurial strategies which she terms technological entrepreneurship and network
entrepreneurship. These strategies for firm formation which hinge on whether innovation or
the individual's business network is driving performance, she argues, resulted in important
implications for the performance of these firms over time.
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As in the U.S., there are various routes to entrepreneurship in China and these have
likely changed over the years as changing institutions signal the appropriate ways of getting
ahead (Baumol, 1990). Particularly in more recent years there has been a government path to
entrepreneurship where higher ranking government officials have opted to either formally or
informally leave their posts and found private firms or reconstitute cooperative companies as
limited liability corporations (Wank, 1999). The connections built up through prior
government service provide these entrepreneurs with advantageous access to both information
and resources. Also, within China where education is highly valued, academic jobs have been
prestigious positions and we should expect that those who have worked in academia may have
access to opportunities that are less available to others. Our interviews indicated that
traditionally, as with the graduates of the French Ecole Polytechnique, the most talented
Tsinghua University alumni often took prestigious positions within the Chinese central
government. Some Chinese took opportunities to study overseas and gain stable work with
large and multinational corporations. Until the most recent generation, these large firm and
government opportunities were seen as the reward for persevering through years of competitive
schooling to attend a prestigious university.
However, as noted above, innovation and high-tech entrepreneurship are rarely part of
the discourse in relationship to China (for exceptions, see Tan, 1996; Tan, 2001; Tan, 2007).
Widespread entrepreneurial activity began with the economic reforms that started in the late
1970s and high-tech entrepreneurship blossomed in the mid-1980s in the IT field. To the
extent that resources and institutional infrastructure for entrepreneurship has been lacking in
China, work experience and the accumulation of social and financial resources may be
relatively more important for entrepreneurs. Our interviews suggest that investors in China see
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fewer experienced entrepreneurs and must rely more on pre-founding work experience outside
of an entrepreneurial context to judge the quality of entrepreneurs.
Financial System
Many authors argue that the state-dominated financial system in China retards efficient
allocation of capital (Boyreau-Debray & Wei, 2005; Chow & Fund, 2000; Steinfeld, 1998).
Bank loans are most often reserved only for state-owned enterprises and so private
entrepreneurs are often denied loans (McMillan, 1997; Nee, 1992). For decades, the central
government controlled all capital allocation by keeping all banks as state-owned and then
directing bank loans towards state-owned enterprises, which were then taxed and received
loans again in a closed-loop system, distorting incentives for all involved. Private capital may
be acting to undo some of the inefficiency; however to know the true extent of the inefficiency
result from state intervention in the financial system would require systematic data on private
capital (business angels, or venture capital) invested. In March 1998, the PRC implemented a
number of policies to promote venture investments (Batjargal & Liu, 2004). The initial venture
capital funds within China were backed by the government, however, and had both policy as
well as financial objectives. These initial government-venture capitalists often lacked the
business experience necessary to pick good investments and these funds are widely seen as
having had very poor performance. A handful of non-government backed private equity firms
began entering the China market in the 1980s. It was not until after 1992 that economic
reforms began to encourage significant numbers of private equity firms to enter the market
(Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). Total venture capital investments in China grew from virtually
nothing in 1990 to $858 million in 2000. In the early 1990s, 90% of VC-backed firms were
SOEs. In contrast, fewer than 10% of the VC-backed firms were SOEs in the late 1990s (Zeng,
2004). By 2001 there were 180 venture capital firms in China, many of them with overseas ties,
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some of these as joint ventures with Chinese government organizations, and $1.87 billion under
management (Batjargal & Liu, 2004). In 2007, $2.49 billion was invested in 241 deals,
according to the China Quarterly Venture Capital Report released by Dow Jones
VentureSource) China's business/consumer/retail industry saw a record $1.25 billion invested
in 94 deals in 2007, up 83% over the $682 million invested in 2006. The most popular segment
within this industry was consumer/business services, which accounted for 48 deals and $761
million in 2007-61% of the industry's investment total. Elsewhere, 110 information
technology (IT) companies in China received $992 million in venture funding in 2007.
Healthcare had 21 deals and $175 million invested. Six deals were completed in clean energy
and some $31 million invested in 2007, a big drop-off from the $421 million invested in 14
deals in 2006.
Theoretical Frameworks
Having finished a high-level overview of the historical perspective on the re-birth of
widespread entrepreneurial activity in China, it is worthwhile to pause for a moment's
reflection before diving into the various theoretical frameworks which may guide more
analytical and generalized thinking about entrepreneurial development and market reform. It
would be a mistake to simplify the past three decades as a story of the rise of private
entrepreneurship and venture capital only. Indeed, the state-owned sector grew as well and
may have even supported reform efforts (Naughton, 1994b). A complex array of policy reform,
macroeconomic conditions, institutional entrepreneurship and individual behavior intertwined
to produce the outcomes. Yet the international literature has characterized the process as 1)
economic reform without political reform, 2) incremental, 3) beginning with agriculture, and 4)
as regionally differentiated (Naughton, 1994b).
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Most scholarly studies of the transition from command economy to markets and
entrepreneurship have debated mainly issues of the optimal pace of reform or financial
liberalization, institution building, and property rights arrangements. The authors have drawn
largely on various sociological and economic theories, but made the assumption that transition
from the starting point of a socialist, planned economy to a capitalist system is a unique and
singular phenomenon (Steinfeld, 2002). However, a different viewpoint and set of theoretical
lenses becomes available when one views the economic problems of countries like Korea or
China as similar to the typical economic challenges of capitalist economies (e.g., corporate
governance, soft-budget constraints, information asymmetries), rather than as totally different
phenomena. So, expanding beyond the particulars of China's market reforms, what are the
theoretical frameworks which should guide deeper exploration of the emergence of
entrepreneurship? In my view, we are not trying to perfect our knowledge of "how to transition
from socialism to capitalism" as (unless some alien socialist planet is discovered, which seems
unlikely) there are no large centrally planned economies left to transition (Steinfeld, 2002).
Instead, I believe the goal is, or should be, to use the special conditions of economic transition
as a laboratory for testing theories and learning things about the economic and sociological
underpinnings of management, entrepreneurship, and strategy for which these settings provide
a unique perspective not available to scholars examining developed economies or while
keeping the set of institutions and corporate governance structures relatively constant. Some
scholars argue that Western conceptions can only take us so far in analyzing the emerging
economic order in non-Western countries (Boisot & Child, 1996). The next generation of
organizational scholars should step up to this challenge of testing theories and addressing
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global differences, not only in marketing, strategy, or manufacturing, but also in
entrepreneurship.
Four Levels of Social Analysis
When naively thinking about the various factors that may lead to international
differences in the entrepreneurial process and outcomes or performance of start-up foundings, a
host of variables come to mind (Begley & Tan, 2001). One could think about the culture,
religion, risk tendencies, or about the governance and property rights institutions, policies, or
even about the material costs and labor market conditions. Without a general conceptual
framework, it is easy to get mired and confused in the myriad possible drivers and mediating
factors. Williamson (2000) attempts to provide a conceptual framework of four levels of social
analysis to begin to classify the various perspectives on why different countries wind up with
different economic outcomes and industrial structures. Of course this is only one view, but it
provides a nice starting point for taking a broad perspective.
Williamson refers to the first level as the social embeddedness level. It is at this level
that culture and religion have their impact and this is the field in which a few economic
historians, many anthropologists and some sociologists work. Factors at this level can be
thought of as relatively stable and slow to change.
Second is the institutional environment. These are the "rules of the game" such as
constitutions, how the judiciary process works, the organization of the political system.
Political scientists and institutional economists or sociologists work on analyses of this level of
society. The third level is that of governance. The governance level is concerned with
contracts (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart &
Moore, 1988; Hart & Tirole, 1988; Williamson, 2002 Holmstrom, Hart, Moore), information
economics (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005), transaction cost economics (Holmstrom & Roberts,
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1998; Teece, 2000; Williamson, 1981), and the theory of the firm (Coase, 1937). In recent
years and looking forward, this is a high growth area in terms of economics research.
Sociologists and management theorists have also provided alternative frameworks at this level.
Linking this area with the institutional environment, Lerner and Schoar forthcoming) analyze
210 developing country private equity investments and find that transactions vary with the legal
enforcement in the country. They find that private equity groups in low enforcement nations
rely more heavily on ownership rather than contractual provisions resulting in lower valuations
and returns.
Finally the fourth level is referred to as the resource allocation level. This is the
domain of neoclassical economists who concern themselves with incentive alignment
(Grossman & Hart, 1983), production functions, quantities, and prices. Having set the stage
with an image of these four levels of analysis of a society, Williamson goes on to argue that
clearly these four levels interact with one another, but primarily in the order in which they have
been laid out. The culture and religion in a country largely constrain the choices as to the form
of the constitution and the institutions that are set up to guide behavior. Similarly, the
institutional environment serves to enable in some directions and constrain in others the
governance structures and types of contracts that can be written or enforced in the economy. In
the same way, the governance level and the choices available there will constrain actors as they
solve the pricing, quantity and incentive alignment problems at the level of resource allocation
within and between firms as well as individuals.
The remainder of the paper will have more to say about the institutional level in
particular as well as the governance level since justifiably, these are a major focus of recent
work in understanding the international differences in economic growth and in
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entrepreneurship. Yet, first I should note that one can easily quibble with this framework,
particularly concerning directions of causality and co-evolution or feedback between different
levels. Along these lines, it could be that it is economic development which provides the
wealth necessary to build better institutions. The framework also lacks emphasis on
psychological and some sociological factors. Nonetheless, it provides a good overview of
relevant factors, and it is difficult to come up with a comprehensive alternative framework.
Some scholars have argued that certain components in the above framework are not
appropriate for the conditions of developing economies. Theoretical work shows that
occupational structure can be shown to depend on the wealth distribution. Only with a certain
level of inequality in wealth does one start to see employment contracts used by employers
(Banerjee & Newman, 1993).
In a reaction against the transaction cost economics framework of corporate governance
mechanisms, Boisot and Child (Boisot & Child, 1988) propose an information based theory. In
their theory, the twin factors of information codification and information diffusion determine
the organizational structures that will dominate in a society. According to their argument, only
in societies with high information diffusion and high information codification do we see
market-based capitalism because only there is the information environment such that it will
support such a system of large firms and mass-produced goods. They develop a matrix of other
alternative arrangements including fiefs and clan structures which result from lower levels of
diffusion or codification.
National Innovation Systems
The literature on national innovation systems also highlights the role of governments
and institutions in enhancing innovation and research activities by coordinating local
knowledge transfers and spillovers between universities and firms (Freeman, 1987; Nelson,
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1993). While the term refers to an overall system, which could encompass government policies,
large firms, start-ups, universities, and public research institutes, mostly, U.S. authors in this
stream have placed weight on spillovers of commercially relevant knowledge from universities
to firms. European authors have tended to emphasize the role of sophisticated users in the
innovation system and the information flows from producers back to suppliers (Breznitz, 2007).
More recent work has applied the innovation systems framework both more at the regional
level and also to countries outside of the U.S. and Europe but similarly stressing
university/industry interfaces (Motohashi, 2005). As discussed earlier, work tracing joint
patent applications between firms and universities in China appears to show a decentralizing
and at the same time localizing trend in knowledge flows from university to industry from 1985
to 2004 (Hong, 2008). Other authors have used a national survey of 22,000 large and medium
sized manufacturers to track science and technology activities and linkages from 1996 to 2002
(Motohashi & Yun, 2007). The national innovation systems literature can be seen in many
ways as a variant or subset of the varieties of capitalism idea that different institutional maps or
structures can lead to different economic outcomes (Breznitz, 2007).
Building on the work on national innovation systems and on macroeconomic growth,
Furman and colleagues (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002; Furman & Hayes, 2004) have
developed a conceptual framework for a country's national innovation capacity, which is a
combination of policies supporting innovation and investments in innovation through R&D
expenditure and personnel. Their empirical work suggests that while many countries have
adopted policies and institutions supporting innovation, those that have had greater growth in
innovative performance have managed to make much greater investments in R&D in addition
to adopting supporting policies.
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Institutional Perspectives
Such alternative conceptions provide contrasting views, rich detail, and ways to think
outside of more traditional frameworks, but have yet to be built upon or empirically tested
extensively. On the other hand, neoclassical economics is built largely on a foundation which
has abstracted away from institutions and the political, legal, and financial rules and structures
within which pricing and quantity decisions are embedded. However, these institutions have
not been neglected by sociologists and political economists and increasingly economists are
paying heed to institutional frameworks as well. In institutional economics, the social
institutions are defined as the laws, norms, and beliefs which form the written and unwritten
"rules of the game" (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Institutions can help alter the constraints
and structure of incentives in a society to direct self-interested behavior towards either more or
less economically productive activities (Baumol, 1990; Nee, 1996). One complaint against the
early institutional work done by many has been that institutions seem at once to be the heroes
of economic development, doing countless jobs, yet the definition bundles together many
seemingly disparate organizations, laws, and traditions. Yet over two decades ago a contract
theory and a "predatory theory" of the state were distinguished (North, 1981). More recent
work distinguished property rights institutions and contracting institutions. The former can be
thought of as vertical, that is, protecting citizens from expropriation from government elites,
while the latter can be thought of as horizontal in nature, protecting citizens and economic
organizations with enforcement when they write contracts between each other. Empirical work
appears to provide evidence that various measures of property rights appear to be more
important for long-run economic development than contracting institutions (Acemoglu &
Johnson, 2005). The explanation given is that it is easier to find informal and alternative
mechanisms or second-best solutions to limited contracting institutions than it is to find
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informal mechanisms to protect citizens from weak property rights institutions. Yet, other
work has shown that informal property rights protection mechanisms do exist and can work
(Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006).
In recent years, there has been a fascinating, growing debate regarding the role of state
intervention in developing economies. One view, which some have called the "Washington
Consensus" for its widespread acceptance has advocated market liberalization including
property rights, financial liberalization, and in general giving greater autonomy and control
over prices and residual rights to private firms to allow markets to form (Johnson, McMillan, &
Woodruff, 2000; Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002). This view argues that there is very
little role for the state in development and demonizes the state and government intervention
while arguing for the great power of free markets and the "invisible hand" to allocate resources
to their most productive uses. On the other hand, some sociologists and economic historians
have argued for the important influence of what has been termed the "developmental state,"
which calls for government intervention to generate economic growth. The pioneers in this
field saw economic development as part of the national building project and that government
attention to the development of the economy was needed to preserve independence
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Gershenkron (1962) argues that certain characteristics of less developed
countries actually allow for more rapid economic development since existing investments do
not act as barriers and a certain map of technological development has been shown by the more
developed economies. In more recent years, scholars have taken the examples of the success of
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to argue for aggressive state intervention in developing economies
(Amsden, 2007). At times, these scholars raise the state to a heroic level, arguing that in
developing economies, only governments have the resources, talent, patience, and long-term
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vision to build the core industries that will drive the growth of the economy. The perspective
often builds on the ideal of a Weberian bureaucracy with career bureaucrats trained from within
for their positions. They argue that relative failure has occurred in many economies in South
America and Russia that have tried aggressive privatization and free market, lassie-faire
approaches. Instead, developmental state proponents advocate government support to select a
few key industries, generously support several large, nationally-owned firms, and protect these
"seedlings" with trade tariffs, tax credits, and government subsidies until they grow to a point
where they are strong enough to conduct their own R&D and support suppliers and related
industries (Amsden, 1989). Theories in this vein talk about the challenges of import-
substitution and upgrading from manufacturing and low-value added activities to do more
innovation and higher margin activities (Amsden, 2003). They tend to ask how latecomers
compete and how can developmental governments intervene in the markets to support them.
A typical successful example given of the effectiveness of the developmental state is
that of Taiwan's semiconductor industry which was dominated by foreign firms in 1975. One
company, Tatung managed to grow larger in size which enabled it to enjoy economies of scale
and more optimal-sized plants (Amsden, 2003). The growth also allowed the company to
develop managerial skills such as large project management among employees. This virtuous
cycle then allowed for the capabilities for outsourcing manufacturing to lower-cost facilities in
China. The Taiwan government had policies to support such large, national firms and gave
subsidies for R&D and facilitated networking between Tatung and those who could help
continue its growth. Stories like this and the case of Japan's rapid development via
government-led efforts have had a strong impact on leaders in China's central government. On
the other hand, the critique of this viewpoint, often from proponents of liberalization policies, is
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that it is precisely too much government intervention and skewed market incentives which were
the problem for planned economies in the first place. The argument here is that we want firms
to be investing more in R&D, operations, and marketing rather than in building political
connections and currying favor from government bureaucrats.
Instead of taking sides in this debate of aggressive market liberalization vs. aggressive
state intervention, other scholars have questioned whether there is not more of a middle road
and if the historical examples cited have relevance for today's world economy. This more
recent area of literature has become known by various names include the neo-developmental
state or the networked developmental state. Other authors have merged in observations related
to globalization and global production network theories. Steinfeld (2004) makes the argument
that what is different today is that because of technological progress and the ability to transfer
codified knowledge via information technology, firms have more networked production and
manufacturing, marketing, and design can be spread across geographic locations. Industries are
spread across locations rather than the entire production chain existing in single location
(Sturgeon 2000, 2002, 2003). This argument is closely related to the work on global
production networks and the global commodity chains perspective (Gereffi, 1999). The global
commodity chains perspective has examined patterns of international trade and industrial
upgrading and looks at mechanisms of organizational learning within trade networks,
organizational conditions facilitating upgrading, and the trajectory from assembly to higher
value activities such as original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and original brand name
manufacturing. In the past, it was more appropriate to promote certain industries, but these
changing in networked production have caused China to become very integrated into the world
economy, but only in terms of low margin manufacturing activities. Instead of market
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liberalization and decentralizing authority and property rights to firms, Steinfeld argues, what is
needed is a clamping down and constraints-based approach to make the basic selection
mechanisms of the market work in a developing economy. Ownership doesn't matter until the
basics of markets are put in place and soft-budget constraint problems are solved (Steinfeld,
1998).
Dating back for many years, some scholars have advocated that the highest economic
growth can be achieved by balancing the trade-offs between state planning and the efficiency of
market competition. Of course, Japan experienced a wave of tremendous economic growth and
with that a flurry of scholars wrote about various mechanisms through which the "Japanese
Miracle" occurred. A similar flurry of writing can be said to be occurring with China's rapid
growth, however, with the benefit of history, one can plot the economic growth of China's
GDP against that of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan and see that in comparison it is exemplary
perhaps in terms of entrepreneurship, but not necessarily in terms of overall economic growth
when comparable starting points are used. Johnson's (1982) detailed review of Japanese
industrial policy argues that it was a highly trained and experienced bureaucratic leadership at
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) coupled with a national priority of
economic growth and skillful implementation of a cooperative industrial policy which
effectively balanced state planning and competition to achieve high growth.
As discussed above, the example of the IT industry in Beijing, Shanghai, Xi'an, and
Guangzhou has been used to argue similarly for the positive impact of local government
policies and help directed at indigenous private or quasi-private enterprises (Segal, 2002). In
Segal's study, many of the top IT firms were spin-offs from government agencies and academic
institutions. He does not argue that the contribution of the state is always positive, but rather
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that it is conditional on past institutional structures. The other areas appear to lag behind since
Beijing offered support for smaller private enterprises but did not have a history of having large
government resources available to distort incentives away from market-based competition.
The latest version of the developmental state (or networked state or neo-developmental
state) combines the perspectives of national innovation systems, global networked production,
and the neo-developmental state framework (Breznitz, 2007). Breznitz (2007) argues that we
need a more realistic story that views the state not as a single monolith, but rather as separate
departments that bring in political choices, allowing for a cohesive story about why in a single
country, one innovation-based industry can fail while a different one succeeds. He builds a
framework where there are choices for the politicians to make in the character and direction of
development. For Breznitz, the state's role is to initiate and encourage a set of actors to enter
into innovation-based industries and then to step back and act more as facilitator and network
broker both internally among the firms and between the firms and multinational corporations or
international financial systems. He emphasizes that in a world of fragmented production, it is
not the state's role to dictate and determine industries to focus on, but rather to allow
participants to sort out where to link into global production chains and to become networked
with the industry enough to be able to respond to needs quickly and in a targeted manner. His
work argues that the route that the state takes to becoming embedded with industry is as
important as the state's structure and that there is no one optimal choice.
As an empirical test of the idea that supporting institutions impact the innovation
strategy and performance of entrepreneurial firms in China, Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001)
examine 184 firms located in the Beijing Experimental Zone science park. They use resource
dependency theory and argue that their results show that there are contingent effects of
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institutional support and environmental turbulence for product innovation strategy and
performance of technology ventures in China. Their findings indicate that product innovation
strategies are more effective in high turbulence environments and when the CEOs perceive
institutional support to be higher. However, their study design has clear problems with
endogeneity in the effects of performance on the perception of institutional support, and since
the only variance among the firms in the environment they actually faced would be the industry,
their results are also confounded with industry effects.
Another view which steps outside of this debate to take an even broader view of the
relationship between non-market institutions and market forces argues against the idea that
there is a single optimum institutional "blueprint" for economic development. A common
element among the more recent, neo-developmental state writing has been a move away from
the idea that economic development and the emergence of rapid innovation-based industries
follows a linear trajectory with a single optimal set of institutions for growth (Breznitz, 2007).
Some have argued that democracy is a type of meta-institution which allows for the
aggregation of local knowledge and the development of the particular ecosystem of non-market
institutions best suited for growth in a particular country (Rodrik, 2000). This argument alludes
to literature on varieties of capitalism which argues that while some capitalist economies are
organized for radical innovation and high growth (U.S.), others are better at other outcomes
such as equality or incremental innovation (such as the EU, Japan) (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
There is some support for this theory in the literature on China's development in the sense that
some practices, unexpectedly, worked in China due to its particular history and environment.
For example, Naughton (1994a) argues that the collective ownership form common for China's
township and village enterprises (TVEs) leads to uncertainty about ultimate property rights.
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Proponents of the role of property rights institutions in economic development might argue that
this should have dulled incentives to invest and thus entry and growth. However, as indicated
above, TVEs were remarkably successful and appear to have grown rapidly. This may have
been because TVEs were an effective adaptation to the particular economic environment in
China at the time (Naughton, 1994a). Product markets and demand for consumer goods was
high, but markets for factors of production or assets and financing were not well-developed.
TVEs may have been an organizational form that was flexible enough to be effective in that
environment. While it's very hard to imagine that "local knowledge" anticipated that this
would work well, it does lend credence to the idea that perhaps no single blueprint can foresee
all the important environmental contingencies and adaptations.
Still another view is that whatever the government may do, legal systems and
institutions are difficult to change or strengthen in the short to medium term, and so the main
challenge for entrepreneurs in emerging economies is in finding informal and clever ways to
overcome weak institutions and limited resources. Overseas Chinese networks have been
shown to help in this regard, both with providing financing and also contract enforcement
(Huang, 2008; Tong, 2005). The preceding line of work has led many authors to question
whether in emerging economies, during liberalization, if it is better for resource-constrained
entrepreneurs to invest in political networking or in R&D, operations and marketing (Guthrie,
1999; Rona-Tas, 1994). Political investment confers status and reputation, access to timely
market information, and politicians still control critical aspects such as tax policy and banking
regulation. However, with liberalization, one may no longer needs officials to bring resources
or remove bottlenecks. Plus, using connections may be more dangerous as law enforcement is
strengthened. Siegal (2007) uses a natural experiment in Korea to examine political
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connectedness after liberalization and finds that, controlling for R&D and marketing,
investments in political connections is one of the strongest determinants of cross-border
alliance formation. The results suggest that the effect of liberalization policies is not to
decrease the importance of political network investments, but rather to allow entrepreneurs to
access new outside resources and partners. The study referred to previously of Beijing science
park firms from the late 1990s found no effects for amount of effort spent on political
networking on innovation strategy or performance (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). However, the
nature of the location and technology focus of these firms indicates that they were likely the
focus of political officials regardless of their efforts to network.
Network theory has been a growing area of inquiry for a long time (Burt, 1992), but
particularly in recent years it has been applied in an innovation or entrepreneurial context
(Freeman, 1991; Shane & Cable, 2002). Previous work has indicated that while networking is
vital in U.S. entrepreneurship, in China guanxi or a particular sense of "social connections"
(Farh, Tsui, Xin, & Cheng, 1998; Park & Luo, 2001) is particularly important and appears to be
a mechanism used to improve firm performance and overcome some of the underdeveloped
legal and financial infrastructure in the country (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Licht & Siegel, 2006;
Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Zhao & Aram, 1995). Political connections, as
measured by affiliation with the ruling Communist Party, have been found to be particularly
helpful for firm performance in regions with weak market institutions and legal protection (Li,
Meng, Wang, & Zhou). Using a nationwide survey of 2,324 privately owned enterprises
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and several other groups (including the
United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), Li
et al. (2009) find that party-member entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain loans, have more
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confidence in the legal system, and have higher firm profitability (assuming no systematic
differences in reporting), even controlling for human capital. However, party-member
entrepreneurs may have been more significant achievers even before becoming party members.
There is an on-going debate, however, about the extent to which elites in transitional economies
have been able to translate their power into economic benefits and the mechanisms that allow
such a transfer (Walder 2002, 2003, Nee 1996).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the laboratory of China's recent economic liberalization and the growth
in private entrepreneurial firms offer a unique window on the effects of shifting institutional
and political factors on the entrepreneurial process and strategic issues for entrepreneurs and
managers. For researchers, it offers an opportunity to examine the effects of aspects of the
economic and social structure which are changing rapidly in China, but tend to remain
relatively stable in the developed country contexts where entrepreneurship previously has been
empirically and theoretically examined. Institutional frameworks have received increasing
attention from scholars in recent years for their roles in supporting R&D along with
entrepreneurial activity. The application of these frameworks in the context of technology-
based entrepreneurship in developing countries should yield exciting results and new
challenges for both empiricists and theoreticians interested in innovation and new business
formation.
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Chapter Five:
Who has 'the right stuff'? Human Capital, Entrepreneurship and
Institutional Change in China
Introduction
Nations, regions, even cities typically encourage entrepreneurship in the expectation
that it drives economic growth as well as competition (Schumpeter 1934, Schumpeter 1942,
Simeon Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 2002). The institutional arrangements to
enhance entrepreneurship are framed in terms of easing constraints to allow those who
previously could not overcome certain obstacles (yet who had entrepreneurial ability) to
become entrepreneurs (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2002, Evans, Jovanovic 1989, Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfaian, Rosen 1994).40 Yet, this view is contradicted by evidence of high levels of
entrepreneurship in some of the poorest, least developed countries that have high constraints to
entry (Gollin 2002). One explanation for this puzzle is that economic development is
associated with better wage employment opportunities and higher opportunity costs to striking
out as an entrepreneur. 4 1 Consistent with this scenario, the current paper proposes and tests the
idea that institutional reform is less about lowering barriers for entry and more about lowering
barriers to new firm growth to tempt talented individuals to take the risk by providing higher
returns to entrepreneurship.
40 In institutional economics, institutions are defined as the laws, norms, or beliefs which form the 'rules
of the game' (North 1990, Williamson 2000). There are also traditions of sociological institutionalism
and historical institutionalism developed within sociology and political science.
41 lyigun and Owen (1998) propose that risk-averse individuals will choose the wage sector over
entrepreneurship in a developed economy.
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An important gap exists in our understanding of the mechanisms by which institutional
change affects entrepreneurship. This paper asks how a particular institutional change draws in
individuals to entrepreneurship and where those individuals are located on a talent distribution.
We question which institutional arrangements, those that lower barriers to entry or those that
lower barriers to growth, are more effective in enhancing entrepreneurial behavior.
Specifically, does a reform lowering barriers to growth draw more talented individuals to
become entrepreneurs by increasing the expected returns?
One role of institutions may be to shape the costs and incentives guiding entrepreneurial
endeavors (Baumol 1990). Previous literature has presented the idea that some are "pushed"
into entrepreneurship, where the individual cannot get a traditional employment job (Amit &
Muller 1995). If the individual can gather the necessary resources to start a firm, then self-
employment becomes a last resort. Alternatively, "pull" entrepreneurship has been
distinguished, where an individual is drawn into entrepreneurship because of the attractiveness
of an opportunity that is too good to pass up (Amit, Muller 1995). Understanding how the
institutional environment affects which individuals leave traditional employment to become
entrepreneurs is not just a theoretical curiosity. It has important implications for the
performance of start-up firms in the economy. It is also important for policymakers interested
in how firm productivity, strategy, and competition via new entrants are affected by
government interventions.
The challenge to answering this question is finding an empirical setting with sufficient
variation in the institutional environment for entrepreneurship and also detailed human capital
or work history data on a comparable set of individuals at risk for entrepreneurship. An ideal
empirical setting would be where individuals of known ability levels are randomly assigned to
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different institutional environments and then tracked over time. Lacking this, a context is
needed where there was an exogenous shift in the institutional environment (ideally in the
direction of increasing the expected returns to entrepreneurship) and where we have measures
of human capital levels. One setting in which the first requirement is fulfilled is in China
where a 1999 Chinese Constitutional amendment aimed to end discriminatory practices against
domestic private firms. This shift is exploited and data developed to satisfy the second
requirement by collecting a unique, detailed survey.
The key finding of this paper is that a stronger increase occurred in the propensity for
entrepreneurship among those with higher human capital levels (as measured by graduate
degrees, promotion, GPA, salary, work experience, or parents' education) when expected
returns to entrepreneurship increased. In addition, these higher human capital individuals were
more likely to found firms which became more profitable, larger, and more innovative. The
rest of the paper proceeds as follows: First, the literatures on institutions and on work history as
they relate to entrepreneurship are each briefly reviewed followed by the hypotheses. Then I
describe the empirical setting. The next section describes in detail the data and the variables
used followed by the analysis and results. Finally in the discussion and conclusion sections I
describe the robustness checks, address alternative explanations and mechanisms, and discuss
the theoretical implications of the findings.
Theory and hypotheses
Institutions and Entrepreneurship
Institutions are defined as the laws, norms, or beliefs that form the 'rules of the game'
(North 1990, Williamson 2000). By altering the constraints and structure of incentives in an
economy, institutions direct self-interested behavior towards either more or less economically
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productive activity (Baumol 1990, Nee 1996). While lively debate surrounds the quest to
determine the best institutions for economic development and entrepreneurship, consensus is
growing that institutions, particularly property rights and financial liberalization, play an
important role in shaping incentives for economically productive entrepreneurial behavior
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2002, Acemoglu, Johnson 2005, Klapper, Amit, Guillen,
Quesada 2007, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny 1998). Theory and evidence linking
institutions to entrepreneurial decisions have lagged behind (Klapper, Amit, Guillen, Quesada
2007).
In contrast, a rapidly growing literature examines the link between career experience,
human capital and entry into entrepreneurship (Beckman, Burton 2007, Boeker 1989, Haveman
1993, Haveman, Cohen 1994, Phillips 2002). This literature yields mixed results. On one hand,
Evans and Leighton (1989) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and find that
those who transitioned to self-employment had relatively lower wages. Similarly, Amit and
colleagues find that individuals who became entrepreneurs had lower salaries in their previous
job (Amit, Glosten, Muller 1990, Amit, Muller, Cockburn 1995).42 In contrast, Hamilton (2000)
examines the returns to self-employment and finds little evidence for wage differences between
would-be entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. Groysberg and coauthors (2007) find that high
performance research analysts in investment banks are more likely than non-star analysts to
become entrepreneurs. Of course, those "stars" may be more visible to and attractive to outside
investors and prospective clients who would lower the difficulties of starting a new firm.
Lazear (2004) uses a database of Stanford Graduate School of Business alumni and suggests
that entrepreneurs tend to be generalists and have more varied work experiences. The evidence
42 However, the authors acknowledge the difficulty in using such a correlation to identify the impact of
opportunity costs on the transition to entrepreneurship, including unobserved ability and lower wages due
to effort being expended on the new startup rather than in the current job.
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on opportunity costs (as measured by previous salaries) and whether low or high human capital
individuals have higher propensities for entrepreneurship appears mixed. It is important to note
that these studies (with the possible exception of Lazear (2004) do not include high proportions
of technology entrepreneurs. No previous literature that we are aware of has examined these
issues in the context of high tech entrepreneurs.
Beyond salary and performance, some literature has begun to examine the contexts that
are more conducive to producing or selecting for potential entrepreneurs (Thornton 1999).
Scholars have theorized about the employment conditions under which employees choose to
commercialize their ideas in external spin-offs rather than within the firm (Anton, Yao 1995,
Klepper, Sleeper 2002, Klepper 2001, Hellmann, 2006, Klepper, Thompson 2006). 43 The
literature has emphasized both the characteristics of the individuals (Evans, Leighton 1989,
Roberts, 1991, Shane, Khurana 2003, Zucker, Darby, Brewer 1998, Stuart, Ding 2005) as well
as parent firms (Burton, Sorensen, Beckman 2002, Gompers, Lerner, Scharfstein 2005,
Sorensen 2007) or job roles and context (Dobrev, Barnett 2005) as important determinants of
the likelihood to spin off new ventures.
Almost no work has made the connection between the broader contexts which influence
people of particular characteristics and not others to found firms. Some signs exist that the
institutional environment also matters (Nanda, 2008). Human capital is clearly an important
determinant of the likelihood of entrepreneurship, yet the relationship between human capital,
institutional environments, and entrepreneurship is unclear. It may be that only through linking
macro-level, institutional effects together with micro-level, individual effects that the
43 Hellmann (2006) develops a model for why employees leave their employers to become entrepreneurs
and also captures the idea that the external entrepreneurial environment may encourage spin-offs.
Holmes and Schmitz (1990, 1995) develop models of occupational choice consistent with those holding
higher entrepreneurial ability (or with good matches with their business) becoming entrepreneurs.
Similarly, the Lucas (1978) model unambiguously predicts the most able will become entrepreneurs.
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previously conflicting patterns may become clearer. Evidence from less-developed countries
(LDCs) is useful for three reasons. First, LDCs more frequently see larger variations in the
institutional environment in the direction of lowering barriers to entry and in terms of lowering
barriers to growth, allowing opportunities for identification. Second, typically LDCs have not
yet developed well-organized industry associations to lobby for reforms, reducing concerns of
reverse causation. Third, more variation exists in the human capital distribution in less-
developed countries where some families are able to send their children overseas for a high
quality education yet overall enrollment in tertiary education is lower.
Very little prior work has examined the link between human capital and institutional
change. Existing work either explicitly or implicitly takes ability for commercial/market
productivity as being largely of a different type than ability that allows individuals to overcome
the barriers to entrepreneurship in less-developed institutional environments. 44 While this view
might be correct, what if a large component to ability is common or transferable across the two
activities? 45 The Roy (1951) model is relevant for theories of occupational choice and has been
widely used and extended (Borjas 1987, Roy 1951, Heckman, Honore 1990, Jovanovic 1994).
The basic model assumes that individuals form predictions of their earnings in two sectors
under consideration and choose the one that provides higher utility. The model examines
sorting into wage employment and entrepreneurship on the basis of known heterogeneous
abilities. The institutional environment may be modeled as altering the relative payoff to skills
in entrepreneurship and changing the resulting self-selection. A relatively simple formal model
based on a Roy Model linking talent, institutional change and entrepreneurial decisions can be
44 Or ability is viewed as uncorrelated with the endowments (such as government connections, family
wealth, or the ability to navigate bureaucratic hurdles) that allow one to overcome barriers to entry.
45 Stuart and Ding (2005) show that scientific advisory board membership is highly correlated with
academic quality and patenting.
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found in Appendix A of this chapter, but the main insights are conveyed via the more
conceptual model below. 46
Insert Figure I here
First, consider two simple alternative formulations of the relationship between human
capital and institutional change. Figure 1 shows the hypothesized relationships between shifts
in the institutional environment for entrepreneurship and increased entrepreneurial behavior.
The top graph of Figure 1 (1A) shows human capital levels on the x-axis and the costs of
starting a business on the y-axis. One curve is shown which represents the income that can be
earned via wage employment that increases at a decreasing rate with talent. The horizontal
lines represent the average costs of starting a business under different institutional
environments. The new institutional environment lowers the average costs (or effort costs) of
starting a firm. If this is true, then if the change in the institutional environment reduces the
barriers to entrepreneurship, the increase in entrepreneurship comes primarily from those who
are relatively lower on the talent distribution.
An alternative mechanism for increased entrepreneurship is higher returns to
entrepreneurship leading to relatively more talented entrepreneurs. This view sees institutions
for entrepreneurship as raising the expected returns conditional on entrepreneurial entry rather
than lowering the bar to enter in the first place. According to this idea, overcoming fixed start-
up costs is relatively easy, but the difficulty is in growing the firm to a significant size or in
46 Changes in the institutional environment for entrepreneurship will raise (or lower), the returns to talent
in entrepreneurship which will impact the payoff to entrepreneurship differentially according to human
capital. Institutional reforms may have the effect of broadening the number of individuals engaged in
entrepreneurship either among the same types of people who were already becoming entrepreneurs or
they may induce those of different ability levels to become entrepreneurs.
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appropriating the returns that the firm generates. In this situation, institutional reform has the
effect of increasing expected returns for entrepreneurs and higher outcomes then encourage
more individuals of higher human capital and with better wage employment options to become
entrepreneurs. 47 The level of expected returns (rather than the fixed start-up costs) may be
more important for more talented potential entrepreneurs. 48
In the bottom (1B) section of Figure 1, the x-axis is again the talent distribution, but this
time the y-axis represents the expected returns to entrepreneurship. The upper line represents
an institutional change that raises the net mean returns to entrepreneurship. Examples of this
type of institutional change are those that lower barriers to firm growth such as policies
awarding government contracts to small or young businesses, industrial policies aimed at
growing businesses and institutions conducive to merger and acquisition or initial public
offerings, or decreased tax rates targeted at high growth entrepreneurial firms.49 Figure 1B
represents the expected returns to entrepreneurship as a flat line for simplicity.50 If the
mechanism in Figure lB is correct then certain institutions affect the level of entrepreneurship
through improving returns to entrepreneurship relative to traditional employment. An
47 This effect may be attenuated over time however, if an increase in high quality firms translates into
more wage employment opportunities or if more competition drives back down the expected returns.
48 This is also true if the prospective entrepreneur is motivated by "need to achieve" (McClelland, 1961)
in which significant tangible accomplishments are made, not merely financial returns. Or if the reward to
the entrepreneur is in overcoming a major challenge, where lesser, easier to attain, goals are not especially
stimulating. Under all these circumstance, making significant growth a realistic possibility would increase
the entry of more aspiring entrepreneurs.
49 By barriers to growth, what is meant more precisely are barriers which depress the entrepreneur's
financial returns relative to wage employment. While start-ups could grow (in terms of employees or
revenue) without providing higher payoffs to the entrepreneurs, in general barriers preventing
entrepreneurial firms from reaching their efficient size (or helping state-owned firms to maintain market
share) will tend to alter returns to talent for the entrepreneur as well.
50 This line may possibly be more accurately represented as an upward sloping curve. A large number of
variations in the shape or height of the curve are possible. A bi-model distribution is possible as well
with high ability entrepreneurs making very high returns in a poor institutional environment. The
simplest case is chosen here to make the point that an increase in the returns to ability in entrepreneurship
should draw in higher ability entrepreneurs.
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environment where we increase the returns to entrepreneurship relative to wage work should
draw more entrepreneurs from relatively higher in the talent distribution.
Hypothesis 1. An institutional change that reduces barriers to growth (or to the returns
from growth) will increase entrepreneurship among individuals located relatively higher in the
talent distribution.
A difference may exist in the types of firms created by those who are induced to enter
entrepreneurship by a different institutional environment. The effects of selection processes in
entrepreneurship on competition and strategy can be quite strong. Banerjee and Munshi (2004)
find differences in the level of capital stock, productivity and the capital intensity of production
between two communities of garment knitters in India, arguing that they are driven by selection
processes of higher ability individuals in one community and lower opportunity cost of capital
in the other community. Certain institutional environments may be required for more talented
individuals to be able to start high performance firms. High human capital individuals will be
more likely to start firms if they can attain higher performance in entrepreneurship, which is
more likely when barriers to growth are lowered. If more talented individuals are increasingly
entering entrepreneurship due to increasing expected returns, then the start-ups they create
should have higher performance levels on average. The idea that higher human capital should
result in higher entrepreneurial productivity seems straightforward, but could be attenuated for
a number of reasons. 5 1 On the other hand, if talent as demonstrated in prior wage work has no
bearing on entrepreneurial performance, then this result would call into question whether the
expectation of higher performance is driving the increased entry.
If there is no component of human capital that is transferrable from the wage sector to
the act of entrepreneurship, then this would make both finding empirical results and policy
51 An association may not be found if competition increases which drives down survival or profit margins,
or if higher ability individuals are attempting riskier start-ups.
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prescriptions more difficult. Thus, the type of human capital or talent that is of interest is a
component that is transferrable from wage work to entrepreneurship. If the marginal individual
being drawn into entrepreneurship is shifting higher in the talent distribution, then one should
also expect that talent or human capital measures should be associated with higher firm
performance levels.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals of higher talent, as evidenced in their wage employment
careers, will experience higher returns in entrepreneurship after an institutional change that
lowers barriers to growth.
The traditional mechanism focused on in the literature lowers barriers to entry (i.e.,
decreased costs to entrepreneurship). For example, individuals may want to become
entrepreneurs but cannot overcome credit constraints or hurdles to registering a new business
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2002, Evans, Jovanovic 1989, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, Rosen
1994). Institutional reform then acts to lower the barriers, in which case we would find an
increase in relatively less talented individuals becoming entrepreneurs. If there is sufficient
correlation in the skills rewarded by wage work and those rewarded by entrepreneurship, then
lowering entry barriers has the effect of driving more low ability individuals to
entrepreneurship. The less talented individuals would expect lower returns to entrepreneurship
(compared to more talented individuals) and have less incentive to save and accumulate the
resources needed for entry so they are impacted more by a reduction in fixed start-up costs.
Recent work shows that in response to an increased cost of external financing, the greatest
decrease in entrepreneurial behavior came from those of lowest ability (Nanda 2008). This
result indicates that decreasing the cost of start-up capital has its greatest impact among lower
ability entrepreneurs.
Hypothesis 3: An institutional change that reduces barriers to entry will increase the
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propensity for entrepreneurship among individuals located relatively lower in the talent
distribution.
China's Institutional Reform
The Chinese context provides a particularly interesting and appropriate empirical
context to study given the high degree of institutional variation (relative to well-developed
economies), and its importance in the world economy. 52 As a case for looking at human capital
and institutional constraints on entrepreneurship, China offers a natural experiment in the 1999
amendment to the Constitution that lowered barriers to growth and altered the history of
discrimination against the growth of domestic private firms. The Chinese context also offers an
earlier 1988 policy shift reducing high barriers to entry.
China's reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s eliminated restrictions on
entrepreneurship and provided legitimacy to private business. Most significantly, in 1988 the
state officially recognized the growing number of private businesses (known in Mandarin as
'saying qiye') with eight or more employees (Xu and Zhao, 2008).53 Significant increases in
entrepreneurship occurred in the years that followed. Yet the years before 1999 had been
characterized by direct discrimination in favor of foreign-invested and state-owned firms
(Huang 2003). In the spring of 1999, the Second Plenary of the Ninth People's Congress
52 The vast majority of the related literature on market entry/entrepreneurship and innovation focuses on
well-developed economies. High-tech entrepreneurship and innovation in transitional and developing
countries are rarely part of the scholarly dialogue which still largely thinks of new products as being
developed in rich countries and moved to low-wage countries (Lu 2000, Puga, Trefler August 2005,
Vernon 1966).
53 Prior to the reform private businesses with fewer than eight employees were permitted. It is widely
recognized that even before 1988 many private businesses had more than 8 employees, but the risk of
being discovered was removed in 1988. Township and village enterprises spread during this time and
many firms registered as publicly owned (known as "wearing the red hat") to avoid discrimination. Wang
(2008) uses a reform in the mid-1990s which allowed employees to purchase their state-owned rental
housing at subsidized prices to examine the impact of credit constraints and mobility costs on entry into
entrepreneurship.
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approved an amendment to the Constitution that put the private sector on the same legal footing
as the public sector (People's Daily, April 9, 1999, Liu, 2008). The amendment essentially did
three things: 1) officially ended discriminatory practices against domestic owned private firms;
2) provided some assurance that private property would be defended; and 3) signaled to local
governments the importance of entrepreneurship. The original clause in the Constitution was
changed from "the private economy is a supplement to public ownership" to "the non-public
sector, including individual and private businesses, is an important component of the socialist
market economy" (China Daily, March 16, 1999, Qian 2000). Local governments responded
and incorporated the promotion of technology commercialization in their local science policies
after this act was passed (Liu, White 2001). Immediately after the amendment, local
governments were reported to start to relax restrictions on private enterprises (People's Daily,
April 9, 1999). 54
Yingqiu Liu, Professor of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS), notes that the amendment created a more level playing field for businesses for the first
time since the Communist revolution (Liu 2008). A large number of provincial governments
issued documents promoting the rapid growth and development of private enterprises. In 2000,
Zeng Peiyan, minister at the State Development Planning Commission, issued a statement
saying "[We will] eliminate all restrictive and discriminatory regulations that are not friendly
towards private investment and private economic development. In the area of stock listings,
54 For instance, the Jiangsu Provincial Government adopted a new policy to give private enterprises equal
treatment as state-owned and collective enterprises in the areas of granting business scopes and credit
access (People's Daily, April 9, 1999). A proliferation of science parks and technology business
incubators occurred following the Constitutional change, as well as associated tax incentives for R&D
and licensing activities all of which supported the growth of entrepreneurial firms. Local governments
had freedom and their own incentives to experiment and the programs seen as more successful such as tax
breaks and industrial science parks spread rapidly to encourage private entrepreneurship (Segal 2002).
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private enterprise should enjoy equal opportunity which was enjoyed by the state-owned
enterprises."
Overall, the institutional environment shifted to encourage the growth of entrepreneurial
firms through office space, R&D tax incentives, and later stage funding. In contrast changes
after 1988 lowered entry barriers and legitimized entrepreneurship, broadly defined, but
without as many specific institutions and policies to support growth of already established
entrepreneurial firms. Also since 2000, property-rights became clarified, there was a policy
push to encourage R&D and high tech firms and after 1998 private equity firms were easier to
set up.
As suggested by interviews with entrepreneurs and investors in China, 1999 was widely
perceived as a key year. Chinese entrepreneurs and investors suggested that there was a
perception that China had moved towards an institutional environment which could support
rapid growth technology start-ups like those that made individuals very rich during the dotcom
boom in the U.S. The perception spread that one could now become very wealthy through the
creation of technology start-ups in China, whereas that was not possible in the past (although
creating smaller scale start-ups was certainly possible). The institutional environment prior to
1999 was not prohibitive for entry, but it did make growth difficult. One Chinese entrepreneur
reported that she had to get each new product approved. 55
I spent an entire year just looking for the right office space... because ... each product
must be registered and approved by the government. It's an expensive and time-consuming
procedure. I eventually found space for the company 's first store in a children's museum
which was perfect since they were selling toy bears aimed at children. This also allowed the
55 These survey data were combined with interviews. The Tsinghua Alumni Association set up 42
interviews in Beijing, Shanghai and Xi'an. Interviews were requested with technology entrepreneurs,
including some who had not been successful. The representativeness of these interviews cannot be
established and primarily those who did become entrepreneurs were interviewed. Presumably any bias
might be more on the basis of performance than on the basis of reasons for selection into entrepreneurship
in one year and not another.
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start-up to hide from government inspectors. - Beijing entrepreneur
The institutional environment post-2000 appears to have been much more attractive for
high human capital individuals. One pair of founders had very high human capital with one
being a lawyer and an MBA and the other having a Ph.D. They started the company in 2003
and the female co-founder said:
I spent 20 years in the [San Francisco] Bay area in life sciences companies. In the mid-
1990s I came back to China to survey biotech companies in China and found that the
environment was not ready yet. - Shanghai entrepreneur
The analyses will exploit both the 1988 reform lowering entry barriers and most
importantly, the 1999 amendment supporting the growth of existing firms and moving away
from practices that discriminated against private firms and kept them at a smaller size.56 A
discussion of the limitations of using this reform as an identification strategy and robustness
checks to allay those concerns is contained in the discussion section below.
Methodology
To address these hypotheses, I use a sample from a well-defined at-risk population with
detailed work history data on both non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs, over significant
periods of time. The empirical context for the study is a sample of alumni from a prestigious
university in China. As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, a survey of alumni has the
advantage of being a well-defined population, not biased by government collection towards
classification of private firms as state-owned and not selected based on success in
56 A more detailed discussion of the Chinese context, particularly as it pertains to entrepreneurship and
science and technology policy is in Chapter 4 and has been written about elsewhere (Wang 2008, Qian
2000, Huang 2008, Steinfeld 1998).
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entrepreneurship or in traditional employment. Such a survey allows us to track the work
experiences after graduation of both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs over long periods of
time. Research universities are also important institutions for educating technologists and
providing a setting for students and faculty to exchange ideas. In the U.S., alumni from leading
research universities are responsible for numerous new ventures (Hsu, Roberts, Eesley 2007).
The Chinese sample provides data on individuals with high enough human capital levels that
many have a real choice between career paths, including entrepreneurship.
In cooperation with the Alumni Association, we undertook a survey of alumni from
Tsinghua University, located in Beijing, China. The survey instrument itself was developed
collaboratively by the author, a fellow Chinese Ph.D. student at our institution, an M.I.T.
professor, and a professor of management at Tsinghua University. Some overlapping questions
were asked from the M.I.T. alumni survey to enable future comparison (Hsu, Roberts, Eesley
2007). It was translated into Mandarin and checked by several Chinese speaking associates for
accuracy and communications clarity. The Tsinghua Alumni Association has assisted with
endorsing, mailing, and collecting the survey results. The survey was sent to all alumni with an
address on record (a total of 30,000 according to the alumni association). Our dataset includes
alumni across all university departments. The respondents could mail back the paper copy or
complete the survey online. In the initial section, completed by all alumni respondents, alumni
were asked if they participated in founding a company, "where founding indicates that you
were present at the start of the company and other founders would consider you a co-founder."
Respondents also answered questions about privatizing a state-owned enterprise since this is
also considered to be "entrepreneurship" in China. Those responding positively to either
question were asked to fill out the Founders Survey section. The working definition of
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entrepreneurship here is more focused and narrower than a representative national sample of
self-employment. 7 The survey also asked a question about whether the individual had gone
overseas to work or go to school. Those who responded positively to that question were
directed to fill out the "Returnee" section of the survey. The survey packet included a
personalized letter from the authors, signed by the University President, the questionnaire, and
a postage-paid envelope with address labels. A total of 2,966 surveys have been received
online and via paper and email (including 718 entrepreneurs).58 Of the 2,966, I eliminate (for
certain analyses) the 144 alumni who responded from outside of China since changes in
policies in China should have less effect on them. Our final number of observations for the
main analysis is the 1,821 alumni who responded to all of the variables used. The entire survey
is available in Appendix B at the end of the dissertation.
The response rate is 10%. 59 One approach to assessing non-response bias involves
extrapolation. This method is useful when trying to determine the direction of bias and a
survey of non-respondents or archival methods cannot be conducted (Lehman 1963, Donald
1960, Pace 1939, Rogelberg, Luong ). It rests on the assumption that individuals who respond
less readily resemble non-respondents, so a common method is comparing characteristics of
respondents who answered quickly with those who answered following a reminder or stimulus
57 Self-employment is interesting in itself, but typically includes professional occupations such as
consultants, lawyers and physicians which do not fit as well with a model of choosing riskier
entrepreneurial activities.
58 The results include 963 alumni responses received via the online survey and 2,003 responses received
via email or hardcopy.
59 The actual response rate is likely to be much higher once incorrect addresses and deceased alumni are
subtracted from the original total. While low responses rates can introduce bias, I examine specifically
whether there is systematic bias in respondent characteristics (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, Thompson
1994). Response rates to surveys of managers in China have tended to be in the lower range (Peng, Luo
2000, Tan, Litschert 1994). Zhejiang University officials told us that when they survey their alumni
response rates of 5% are average. In the U.S. response rates for entrepreneur surveys are often lower than
those for managers.
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at a later time. 60
Although one limitation of our data is that it is cross-sectional in the sense of coming
from a survey given at one point in time, on the other hand, our respondents graduated from the
university and founded companies over an impressive span of time. The advantages of this
dataset include a panel of detailed work history and education variables, information on family
background, coverage over many years of graduates, detailed data on funding and performance
measures for multiple founding attempts, and less bias than government surveys where Chinese
entrepreneurs are known to misreport their earnings and firm status as state-owned (wearing
the red hat) to avoid discriminatory practices. Forty-five questions were asked about prior firm
founding history and the entrepreneur's most recent start-up including: industry category, work
experience, relationships among the cofounders, sources of entrepreneurial ideas, timing and
sources of financing events, commercialization strategy changes, causes of failure, exit routes,
60 Appendix A of this chapter shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed)
characteristics of the responders and non-responders are roughly the same statistically. Only the variables
gpa rank, age, entrepreneur, privatized, and high salary show statistically significant differences in
means at below the 1% level. It appears that non-respondents were more likely to be entrepreneurs, were
slightly older, had higher salaries, less likely to have been academics, and slightly more likely to have
held a greater number of job positions, to have a higher GPA, and more likely to come from more wealthy
families. Years of education is significant, but the means are very similar. Older founders appear to have
been equally likely as younger founders to respond. The 1 0 th, 25t , 5 0th , 7 5 th , and 9 0 th percentiles of
graduation years were also checked and are similar, offering some reassurance that there were not large
differences over time in the response rates. Since there is evidence of some non-response bias, weights
were created using logistic regression and calculated as one over the predicted probabilities of responding.
Results are robust to using and also not using these weights. Finally Appendix C of this chapter shows a
histogram of respondents by bachelor's graduation year. One can see the impact of the Cultural
Revolution when Tsinghua was largely disrupted between 1966 and 1976 when regular admissions
resumed. In comparison to a representative sample of rural and urban households from the China Health
and Nutrition Survey (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china) the Tsinghua sample is 8.7 years older on
average, much more likely to be male, less likely to be married, more highly educated, and slightly more
likely to have founded a firm. The differences in age and education most likely contribute to differences
in the entrepreneurship rates. The data were also benchmarked against a representative sample from the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 1999 survey). In comparison the Tsinghua sample is significantly
older, less likely to be self-employed, has more years of education, but similar in terms of parent's
education and parental self-employment. It appears that the sample is not weighted towards more recent
alumni. A non-respondent survey is also in progress.
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revenues and number of employees. In addition, the data include notes from interviews with 42
people (including entrepreneurs, investors, and government officials), along with follow-up
phone calls to probe more deeply. Figure 4 shows a plot of the locations of the entrepreneurial
respondents with the three locations where we did interviews in red.
Measures and Data
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
In this context the descriptive statistics alone are interesting. Figure 2 previews the
main findings of the paper by showing the increase in the rate of higher human capital
individuals becoming entrepreneurs in the more recent time period. The figure reinforces the
story that institutional change pulled individuals from higher in the talent distribution into
entrepreneurship through improved outcomes. It appears that there was some increase just
prior to 1999. Interestingly, the increase in the proportion of those with graduate degrees
becoming entrepreneurs follows closely the increases in founder income (these coefficients are
taken from the corresponding year dummy variables of a regression on founder salary). This
adds support to the idea that improved returns to entrepreneurship may be driving the increase.
Figure 3 shows the increases in the proportion of 'at risk' individuals becoming entrepreneurs
in each year. Table 1 shows the industry breakdown for the firms. Internet, electronics and
software firms are the most common, which fits with the technical training of these graduates. 6 1
The average number of employees per firm as of 2007 is 628 (median=20). Approximately
34% of the firms have 10 employees or fewer. The mean annual revenues of each firm were
495,000 RMB (the median is 70,000 RMB or $20,290 at an approximate 2007 PPP exchange
61 The industries also provide evidence that the respondents have started firms rather than reporting on
primarily "sole proprietorships" and self-employment activities.
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rate of 3.45 RMB/dollar). Seventeen percent of the firms claimed to hold at least 1 patent.
Median profit levels were reported as 20% of gross revenues. Table 2 presents pair-wise
correlations. Table 3 presents independent variable definitions and summary statistics.
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
Analyses and Results
To determine whether changes over time took place in the market development of the
institutional environment that had a differential impact on those with higher human capital, a
differences-in-differences regression analysis is performed. The differences-in-differences
estimate is identified by interacting the post-1999 variable with the various human capital
measures to see in the post period how the propensity for entrepreneurship for more talented
individuals changed relative to those lower in the talent distribution. 62 The dependent variable
is the event of founding a firm for the first time. 63
Since the most recent graduation classes have not had much time to gain work
experience and found firms, right-side censoring is a concern. The analyses in Tables 4 and 7
employ Cox (1972) hazard regression models for two reasons. First, the model is semi-
parametric, so that we can estimate the impact of independent variables on the hazard of
62 Identification of a panel differences-in-differences estimator requires the assumption that trends are
parallel before and after the reform. A placebo regression (Appendix I) using 1997 as the reform year
provides some evidence that pre-reform trends among higher human capital individuals were not
significantly different. Including year interaction terms with years of education and income residuals also
provide evidence that trends in these coefficients are relatively flat in the post-reform period also.
63 Privatizing an SOE is also an entrepreneurial act in China since it often requires all the same behaviors
of taking on risk, raising funding, recruiting new employees or cofounders, becoming the residual
claimant, and redefining the product market strategy. Any performance analysis would need to control
for higher beginning asset levels of SOEs, but conceptually this paper is interested in transitions to
entrepreneurial behavior rather than performance. The results are robust to limiting the sample to only
pure startups as well. A total of 47 of the firms reported on in the survey were privatized SOEs.
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founding a firm while being agnostic about the baseline hazard function. 64 Second, the model
explicitly takes the timing of events into account (by estimating the probability of founding a
firm in a given year conditional on not having founded a firm up until that time period), and
adjusts for the right-censoring of the data. In these regressions subjects start being "at risk" of
founding a firm at the time of their graduation, and a "failure" event occurs the year the
individual founds a first firm (otherwise, the founding year is considered censored for that
individual as of the year 2008).65 Reported coefficients are hazard ratios, with values above 1.0
representing increases in the hazard of founding a firm and vice-versa for values below 1.0.
The main results are robust to using a logit as well. The Breslow method is the default for
handling ties, but the results are robust to using exact marginal likelihood and exact partial
likelihood.66 The specification of the model is as follows:
A(t l x)= o(t)exp(X' p) (1)
where the vector X includes our founder and work experience characteristics. A(t X) is the
rate at which founders will start a firm at any particular date, given that they have not founded a
firm up until that point in time. Equation (1) specifies the hazard rate as the product of two
components: a function of the period length (i.e. delay time since graduation), Ao (t) or baseline
hazard, and a function of the observable characteristics, denoted by the vector X. The Cox
64 It does assume that the hazard functions (in this case, the probability of founding a firm, conditional on
time) at different levels of an independent variable are proportional to the baseline hazard function. The
standard procedure to test this assumption is to examine the graphs of the natural logarithms of
cumulative baseline hazard functions (Anderson 1982). The functions appeared to be approximately
proportional to one another, offering reassurance that the proportionality assumption was not violated.
65 The statistics literature (Breslow, Lubin, Marek, Langholz 1983) suggests little loss of efficiency so
long as approximately 20% of a sample has experienced the event of interest (over 20% of my sample has
founded a firm).
66 Since the human capital measures were mainly run in separate regressions, multicollinearity is not a
primary concern; however, future versions can orthogonalize the variables using a modified Gram-
Schmidt procedure.
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nonparametric estimation allows the estimation offp without needing to make a distributional
assumption about ;, (t) . Figures 5 and 6 show the results of Kaplan-Meier and Schoenfeld
residual tests of the assumptions of the hazard rate model. The data appear to satisfy the
requirements.
Insert Table 4 about here
Observable Human Capital Measures
Table 4 examines the impact of lowering barriers to growth and the 1999 Constitutional
amendment. The table examines the impact of observable measures of human capital. In
Model 4-1, looking first at the controls, individuals were less likely to transition from jobs in
academia to entrepreneurship. Academic jobs are traditionally prestigious positions within
Chinese society. Those able to secure such positions would be reluctant to risk their careers on
entrepreneurship. 67 Individuals who had worked in a higher number of different positions and
who were male, or who had worked in academic jobs in the past, had higher rates of
transitioning into entrepreneurship. Having a higher number of prior job positions has also
been found in the U.S. to correlate with entrepreneurship (Lazear, 2004).68 All models include
dummy variables for the Bachelor's degree academic major, graduation year, and current
67 As is true in most U.S. universities (but not MIT), Chinese faculty have not traditionally been
encouraged to start a company while retaining their academic positions. In my conversation with the
Technology Licensing Office (TLO) at Tsinghua, the director indicated that because Tsinghua is so
prestigious they do not have problems with faculty leaving to set up companies. However, they do
demand very favorable terms for Tsinghua in any faculty licensing arrangements to start-up companies.
There are strong penalties for faculty who do not go through the TLO, so many faculty are reported to
allow their students to graduate and then take the technology to commercialize via a start-up.
68 Interestingly, in Table 4, individuals with parents who were entrepreneurs are not more likely to
become entrepreneurs themselves. A positive association between parental self-employment and
entrepreneurship has been found repeatedly in the U.S. and Europe, but does not appear to hold in the
Chinese context. One good explanation may be that during the time period when these individuals'
parents could conceivably have founded companies, most entrepreneurship was illegal in China.
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region. Turning to the main independent variables, those with Master's degrees were
significantly less likely to become entrepreneurs. 69 Model 4-1 shows the results for the
differences-in-differences estimation by including an interaction term between Master's degree
and a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual was 'at risk' of founding a first firm in
2000 to 2007 (to be at risk the individual must not have founded a firm previously and below
age 65). The interaction term is greater than one and statistically significant, indicating that
there was a stronger effect on those with Master's degrees for increasing the probability for
entrepreneurial behavior. The coefficient on Master's degree alone is below one and
significant indicating that before the institutional change, those with Master's degrees were less
likely to found firms. The same interaction was included with Doctorate degree. Dummy
variables equal to one for those who were at risk for entering entrepreneurship for the first time
between 1991 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2007 are included (1978-1990 is the omitted
category).
In Models 4-2 through 4-7, the results for the controls are largely the same, with one
exception. In some of the models individuals are significantly less likely to transition from a
government job to entrepreneurship. Like academic jobs, positions in government have been
historically very prestigious and stable so this is expected. 70 In some models, returnees who
69 Human capital as measured by education (Fairlie, Woodruff 2007, Fairlie, Robb 2008, Baumol 2004,
Dunn, Holtz-Eakin 2000, Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny 1991, Roberts, 1991) or work experience is clearly
related to entrepreneurship. Macroeconomists also have a long tradition of examining the impact of
education on growth (Bils, Klenow 2000). Recent reviews of the literature on education and
entrepreneurship and on the returns to education more generally have been compiled by others (van der
Sluis, J., van Praag, Vijverberg 2004, Card 1999). Murphy et al. (1991) acknowledge that the direction of
causality may be reversed here, however: countries with faster growth may provide more engineering jobs
and may support more engineering education. Roberts (1991) shows a curvilinear relationship between
education level of high-tech entrepreneurs and their firms' overall performance, with Master's degree
recipients doing best.
70 There is an on-going debate, however, about the extent to which elites in transitional economies have
been able to translate their power into economic benefits and the mechanisms that allow such a transfer
(Walder 2002, 2003, Nee 1996).
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were educated or worked abroad are also less likely to found firms. The returnees are also
more likely to take jobs in business rather than in government or academia. Models 4-2
through 4-7 substitute a series of measures of human capital into the equation. In general, they
show the robustness of the results to various observable measures of human capital including
parents' education (found in the psychology literature to correlate with the child's test scores),
whether the individual was promoted to general or technical manager, higher GPA, higher
salary and whether the individual held one of the higher ranking student leader positions. The
results are also robust to including an indicator for whether the parents' education level was
above the median. The number of years of work experience is the only measure where the
result does not come out as significant. In all models, the coefficient on the human capital
measure (not the interaction term) is below one and significant indicating a lower likelihood of
founding a firm for those with higher human capital during the pre-1999 period. The main
results are mostly robust to the calculation of robust standard errors.
If the impact of the market development of the institutional environment was to raise
returns to entrepreneurship rather than lower the barriers to entry, then the coefficient on the
interaction terms between human capital and the post-period should be greater than one. This
is indeed the case and the size of the effect is large. This result can be interpreted as consistent
with increase in the propensity for entrepreneurship among individuals higher in the talent
distribution.
Unobservable Ability
Any study of human capital and entrepreneurship must reflect concern about
unobserved ability levels. At least four drawbacks exist to using the observable measures. The
first is that the observable measures of human capital are not pure measures of underlying
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ability and may be conflated by the influence that family background may have on both the
likelihood of being able to afford and attend graduate school and having access to the resources
necessary to become an entrepreneur. Similarly, being promoted, having a higher salary and
even a higher GPA could potentially be influenced by the family socio-economic status and
likelihood of paying for tutoring or having important family connections.7" The second
concern with the observable measures is that with the market development of the institutional
environment, the salaries available in the wage sector should have been improving as well and
in that case, increasingly, only those who are truly talented (or who happen upon very good
entrepreneurial opportunities) would become entrepreneurs, even if the institutional
environment for entrepreneurship was not improving. Third, there may be shifts in the
marginal individual obtaining a graduate degree, or becoming promoted as conditions change.
Fourth, it may be more convenient to have a more continuous underlying measure of talent to
be able to test changes in the shape of the distribution of those becoming entrepreneurs. To
address these possibilities, the next section explores the impact of other, "unobservable"
measures of underlying ability.
Ordered Logit Income Regression and the residual measure of underlying ability
Finding a measure of underlying ability is challenging. 72 The method used in this paper
exploits the data on salaries at the end of each job spell and uses the residuals from a wage
regression. It is possible to use higher or lower than expected performance in the most recent
job to generate an underlying ability measure. In the first stage, a regression is performed with
71 It is important to note that the (self-reported) parents' wealth level is controlled for, so the estimates are
consistent with a story that controlling for family background, via all other observable work history
characteristics, then relatively higher ability individuals may have had better outside options yet
increasingly chose entrepreneurship.
72 Some have used cross-sectional salary levels; however, these may be more a function of
contemporaneous external labor markets, macroeconomic conditions, opportunity costs, or specific career
path choices than underlying ability (Elfenbein, Hamilton, Zenger 2008).
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the most recent (pre-entrepreneurial) income as the dependent variable and independent
variables include the year, job type (business, academia, government, etc.), tenure, graduation
year, etc. The residuals from this regression can then be thought of as either positive or
negative shocks to the salary level relative to what the individual might have expected given
her family socio-economic status, education and career choices. General measurement error
will also be present, but should reduce the likelihood of a significant finding. Many factors and
components of ability or skill will still be amalgamated in this residual term including
potentially social skills, social network, and any other individual capabilities which influence
higher salaries in the wage sector. Nonetheless, methodologically this is a step in the right
direction. Since the last (pre-entrepreneurship) salary for the entrepreneurs would be farther in
the past than for the non-entrepreneurs, a 2:1 matched sample of non-entrepreneurs was created
by matching on both graduation year and last job year for the entrepreneurs. This reduces the
sample size, but allows for a control for the year that the salary is measured which should
control for inflation and trends in the increase in wage sector salaries.
A component of the residuals indicates performance in each job which can be
contributed to the individual controlling for education, year and work history. 73 The results of
the income regression used to generate the residuals are shown in Appendix E. An ordered
logit specification is used because the dependent variable is the pre-entrepreneurship salary for
each job (six categories for salary bands earned at the end of each job spell).74 The regression
is of the form:
73 Independently, a very similar method is already being used to capture talent levels (Andersson,
Freedman, Haltiwanger, Lane, Shaw 2006).
74 One might attempt to estimate the unobserved ability by using the multiple employment observations
over each individual using fixed effects wage regressions in the first stage. As a robustness check, this
method was also implemented. The residual measure described above is positively correlated with
individual fixed effects calculated in this way. However, the methodology relies on panel data on salaries
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Yi = a + YiXi + Ei
where Yit is each individual's total income (including bonuses) in job t and Xit is a
vector of education, work experience, job type, graduation year, and regional variables.
Individuals having worked in business, having higher education levels, overseas educational
and work experiences, and a higher parental economic status are all associated with higher
salaries.
Insert Table 5 about here
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Panel A of Table 5 shows the results from a quantile regression using the income
residuals as the dependent variable and dummy variables equal to 1 if the individual founded a
first firm in each of three time periods (Koenker, Hallock 2001).75 This method is largely
equivalent to regressing the residuals on a dummy variable for becoming an entrepreneur in
each period and allows an examination of the relationship between being located at a point on
the talent distribution and founding a firm. The post-1999 time period is the one of interest and
the 1990s is used as a comparison as well as the pre-1990 time period. Column 1 (10th
percentile) compared to Column 5 (the 9 0th percentile) shows that those at the bottom of the
prior to entrepreneurship and the survey is essentially a cross-section. In addition, the individual fixed
effects have the drawback of being only a time-invariant component of ability and the capability to learn
more quickly on the job over time may be more important for entrepreneurship. In cases where the
coefficients need to be interpreted, a negative binomial can be preferable to an ordered logit. However, in
the negative binomial specification, the idea that the categories are ordered from lower to higher salary
categories is not captured.
75 Quantile regression shares many of the attractive properties of ordinary least squares (OLS) or mean
regression, yet has the advantage of allowing changes in the shape of the entire conditional distribution to
be examined. The results are robust to using a dummy variable for residuals above or below the median
and using a logit specification. Using the residuals as the dependent variable avoids possible concerns
about computing standard errors if the residual is entered as an independent variable.
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distribution were more likely to found firms in earlier time periods and those of highest
underlying ability are significantly more likely to found firms during the post-1999 time period.
Panel B uses quantile regression to show that individuals higher in the talent distribution were
associated with more profitable firms. Since heteroscedasticity is one of the motivations for
using quantile regression, the bootstrap method (with 100 repetitions) is used to generate
standard errors (Horowitz 2001, Rogers 1992). The results support the idea that there was not
less entrepreneurship among individuals lower in the distribution of talent. Also the results
provide some initial evidence for hypothesis 3, that these individuals were more likely to found
firms in the years after the 1988 reduction in barriers to entry.
Effects on Start-up Firm Productivity
To more directly show that returns to human capital in entrepreneurship increased
relative to wage employment is difficult since it is hard to know the salaries of entrepreneurs
had they remained in wage jobs. However, Table 6 uses differences-in-differences estimates to
see whether the returns in entrepreneurship to human capital increased in the post-period. The
dependent variable in Models 6-1 to 6-4 is the natural log of the average profit margin for the
firm. Models 6-5 to 6-8 use the log of the income of the founder from the business as the
dependent variable. Since these dependent variables take only non-negative values and can be
thought of as being censored at zero, a tobit model is used (the results are robust to using a
Poisson and not taking the log of the dependent variables).76 The regressions interact the
human capital measures with a dummy variable indicating whether the individual founded the
firm in the post-period. The results robustly support the idea that higher human capital
individuals appear to have had higher returns to entrepreneurship after the institutional reform.
76 Respondents were asked for profits as a percentage of revenues. Those with negative profits or no
revenues can be considered censored at zero.
178
The results become even stronger when run without using robust standard errors.
Insert Table 6 about here
Next we ask whether after the 1988 reform that reduced entry barriers (legalizing
private firms with more than eight employees) entrepreneurs were drawn from lower in the
human capital distribution. Table 7 shows Cox hazard rate regression results, but just including
individuals at-risk for founding a firm between 1988 and 1999. The results are that those
founding firms during this period were more likely to be drawn from the lower end of the talent
distribution. The results, along with prior empirical work (Nanda, 2008, Xu and Zhao, 2008)
are consistent with hypothesis 3.77
Insert Table 7 about here
To further examine how the changing macro-economic environment may affect
entrepreneurial activity, yearly data on several measures of the broader economic environment
in China were compiled mainly from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics 78 and filled in
with data from other sources such as the World Bank and Chinese statistical yearbooks. These
variables were regressed on the number of new start-up firms established. Data on new firm
formations were from the Tsinghua survey described above. To get enough observations to
make the regressions meaningful, the data go back to 1959 through 2007, however, the earliest
firm founding in our data was 1964. The results here should be interpreted with caution due to
the small sample size and the unreliable nature of economic data in China, particularly from
77 The interpretation that lower human capital individuals were better represented among entrepreneurs
before the 1988 reform is not ruled out by this analysis but seems extremely unlikely given the conditions
in China and prior findings (Xu and Zhao, 2008).
78 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
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earlier time periods. These results are reported in Appendix G. Since the dependent variable is
a count of the number of new firms established that year, negative binomial regressions are
used and the independent variables are lagged by 1 year. Dummy variables for 1988
(indicating the reform allowing eight or more employees in a private firm) and for 1999 are
included. The results support the idea that the 1999 and 1988 institutional reforms led to higher
levels of entrepreneurship even when controlling for other macro-economic factors. The
macro-economic conditions in China impact both positive and negatively the level of
entrepreneurship. 79
The regressions in Appendix I test whether the human capital measures are transferrable
and associated with higher entrepreneurial productivity. In addition to controls for whether the
firm was bought, privatized and its age, industry, city, founding year, and graduation year fixed
effects are included in all models. For the unobserved ability measure calculated from the
wage regression residuals, these residuals are recalculated on just the sample of the founders
for the performance analysis. For Model (1) this underlying ability measure has a positive and
significant effect on the firm profits. Model (2) finds that none of the human capital measures
have a significant effect on firm revenues (or the sample size is not large enough to detect it).
In Model (3), those with more years of education or who were promoted start firms with greater
numbers of employees. The human capital measures are not significantly related to firm
survival (in theory there are conflicting effects since those with higher opportunity costs may
be quicker to close underperforming firms). Finally, Model (5) uses a logit regression on a
dependent variable that indicates whether the founder indicated that intellectual property was
79 The results show that higher GDP per capita (in 0.1 billion RMB), lower Shanghai Stock Exchange
Market Capitalization, and few domestic patents issued, are associated with higher levels of
entrepreneurship. Results are robust to contemporaneous and two year lags, except the year dummy
variables are not robust to two year lags.
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important for the start-up or not as an indicator of innovation. Those who had higher education
levels, higher wage regression residuals, and who had worked in R&D positions were more
likely to start firms where innovation and intellectual property were considered important. In
general, the results show evidence that relatively more talented individuals indeed start firms
which are higher in productivity. 80
Discussion
Overall the results support the main thesis of this paper. Reforms in the institutional
environment in the period after 2000 reduced constraints to growth and returns to
entrepreneurship increased relative to wage employment. The evidence for this is that post-
2000 individuals with higher human capital were relatively more likely to engage in
entrepreneurship and had higher economic returns.
Endogeneity and Alternative Explanations
Five possible mechanisms may be behind an observation of reforms in the institutional
environment and increased entrepreneurship. Other empirical work has already used
instrumental variables approaches to largely alleviate concerns one through three (Acemoglu,
Johnson 2005). First, entrepreneurs may be causing the improvement in institutions (reverse
causality). Work on the political economy of private entrepreneurs in China suggests that they
have not coalesced into a unified political movement, reducing concerns of lobbying for
institutional reforms (Tsai 2005). Second, market opportunities may be driving both changed
institutions and increased entrepreneurship. Either anticipated technological opportunities or
poor wage employment opportunities may be causing both an increase in entrepreneurship and
80 A further implication of the results is that the 1999 reform may have altered the incentives for
individuals to invest in (certain types) of human capital. Future work may look for this implication that
with greater incentives for entrepreneurial activity, individuals may have altered their investment
decisions in the direction of the types of skills relevant for entrepreneurship.
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efforts to improve the institutional environment. This endogeneity concern is not easily ruled
out. Several factors together alleviate the concern to some degree. Prior literature using
instrumental variables techniques suggests that there is a direct causal effect of institutions on
economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson 2005). Next, removing internet and software industries
(the most likely candidates for anticipated technological opportunities) only reinforces the
results. Also, this story suggests that government bureaucrats saw technological opportunities
arising and that they then designed institutions to reduce growth barriers. Yet, despite the 1999
amendment being intended to move China toward a market economy, accounts do not describe
it as intending to encourage more talented entrepreneurs (OECD, 2007, Qian, 2000).81 The
third mechanism is that changes in the investor community or competitive environment may be
causing changes in the type of entrepreneurs being selected for funding. Fourth, the set of
institutions that resulted from market development in the more recent period could be lowering
the barriers to entry, which may lead to more individuals of lower quality or with lower payoff
ideas to become entrepreneurs. Fifth, the set of institutions in the more recent period could be
leading to better outcomes for entrepreneurs and encouraging others who are higher in the
talent distribution to become entrepreneurs.
Still other interesting possible alternative explanations and mechanisms merit further
analysis: (a) universities and research institutes themselves became more profit oriented and
sought to invest in the ventures they knew most about, those of their own students, and the
university had better information on underlying ability levels; (b) the demography of the
funders/lead investor community itself might have changed and its preferences perhaps leaned
towards higher ability individuals or technically skilled entrepreneurs with real marketable
81 Since 1986, the government had attempted to encourage high tech entrepreneurship so this was not new
as of 1999 (Zhang, Li, Schoonhoven 2008).
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research output; (c) the nature of the economic opportunities or competition changed as China
liberalized and the available opportunities required those with higher ability levels; (d)
increased college student enrollment led to a flood of graduate students with limited wage job
opportunities; (e) payoff to skills, demand for innovation/R&D in the economy increased; (f)
increased legitimacy may have led higher status individuals to become entrepreneurs and
higher status also happens to be correlated with ability. The available evidence is used to
address these mechanisms.
University investing. First is the idea that the universities and research institutes
became more profit oriented and then invested preferentially in the spinoffs created by their
own students or professors for which they had more information. A question on the survey
asked whether Tsinghua played a role in either directly funding the startup or in helping to find
funding. Only 13 respondents indicated "yes" to either question. Thus, it seems that university
funding does not explain the results. 82
Shifting investor community. The demography or preferences of the investor
community may have changed. This explanation is harder to rule out since the question cannot
be addressed head-on without data on the demography of investors and their investment
preferences. Specifically, the dotcom boom in the U.S. inspired both investors and
entrepreneurs to seek out internet and software opportunities in China. To test this explanation,
the analyses were re-run, dropping all internet and software firms from the sample and the
results hold with coefficients of slightly higher magnitude. Nonetheless, it is important to note
that the venture capitalists that we talked with indicated that VCs in China primarily tended to
focus on later stage private equity deals and non-technology start-ups. Certainly changes were
82 Furthermore, during the 1990s the largest increases in university-affiliated start-ups occurred due to
funding cuts and the universities' need to generate operating revenues. During the 2000s, as funding for
top universities increased the number of such enterprises declined.
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occurring in the investor community during this time. 83 However, the main effects should have
been for later stage firms. 84
Changing Opportunities. The nature of the entrepreneurial opportunities or the
competition increased such that potential entrepreneurs located relatively lower in the talent
distribution were screened out and the opportunities were only available to entrepreneurs with
higher human capital levels. Other forms of this same argument are that perhaps the payoff to
skills in entrepreneurship increased or the demand for innovation and R&D in the economy
increased.85 Again, the fact that the result remains and grows stronger with the elimination of
software and internet firms provides some evidence inconsistent with this interpretation. The
results also hold when all 193 firms indicating that intellectual property would be important for
their success were dropped. The results in Panel A of Table 5 provide evidence against the idea
that there was a decrease in entrepreneurship among the lower tail of the talent distribution.
Finally, Appendix F shows that there were not increases in the returns to talent in the wage
sector after the reform.
Labor Market. On the supply side, the number of students enrolling in tertiary education
in China dramatically increased since the 1990s. According to the National Bureau of Statistics
83 In March 1998 China implemented a number of policies to promote venture investments (Batjargal, Liu
2004). The initial venture capital funds within China were backed by the government, however, and had
both policy as well as financial objectives. Total annual venture capital investments in China grew from
virtually nothing in 1990 to $858 million in 2000 (Batjargal, Liu 2004).
84 There are actually two separate questions here. The first is whether new types of investors entered the
market, who were more interested in high quality individuals rather than the merits of the idea alone or its
alignment with policy objectives. The second question is whether the existing investors shifted their
preferences towards high ability founders. Only twenty-five of the firms in the sample reported venture
capital funding, so the relevant investor groups would mainly have been informal (angel investors).
Anecdotal evidence from the interviews does not appear to support this notion since the entrepreneurs
indicated that most of the informal (angel) investors in China made their money in traditional industries.
While they want to diversify into technology firms, many reported that their informal investors were not
knowledgeable about technology industries and thus would not be expected to have greater capacity to
select based on ability.
85 It has been argued that Chinese managers imitated some of the practices of Western managers (Guthrie
1999). Some have suggested that there was imitation of the U.S. dotcom entrepreneurs.
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of China, restricting the definition to four year colleges and universities, the total number of
graduates has gone from 830,000 in 1998 to just over three million in 2005. Since 1999, the
number of undergraduate and graduate students has grown at nearly 30% per year.86 If
traditional job demand could not accommodate this increased supply, many of these individuals
may have turned to entrepreneurship. However, while possibly true more broadly, this type of
explanation does not seem likely for the individuals in this study since alumni from the top
engineering school in the country should have had no problems finding employment. Second,
for this account to be correct, one would expect that it is primarily the individuals from the
lower end of the talent distribution who both have trouble finding acceptable wage employment
and thus who opt into entrepreneurship. This implication is contradicted by the data in 5-3 on
the increase coming from the higher end of the talent distribution.
Increased legitimacy. An alternative explanation is that the increase in entrepreneurship
among more talented individuals is not due to changing incentives in the institutional
environment, but rather to the increasing legitimacy of entrepreneurship in China during this
time. Changes in legitimacy may be highly correlated with changes in the institutional
environment. Xu and Zhao (2008) use a national dataset from 1978-1996 in the China
Statistical Yearbook and argue that as entrepreneurship became fully legitimized by 1996,
particularly at the local level, greater numbers of high-status individuals (Communist party
cadres and those with more education) became entrepreneurs at a more rapid rate. However,
status and education also tend to correlate with ability. Interviews seem to indicate that by the
end of the 1990s, entrepreneurship was already seen as a legitimate career option. According
to Xu and Zhao (2008), entrepreneurship was already fully legitimized by the mid-1990s, and
86 However, evidence indicates that quantity has been expanded at the expense of the quality of the
graduates (Gereffi, Wadhwa, Rissing, Ong 2008).
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legitimate enough by 1996 (when their data end) that government officials and highly educated,
high status individuals were becoming entrepreneurs at faster rates than lower status individuals.
They measure legitimacy by the state's official recognition of private enterprise in 1988 when
private businesses with eight or more employees were granted "organization" status. Their
analysis ends in 1996, the year before the state "fully recognized private business as an
important component" in the economy. It is reasonable to believe that entrepreneurial activity
was seen as quite legitimate by 1997 by when most (74%) of the pre-2000 foundings occurred.
Also, a control for the graduation year controls for more recent graduates viewing
entrepreneurship as more desirable. Even controlling for such trends, the propensity for higher
ability entrepreneurs to found firms appears to increase. Perhaps most convincing are the
results in Appendix C. If the effect is due to legitimacy, then one should see higher status
individuals (who had more to lose previously) becoming entrepreneurs at a higher rate
(Giordano 1983, Xu, Zhao Jan. 2008). Thus, a dummy variable was added indicating whether
the individual was high status (government officials, and Communist party members) and this
variable is interacted with the dummy for the post-1999 time period. The coefficient is
insignificant while the human capital measure remains significant indicating that a change in
legitimacy does not appear to explain away the results. Furthermore, the analysis here controls
for many status factors, such as level in the government, education and academic positions, so
the results indicate that even after controlling for status, still individuals located higher in the
talent distribution became entrepreneurs at significantly higher rates post-2000. The current
paper offers support for a different explanation for the rise in entrepreneurship, one that focuses
more on incentives for more talented individuals to form private businesses and less on the
roles of status and legitimacy.
186
Robustness
Three dimensions appear important for checking robustness on for these results:
different talent measures, a subset of the sample where confidence is higher, and different
model specifications.
Robustness to different talent measures. For those with prior jobs in business, the data
include whether they had been promoted to general manager positions. The results are robust
to using many observable ability measures. An alternative measure of "pull" entrepreneurship
(Klepper, 2008) is whether the Bachelor's or Masters major matches the industry of the start-up
that the individual founded. This proportion goes from just under 30% before 1999 to 40%
post-1999 (p<0.05; t = 1.759).
Time invariant underlying ability. The results are robust to using the data on job spells
to create a panel of multiple observations on each individual and using the wage regression to
generate individual fixed effects. The main results are also robust to using a logit rather than
the hazard model. The underlying ability measure is robust to using a negative binomial rather
than the ordered logit.
The number of responses was lower for graduates during 1947-1951 and 1970-1980.
The first period is the time of the Communist revolution and the second period is the time of
the Cultural Revolution during which university activities were impaired. To check whether
the results were affected by response bias during these times, the analyses were repeated
dropping all observations during these two time periods and the results hold.
Limitations
It is useful to keep in mind three data-related issues: representativeness, response rates
and self-reporting. The first issue is the extent to which inferences made from this dataset apply
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to entrepreneurship in general. The data for this study come from alumni of a very important
academic institution in China. It is important to note that these are alumni and therefore the
sample is not limited to those currently associated with Tsinghua or to technology coming from
Tsinghua. I do not claim generalizability across the spectrum of entrepreneurial activity;
however, the sample represents an interesting and important population of individuals.8 7 To the
extent that individuals at the bottom of the talent distribution are excluded, the exact slope
estimates will be biased. A second issue is possible response bias. For example, graduates who
started a company but were unsuccessful may well not have reported these failed firms, either
by omitting them from their responses or by not participating in the study at all. Next is the
issue of self-reporting. Older respondents, especially those who have started multiple
companies, may display a memory bias in which some companies, possibly those which were
relatively unsuccessful, are not reported. This may lead to the appearance that younger
entrepreneurs are starting more (though less successful) firms on average. Older entrepreneurs
may have been less likely to respond to a university survey if such alumni ties weaken over
time.88
Two more conceptual issues should be considered. The first is identification and there
are two main concerns. It is not unambiguous that the 1999 policy reform only lowered
barriers to growth without also lowering barriers to entry. If the effect of the reform was
87 While those with a technical education and knowledge workers are seen as an increasingly important
part of the economy, we know relatively little about what drives them to start technology based
enterprises (Roberts 2004). National samples of entrepreneurship may be more representative of
entrepreneurship broadly defined, but probably not of technology-based entrepreneurship. Moreover,
comparing national samples of entrepreneurship is challenging, as data sampling strategies vary
depending on the subject matter of study (compare, for example studies of self-employment (Blau 1987)
and manufacturing (Dunne, Roberts, Samuelson 1988). With these caveats in mind, note that very few
datasets exist of entrepreneurial activity in China, especially for technically trained individuals, so in this
sense the present study represents a step forward.
88 During the interviews many older alumni assured that they feel a very strong bond with Tsinghua and
the Alumni Association which reassures us that there were not large biases in the age of respondents.
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primarily to lower barriers to entry then the results could be interpreted as consistent with the
conventional view. Five pieces of evidence help to allay concerns. First, access to a similar
survey of MIT alumni enables a robustness check (Hsu, Roberts, Eesley 2007). During the
dotcom boom years of 1998-2000 there was a perception of increased returns to
entrepreneurship. Anecdotal reports exist of many MBA students and alumni at elite business
schools founding firms. If similar results were not found in the U.S. during this time then it
would cast doubt on the robustness of the results. Results for a similar differences-in-
differences hazard rate analysis using the MIT alumni dataset reinforce the findings. The
interaction term between years of education and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual
was 'at-risk' of a first firm founding during 1998-2000 is greater than one and statistically
significant. Results for a placebo regression using the pre-boom years (1995-1998) were
insignificant. Second, in the data from Tsinghua, a set of 'placebo' regressions were run using
1997 and 1998 as the cutoff year instead of post-1999. As expected, the differences-in-
differences estimates lose their statistical significance when the wrong year is chosen for the
policy change. Third, the results in Tables 5 and 6 more directly test whether increased returns
to entrepreneurship occurred after the reform. Fourth, results from income regressions show
that there were not higher returns to talent in wage employment during this time period,
alleviating concerns that the reform had broader effects (Appendix F). Fifth, qualitative
evidence from interviews indicates that lower barriers to entry were not perceived as a result of
the reform, but rather that it was possible to create a high growth business during the post-1999
time period. As long as the primary effect was to increase returns to talent in entrepreneurship,
if entry barriers were marginally lowered then the interpretation here is still sound. If other
changes were happening in China that were both highly co-linear with the changes in the
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institutional environment post-1999 and acted primarily to increase the returns to human capital
in entrepreneurship, they would be difficult to disentangle. It is possible that the analysis may
pick up the effects of earlier reforms. If the earlier reforms primarily act in the same direction
this would introduce the 'treatment' effect in the pre-2000 time period and should be making it
harder to see an effect.
Next, unobserved heterogeneity is a valid concern which can never be entirely
addressed. 89 The fixed effects robustness check alleviates this concern, however there may be
unobservable attributes of the past work experience which drives the distinction between the
measure of talent and are also correlated with entrepreneurship, such as working in a
multinational corporation. One of the advantages of our dataset is the relative uniformity of
Tsinghua alumni. This should provide some level of uniformity in unobservable characteristics,
especially compared to other datasets of entrepreneurs. Academic department dummy
variables and a well-defined sample population help alleviate concerns that various sources of
unobserved heterogeneity are driving our findings.
Regional variation exists in the institutional environment in China and traditionally
movement of individuals across regions was restricted. However, the coastal provinces have
experienced quicker market development of the institutional environment in many ways and
much higher overall economic growth. Future work will take advantage of regional variation
of reforms. 90
89 Propensity score matching models would better address heterogeneity concerns, yet a propensity score
matching model is not possible to implement in this context since there is no suitable untreated control
group of individuals (untreated here would mean that they did not live in China after 2000 or had already
founded a firm prior to 2000).
90 In recent years some policies allowed movement of technically trained employees across provinces.
Therefore, the regional variation does not provide an opportunity for identification when only looking at
coastal provinces versus others. Entrepreneurship does not appear to have been higher in the coastal
provinces which is consistent with these areas having better wage employment opportunities.
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Boundary Conditions
The results appear to open up an interesting line of research. However, given the
complexity and diversity of entrepreneurs and of institutional environments, lowering barriers
to entry is unlikely to draw increased entrepreneurial behavior from those lower in the talent
distribution in all research samples. Similarly, lower barriers to growth may not always
increase the propensity for entrepreneurship among individuals higher in the talent distribution.
Considering the sample used, it is vital to outline certain boundary conditions. The theory
should apply outside of the context of Tsinghua graduates so long as at least four boundary
conditions hold: 1) the types of skills and talent necessary to overcome entry barriers are not
largely orthogonal to those useful for firm growth; 2) feedback loops are weak: that is,
increases in the number of entrepreneurial firms do not strongly increase competition or create
significantly better wage employment opportunities; 3) the initial relationship between talent
and returns to entrepreneurship is not one where primarily those at the top of the talent
distribution become entrepreneurs; and 4) sufficient variation exists in the distribution of talent
(by measures relevant for wage and entrepreneurial payoffs) in the sample at risk for
entrepreneurship.
First if the skills that are useful for generating returns in entrepreneurship are unrelated
to the skills (or endowments) needed to overcome entry barriers then the theory will not hold.
Second, if increases in entrepreneurship by those of higher ability increase competition
significantly then this feedback mechanism should act to bring expected returns to
entrepreneurship back down. Similarly, if increased entrepreneurship results in significantly
better wage employment opportunities then this will counterbalance the returns to
entrepreneurship relative to wage work. Third, in some cases the relationship between human
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capital and returns to entrepreneurship may be initially represented by a line or curve that
begins below the curve for returns to wage work and only intersects at the high end of the
distribution. A shift upwards in the curve for returns to ability in entrepreneurship would then
increase entrepreneurship among those of relatively lower talent levels. Finally, for research
settings without sufficient variation in the talent distribution it should be more difficult
empirically to find results.
Our data comprise a representative sample of Tsinghua alumni not selected based on
entry (or successful entry) into entrepreneurship. 91 While generalizations to all entrepreneurs
are challenging, the advantages of this dataset are the systematic survey methodology, the
number of years covered, the number of observations and detailed work histories as well as the
ability to compare the founders' characteristics with their classmates who had largely the same
educational experience but did not become entrepreneurs. The data include individuals who
were very successful in their careers as well as many who had low salaries, were fired or never
promoted. The Tsinghua dataset is one of the first systematic large-scale records of
technology-based entrepreneurial activity in China.
Conclusions
The impact of the institutional environment on entrepreneurship has conventionally
been seen at its worst as severely constraining entrepreneurial behavior via difficulty in raising
start-up capital, insecure property-rights, or unreliable courts and contracts, and at its best as
allowing market incentives to work. Yet the very high rate of entrepreneurship in less
developed countries leaves a puzzle for this conception of the role of market institutions. The
91 The Tsinghua data contain wide variation in firm sizes, number of operating years, and outcomes so
they do not share to the same extent the limitation of other entrepreneur datasets in only sampling
successful founders.
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other side of the coin is the puzzle of why certain countries that have rapidly adopted
institutions of privatization and financial liberalization have not experienced higher levels of
growth from entrepreneurship (McMillan, Woodruff 2002, Frye, Shleifer 1997)? This paper
takes a step towards showing the type of institutional change that can induce individuals more
likely to succeed to become entrepreneurs.
To shed light on the impact that lowering barriers to growth may have for
entrepreneurship among individuals of differing human capital levels, a novel survey was
collected including entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial alumni covering multiple decades
when entrepreneurship began to emerge across China. The analysis uses a differences-in-
differences approach, exploiting a natural experiment with the 1999 Chinese constitutional
reform and detailed data on pre-entrepreneurship work history. This paper is one of the first to
combine a dynamic view of institutional change with a view on specifically who is most
affected by shifting incentives for entrepreneurship. The main results come in two stages. First,
a change in the institutional environment in 1999 which lowered the barriers to entrepreneurial
firm growth resulted in a greater increase in talented individuals becoming entrepreneurs.
Second, the results show that various measures of human capital are associated with founding
firms which become larger, more profitable, and are more likely to innovate.
These results are novel, not only for documenting for the first time that a policy change
results in higher quality entrepreneurship, but because they change the way we think about the
mechanisms through which institutions affect entrepreneurship. The findings change
previously held views in three different ways. First, the ability to overcome institutional
barriers to entry (either through connections or the capability to navigate a complex
bureaucracy) is not orthogonal to the aspects of ability which are important for commercial
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success in the market, but rather there is much overlap. Second, individuals with stronger
resumes and with better employment performance relative to their resume do carry over those
skills to the task of entrepreneurship with the implication that investors and entrepreneurs may
want to look for those characteristics. Third, policy may be able to influence not just the rate,
but the overall direction of innovative activity and the type of entrepreneurial firms in a society
by focusing less on the fixed start-up costs of entrepreneurship and more on the barriers to
growth and opportunity costs. Nevertheless, the results are not merely consistent with a
standard opportunity cost explanation. Rather, even controlling for opportunity costs and rising
salaries in the wage sector, the results in Table 5 show that the institutional shift had an additive
effect of its own.
The results have several implications. First, they contribute to the literature on
institutions and economic growth by shedding light on one mechanism by which certain
institutional environments contribute to economic growth. The paper provides a unique
theoretical link between institutions and the economics of entrepreneurship. Institutional
reforms alter the selection into entrepreneurship, not only by reducing barriers to entry, but by
shifting the directions in which talented individuals channel their energies in society (Baumol
1990). One important implication is that there may be two separate classes of institutions, one
that lowers barriers and costs to entry and another which lowers barriers to entrepreneurial
growth. Some have already begun to unbundle institutions, but the distinction between
institutions which have different mechanisms of action may be important to consider. 92 The
results have implications for developing economies, particularly those with a manufacturing
92 Examples of the first category may include government legalization and legitimatization of
entrepreneurship, property-rights institutions, and some types of financial and banking reform. Examples
of the second category may include subsidies and tax incentives for R&D, science parks and incubators,
licensing laws, IP protection, private equity and venture capital reforms, and changes in the regulatory
systems for mergers and acquisitions or IPO.
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sector that is looking to upgrade and to foster the emergence of technology-based
entrepreneurship as a driver of economic growth. For policy-makers, entrepreneurs, and
university officials to blindly apply theories tested in developed country contexts is not without
risk. The prior literature may be incorrect in conceptualizing the characteristics which allow
one to overcome institutional barriers to entry as being largely orthogonal to those important
for commercial success or entrepreneurial ability. Lowering barriers to entry may increase
entrepreneurship among individuals lower in the talent distribution (i.e. by reducing the costs of
entrepreneurial finance) (Nanda 2008, Wang, 2008). The results may lead to rethinking even
the theoretical predictions on liquidity constraints. Even the original model of Evans,
Jovanovic (1989) predicts constraints impacting the top quartiles of the ability distribution most
strongly, leading to the idea that liquidity constraints may actually be one of many types of
constraints to growth, rather than being most binding on entry. Buera (2008) shows that a
dynamic model of financial constraints yields more nuanced predictions than standard static
models. Testing his model with U.S. data, he shows that welfare costs are not due to
individuals with ability not starting businesses, but rather to undercapitalized entrepreneurs.
The results here may allow for targeted programs to encourage entrepreneurship among those
more likely to create high-impact organizations by focusing on growth of entrepreneurial firms.
The paper also provides groundwork for a talent-based theory of technology bubbles or
of the direction of technological progress. For strategy researchers, the findings contribute to
our understanding of who is selecting into entrepreneurial firms and also on the type of firms
and competition in the market. Previous work finds that institutions which reduce the
perceived risk in new sectors appear to result in greater use of novel technology by
entrepreneurs (Sine, Haveman, Tolbert 2005). Similarly, the results of this study show that
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individuals with higher levels of human capital were more likely to indicate that intellectual
property would be important for their firms and were more likely to found firms after the
reform. Prior theories of why we see waves of creative destruction have emphasized
differences between large and small firms in capabilities or incentives to innovate, while this
paper provides a theory of when and why human capital may flow in the direction of smaller
firms. Savvy entrepreneurs may capitalize on an awareness of shifts in the institutional
environment to begin recruiting more talented cofounders or to anticipate shifts in the
competitive landscape. Changes in the institutional environment could alter the basis of
competition, or open up new markets if it brings about entrepreneurial entry by a different
group of people. 93 Particularly in fast-paced industries, there may be room for the strategic
influencing of perceived payoffs in a particular market or for managers to avoid stiff
competition by searching for markets and technologies with payoffs that are falsely perceived
to be lower than elsewhere. A higher propensity for more talented individuals to become
entrepreneurs may result in stronger competition or result in more firms needing to use an
innovation strategy to avoid direct competition on price or market share. The results also show
that prior conflicting results on the human capital characteristics associated with
entrepreneurship may be due to differences in context. Some environments are more conducive
for altering the marginal costs, encouraging entrepreneurs to be drawn from relatively lower in
the talent distribution. Others alter the marginal benefits and foster entrepreneurship among
those with higher levels of human capital. The findings help guide those in larger organizations
93 Similarly, those interested in national innovation systems (Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993) or the related
literature on varieties of capitalism argue that while some capitalist economies are organized for radical
innovation and high growth (U.S.), others are better at other outcomes such as equality or incremental
innovation (Hall, Soskice 2001).
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looking to do more corporate venturing. 94 A better understanding of the incentives for
entrepreneurial behavior is important for product development and corporate entrepreneurship
efforts when structuring incentives to attract high ability employees towards risky new business
projects. Appendix H summarizes the implications for the competitive environment and for
entrepreneurs. This paper provides evidence that entrepreneurship in distinct institutional
environments may have different drivers and outcomes. 9 5
A key contribution of this paper is that there may be two different margins at which
institutions affect entrepreneurship. Prior literature has examined one margin, where potential
entrepreneurs are considering the costs and barriers to entry and are concerned primarily with
whether the resources necessary to begin the business can be gathered. Yet there is another
margin that has a greater impact on more talented individuals. Most of these individuals are
capable enough to creatively acquire the necessary resources to start a business if they wanted
to do so. Yet, they have good options in the wage sector and may be concerned more with the
relative payoffs and whether the size and type of business they wish to start can be achieved. 96
94 Prior work finds larger firms that select and reward managers based on performance grow faster and
have higher return on capital (Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, Sadun, 2008, Bertrand, Schoar 2003).
95 Previously, other scholars have suggested a necessary ordering to institutional reform, with
macroeconomic stability coming first and then financial liberalization needing to be tied to securing
property rights and market infrastructure (Johnson, McMillan, Woodruff 2000). China has certainly had
macroeconomic stability at least since the Cultural Revolution; however, it appears to be a counter
example in having experienced rapid growth despite ambiguous property rights. Others have suggested
that the idea of one ideal blueprint may be incorrect (Segal 2002, Breznitz 2007). The confusion may
reflect the literature's implicit assumption that the same market failures affect all potential entrepreneurs
equally from creating the same types of firms at all stages in market development. In the early stages of
market development, good wage employment options are not available and lower ability individuals
experience a strong push towards entrepreneurship but are resource constrained. At a middle stage in
market development, better wage opportunities are available and the resources to start small scale firms
can be gathered. Different market failures affect different individuals and different firm types at different
stages in development.
96 This is not to imply that potential entrepreneurs care only about pecuniary benefits (Hamilton 2000).
Nonetheless, it does appear that monetary outcomes are better for those higher in the ability distribution
(Hamilton 2000) and even the non-pecuniary benefits may only accrue if individuals can create the type
of firms they prefer to found and run.
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The results show that entrepreneurs and investors can screen for higher quality co-founders and
that policymakers can craft institutions to encourage more market entry by those who are more
likely to create high-growth, innovative firms. I provide evidence consistent with a story that
the institutional environment may be shaped to encourage a more Schumpeterian-type of
creative destruction rather than to increase marginal new firm creation by less talented
individuals (Schumpeter 1942).
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TABLE 1
Industry Breakdown
Industry Number of Firms Percentage
AEROSPACE 3 0.90
ARCHITECTURE 13 3.88
BIOTECH AND DRUGS 7 1.09
CHEMICALS 8 2.39
CONSUMER PRODUCTS 17 5.07
ELECTRIC 12 3.58
ELECTRONICS 69 20.60
ENERGY 14 4.18
FINANCE 10 2.99
INTERNET 33 9.85
LAW, ACCOUNTING 22 6.57
MACHINERY 19 5.67
MANAGEMENT 21 6.27
MATERIALS 13 3.88
MED DEVICES 4 1.19
OTHER MFG 16 4.78
PUBLISHING 11 3.28
SOFTWARE 34 10.15
TELECOM 9 2.69
TOTAL 335 100
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TABLE 2
Pairwise Correlations
2
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 1
1 Last job academia 1
2 Last job business
3 High government
4 Low government
5 Ever job academia
8 Number ofPositions
Avg. Tenure
Gender
Entrepreneur Parents
High Salary
Family economic
3 status
1
4 Student Leader
1
5 Communist Party
1
7 Master's
1 PhD
8 PhD
0.4
25
0.1
49
0.0
47
0.0
46
0.0
41
0.1
38
0.0
30
0.0
09
0.0
02
0.0
37
0.2
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0.0
80
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85
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1
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1
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2
1
9 Overseas Experience
2
0 Bachelor's Grad Year
Age
17
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0.0
99
14
0.0
83
0.4
33
0.4
38
25
0.0
44
0.1
30
0.1
36
0.0
76
0.2
42
0.2
36
0.1
47
0.4
57
0.4
71
0.1
30
0.1
60
0.1
71
1
0.2
32
0.2
40
0.9
89
213
,
1
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN SD
Panel A: Firm and Individual-level measures
First start-up founded Year in which first firm was founded 2000.38 5.20
(censored if not observed by 2007)
Firm age Age of the firm 3.50 2.44
Privatized =1 if firm was privatized 0.10 0.47
Entrepreneur =1 if the individual was an entrepreneur 0.26 0.46
Entrepreneur Parents =1 if parents were entrepreneurs 0.09 0.29
Graduation year Year of graduation (Bachelor's) 1980.66 17.80
Family economic status Family's economic status in China during college, 4-=top 3.78 1.01
10%, 3--top 10-25%, 2=top 25-50%, l=bottom 50%
Individual's age
Age Dummy = 1 if male 49.82 18.35
Gender 0.88 0.32
Panel B: Work history-level measures
Recent Salary Most recent pre-founding salary (5 categories) 3.32 1.43
Avg. Tenure Average number of years in each job 7.11 9.45
Number of Positions Number of different positions (R&D, sales & marketing, 2.37 1.26
general manager, etc. ) that were held
High government =1 if ever had job in government (minister, province, 0.03 0.17
Bureau or municipal levels
Low government =1 if ever had job in government (below municipal level) 0.17 0.38
Last job academia = 1 if last job was in academia (inclusive of 0.19 0.39
faculty, researcher, staff, etc)
Last job business = 1 if last job was in business 0.62 0.49
Everjob academia = 1 if ever had job in academia (inclusive of 0.32 0.47
faculty, researcher, staff, etc)
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TABLE 4
Cox Hazard Rate Regressions
Dependent Variable = Start-up founded (subjects start being at risk upon graduation)
Independent Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios, coefficients above 1.0 represent an increased likelihood of entrepreneurship; (N=1,821)
Variables (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) (4-5) (4-6) (4-7)
Master's degree
Master's x
POST
Doctorate
degree
Doctorate x
POST
Parents' edu.
Parent
edu.xPOST
Log (Work exp.)
Log(Work)
xPOST
Promoted
Promoted x
POST
High GPA
GPA x POST
Highest salary
(pre-founding)
Salary x POST
Student leader
Leader x POST
Years 2000-07
Years 1991-99
0.444* (0.12
** 1)
(0.04
0)
(0.08
9)
0.832* (0.02
** 2)
(0.02
0.999 7)
0.216*
**.
3.361*
(0.11
2)
(1.95
3)
0.350* (0.11
** 1)
(0.65
1.811* 1)
0.771* (0.07
* 9)
1.225*
(0.01 0.002*
6) **
(0.01 0.043*
(0.00
1)
(0.00
0.060*
**
0.056*
(0.01
9)
(0.01
0.012*
**
0.067*
(0.00
7)
(0.01
0.020*
**
0.064*
(0.00
6)
(0.01
0.007*
**
0.050*
(0.14
7)
(0.00
4)
(0.00
0.718* (0.09
* 7)
1.336*
0.027*
**
0.068*
(0.20
9)
(0.00
7)
(0.01
215
1.771 *
1.131
0.889
(0.58
1)
(0.63
0)
(0.54
9)
0.724*
**
1.417*
**
0.054*
**
0.064*
Overseas
Last job acad
Last job govt.
High
govt. (ever)
Low govt (ever)
Ever job acad
Num. positions
Gender
Entrep. parent
Family Wealth
Communist
Party
** 0)
(0.15
0.860 1)
(0.23
0.734 3)
(0.19
0.657 0)
(0.28
0.772 8)
(0.30
1.322 1)
(0.26
1.195 5)
1.361" (0.07
** 7)
(0.45
1.437 4)
(0.07
0.947 1)
(0.14
0.971 1)
(0.15
0.86
**
0.675*
0.390*
**
0.879
0.896
1.143
1.517*
*
1.305*
**
2.551"
**
0.54
1.078
1) 0.929
8)
(0.13
5)
(0.13
8)
(0.27
8)
(0.35
6)
(0.27
4)
(0.31
3)
(0.07
5)
(0.85
9)
(0.23
6)
(0.09
7)
(0.14
**
0.555*
**
0.205*
**
0.377*
1.139
0.916
1.531*
1.353*
**
1.820
0.486
1.110
1) 1.080
2)
(0.12
4)
(0.08
5)
(0.14
4)
(0.45
2)
(0.25
6)
(0.35
2)
(0.08
8)
(0.66
8)
(0.24
6)
(0.09
0)
(0.18
2)
Note: POST=Years 2000-07; 308 failures; 44,248 total years at risk; ***, **
**
0.622*
0.440*
0.607
0.913
1.306
1.491"
*
1.412*
**
1.990*
*
0.450*
1.015
0.967
1)
(0.12
3)
(0.15
7)
(0.19
0)
(0.36
1)
(0.30
6)
(0.30
2)
(0.08
8)
(0.63
8)
(0.19
7)
(0.07
6)
(0.14
4)
**
0.595*
0.512*
0.563*
1.015
1.385
1.236
1.324*
**
2.633*
**
0.482*
0.953
1.025
2)
(0.12
0)
(0.18
4)
(0.18
5)
(0.38
3)
(0.33
3)
(0.26
2)
(0.07
7)
(0.87
9)
(0.21
3)
(0.07
4)
(0.15
** 9)
(0.15
0.754 0)
0.369* (0.14
* 4)
(0.22
0.654 0)
(0.32
0.775 0)
(0.32
1.310 8)
(0.30
1.423* 1)
1.300* (0.08
** 0)
2.083* (0.71
* 0)
(0.26
0.5.9 1)
(0.07
0.982 9)
(0.12
3) 0.803
**
0.615*
0.482*
0.599
0.954
1.417
1.506*
*
1.345*
**
2.151"
0.488*
1.001
4) 1.033
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All models include controls for Bachelor's graduation year (age), Bachelor's Major (academic department), and region fixed effects.
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2)
(0.12
2)
(0.17
0)
(0.18
8)
(0.37
0)
(0.33
3)
(0.30
9)
(0.07
7)
(0.69
6)
(0.21
0)
(0.07
5)
(0.15
5)
TABLE 5
Quantile Regression on Unobservable Human Capital
Panel A Dependent variable = income residuals
Percentiles 10 25 50 75 90
Founded in 1978-89 0.737*** 0.502*** 0.085** -0.362** -1.427*
(0.229) (0.151) (0.039) (0.175) (0.777)
Founded in 1990-99 0.771*** 0.344*** 0.034 -0.094 0.206
(0.143) (0.131) (0.063) (0.201) (0.655)
Founded in 2000-07 0.571*** 0.740*** 0.429*** 0.736*** 0.586**
(0.181) (0.158) (0.122) (0.189) (0.232)
Constant -1.556*** -0.894*** -0.156*** 0.420*** 1.184***
(0.110) (0.098) (0.049) (0.110) (0.107)
Observations 595 595 595 595 595
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.034 0.021 0.042 0.023
Panel B Dependent variable = income residuals (Entrepreneurs only)
Percentiles 10 25 50 75 90
Ln(profit) 0.215 0.093 0.195 0.242** 0.246**
(0.295) (0.234) (0.155) (0.123) (0.126)
Controls
Ln(firm age) 0.479 0.332 0.273 0.241 0.196
(0.483) (0.434) (0.403) (0.379) (0.415)
Ln(registered capital) 0.154 0.110 -0.037 -0.022 0.010
(0.207) (0.146) (0.109) (0.109) (0.104)
Privatized 1.308 0.406 0.687 0.435 0.242
(1.182) (0.901) (0.690) (0.666) (0.752)
Bought 0.857 0.537 0.616 0.690 0.852
(1.324) (1.189) (0.847) (0.566) (0.544)
Ln(income from firm) -0.068 -0.074 -0.05 -0.015 -0.050
(0.112) (0.089) (0.063) (0.062) (0.053)
Constant -90.977 -61.093 -28.173 -17.581 -28.286
(98.614) (86.086) (62.509) (62.713) (70.683)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
Pseudo R-squared 0.461 0.360 0.293 0.418 0.601
The top of the talent distribution was more likely to found a tlrm atter 1999 and conaitional on tounaing
a firm, had higher profits. Dependent variable is the residual from the income regression in Appendix E.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 repetitions); Panel B uses newly generated residuals from the sample
of entrepreneurs only and includes founding year, industry, coastal region, Beijing and Shanghai
controls; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sample includes non-entrepreneurs matched on graduation year and job ending year.
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TABLE 6
Tobit Models: Returns to Human Capital in Entrepreneurship Increase Post-1999
Independent Log(profit margin) Log(income from start-up)
Variables (6-1) (6-2) (6-3) (6-4) (6-5) (6-6) (6-7) (6-8)
POST-1999
founding
Master 's degree
POSTx
Master's degree
High GPA
POSTx High
GPA
-0.301
(0.455)
-0.449
(0.276)
0.236
(0.345)
-0.448 -0.753 2.200**
(0.598) (0.563) (0.937)
-0.269
(0.340)
-0.279
(0.427)
0.639
(0.453)
-0.111
(0.412)
-0.523
(0.589)
0.866
(0.595)
-1.329
(0.977)
-1.037
(0.905)
1.783*
(1.039)
6.443**
-0.139 1.027 *
(0.686) (0.819) (1.861)
0.090
(0.928)
0.163
(1.054)
-1.191 -1.417
(0.737) (0.903)
2.348**
* 2.376**
(0.887) (1.042)
Income residual
POSTx income
residual
Promoted
POSTx
Promoted
Privatized
Bought
Log(revenues)
Log(registered
capital)
Log(employees)
Log(firm age)
Overseas
Coastal
province
Bach. Grad
year
3.239**
(0.901)
0.073
(0.255)
0.152
(0.312)
-0.900
(0.611)
1.751**
(0.768)
-0.297 -0.385 -0.083 -0.423
(0.400) (0.363) (0.758) (0.388)
-0.079
(0.586)
0.275**
(0.089)
0.226**
(0.111)
0.027
(0.152)
0.438
(0.486)
--
-0.106
(0.620)
0.274**
(0.093)
0.225**
(0.112)
0.024
(0.156)
0.614
(0.541)
-0.175
(0.299)
-0.022 -0.189
(0.660) (0.577)
0.242**
0.234** *
(0.098) (0.089)
0.305**
(0.126)
-0.056
(0.175)
0.087
(0.562)
0.272
(0.404)
-0.210*
(0.111)
-0.001
(0.154)
0.388
(0.583)
-0.234
(0.274)
0.986
(1.043)
3.233**
(1.165)
0.921
(1.015)
2.919**
(1.034)
2.624**
(0.987)
-1.123
(1.182)
5.803**
(1.678)
-1.307 1.264
(1.432) (1.141)
2.721"*
3.004** *
(1.430) (0.975)
0.334* 0.324 0.058 0.207
(0.194) (0.203) (0.249) (0.155)
-0.036
(0.256)
0.116
(0.392)
2.742*
(1.413)
0.772
(0.978)
0.044
(0.253)
0.021
(0.416)
0.804
(0.561)
0.557
(0.935)
-0.451
(0.377)
1.018*
(0.548)
1.157
(0.782)
1.119
(1.147)
0.029
(0.252)
-0.015
(0.351)
0.635
(0.513)
0.283
(0.891)
0.137 0.222 -0.592 0.191 -0.563 -0.709 0.657 -0.396
(0.254) (0.262) (0.385) (0.260) (1.002) (1.106) (1.320) (1.056)
0.011 0.013 0.022** 0.021* -0.052 -0.037 -0.028
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
-0.008
(0.035)
218
Constant
Observations
R-squared
-237.31 -320.76 -152.01 -213.95 -876.14
(643.57
(239.94) (278.33) (267.88) (301.93) )
149 147 94 147 150
0.27 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.15
76.92 50.50
(75.60) (77.01)
148 93
0.15 0.17
Standard errors are robust. The dependent variable is potentially censored below zero. Main results are robust to a
Poisson specification (as well as not taking the natural log). All independent variables are not run together due to
collinearity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All
models include controls for year and region fixed effects.
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23.04
(70.12)
148
0.18
TABLE 7
Years 1988 - 1999
Dependent Variable = Start-up founded (subjects start being at risk
upon graduation)
Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios (N=1,540 individuals)
Independent Variables (7-1) 1 (7-2) (7-3) 1 (7-4) (7-5) (7-6)
Master's degree
Doctorate degree
Low work exper. (0-10
yrs.)
work exper. (>30
Promoted
High GPA (above median)
Last Salary (Pre-
founding)
Overseas
Last job acad.
Last job govt
High govt. (ever)
Low govt (ever)
Ever job academia
Number ofpositions
Gender
Family Wealth
Communist Party
Bach.Grad. Yr.
0.675*
(0.158)
0.344**
(0.166)
1.333
(0.351)
0.060***
(0.039)
0.914
(0.247)
0.973
(0.413)
0.504
(0.219)
0.841
(0.504)
1.202
(0.356)
1.312
(0.419)
1.530***
(0.120)
1.062
(0.428)
0.753***
(0.078)
0.76
(0.167)
1.154***
(0.023)
0.745
(0.199)
0.744
(0.314)
0.513
(0.219)
0.964
(0.578)
0.985
(0.289)
1.105
(0.352)
1.489***
(0.115)
0.934
(0.375)
0.769***
(0.078)
0.807
(0.176)
1.090***
(0.026)
0.689
(0.251)
0.807
(0.217)
8.30E-01
(0.349)
0.509
(0.217)
0.883
(0.528)
1.079
(0.313)
1.155
(0.367)
1.499***
(0.118)
1.018
(0.410)
0.750***
(0.077)
0.77
(0.169)
1.145***
(0.022)
0.685*
(0.150)
0.775
(0.211)
1.02E+00
(0.434)
0.425*
(0.194)
0.807
(0.485)
0.927
(0.277)
1.184
(0.380)
1.527***
(0.126)
1.134
(0.456)
0.798**
(0.083)
0.774
(0.173)
1.107***
(0.022)
0.667***
(0.065)
1.154
(0.329)
8.62E-01
(0.408)
0.340**
(0.169)
0.987
(0.602)
1.137
(0.358)
1.227
(0.405)
1.414***
(0.120)
1.118
(0.478)
0.768**
(0.089)
0.776
(0.185)
1.099***
(0.025)
0.562**
(0.152)
0.641
(0.323)
1.500
(0.442)
dropped
0.686
(0.270)
1.288
(0.325)
0.694***
(0.071)
0.929
(0.280)
0.778
(0.384)
0.402*
(0.206)
0.916
(0.557)
0.963
(0.318)
1.425
(0.492)
1.288***
(0.117)
1.045
(0.464)
0.787*
(0.097)
0.808
(0.195)
1.067**
(0.029)
Note: coefficients below 1.0 represent a decreased likelihood of entrepreneurship; 102 failures; 30,716
total years at risk; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All models include controls for Bachelor's graduation year (age), and region fixed effects
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APPENDIX A: Roy Model
The base model here is a Roy Model as extended by Borjas (1987). Three cases will be
generated from the model, one where more talented wage employees become better performing
entrepreneurs, one where less talented employees become less talented entrepreneurs and a
final one where less talented employees become higher performing entrepreneurs. The case
that will apply depends on the returns to talent in entrepreneurship relative to the wage sector
(more precisely the variance in wage income relative to the variance in entrepreneurial income).
Economic intuition behind the model is that there is a trade-off between increased returns to
talent in one sector selecting talented individuals and the relative compression of wages in the
other sector subsidizing (and attracting) less talented workers. The paper examines the impact
on self-selection into entrepreneurship of a shift in the returns to entrepreneurship relative to
the wage sector implemented through a reform in the institutional environment. An increase in
this ratio should push self-selection towards the first case of positive hierarchical selection, a
finding supported by the results.
Consider the wage sector and entrepreneurship denoted as two labor markets 0 and 1,
respectively. Log earnings in the wage sector are given by:
Wo = go + F0
where Eo0 N (0, 0o2) . The de-meaned value of worker's 'skill' or talent in the wage sector can
be thought of as Eo. The wage sector earnings would be the following if everyone from the
wage sector were to migrate to entrepreneurship (ignoring general equilibrium effects):
Wl = g1 + 61
with El - N (0, a12).
Assume that the cost of becoming an entrepreneur is C, which can be relabeled as n = C/wo.
Further assume that n is constant, meaning that C is directly proportional to wo. Assume
further that each worker knows C, go, 1L and his individual epsilons: eo, 61. If C is higher than
the net present value of the future difference between wl and w0 then this represents a barrier
to entry. What can be inferred about what the wages for entrepreneurs would have been had
they stayed in wage employment? What would wages in entrepreneurship be for non-
entrepreneurs had they become entrepreneurs?
001
The correlation between entrepreneur and wage worker earnings is p -
where 01o is cov(co, 01). A worker will choose entrepreneurship if
(l -L 0 - n) + (E1- ) > 0 (1)
(Define the indicator variable I, equal to 1 if this selection condition is satisfied, 0 otherwise).
Define v = c1 - Fo. The probability that a randomly chosen worker from the wage sector
chooses to entrepreneurship is equal to:
P= Pr[v > (go - 1 + n)]
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1 (g g +
- 1- (D(z)
where 0 (-) is the CDF of the standard normal and z = (go - 1g + x) /o. Note that z is rising in
the mean earnings in the wage sector and the cost of becoming an entrepreneur. The larger is z,
the lower is the probability of entrepreneurship. So aP/ag0 < 0, aP/agI > 0, laP/x < 0. In this
model, lower barriers (costs) to entry increase the probability of entrepreneurship among all
individuals. So we can focus on self-selection rather than mean differences, from here forward
assume that ,1 z 10o.
Selection conditions
One can think about the institutional environment altering the returns to skill/talent in
entrepreneurship relative to the wage sector in the case of lowering barriers to entry. On the
other hand, lowering barriers to entry would lower the cost of becoming an entrepreneur. Now
I calculate the expectation of earnings in the wage sector for workers who choose to become
entrepreneurs.
E w0 Entrepreneur = g0 + E E0 o (2)>
= 90 + o0E -- > z
O+E{O I
Given the normality of 0o, E1, the expectation of Fo given some value v is simply equal to the
regression coefficient:
E [ 0 v - .vOv
Applying this to (2),
EO v 0 v  1v 1 v
00 00 O 2 -2 00O o
OOv v
000v av
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Due to the normalizations, the covariance cov(so, E1) is reduced by 1/cool and the variance of
v/ov is 1. We can rewrite (2) as:
E w 0 Entrepreneur =o + a0
E  > z
S v (3)
=go + POv(o E  i v >z]
go + POvO 1- (z)
where p (z) / (1 - D (z)) is equal to the conditional expectation of a standard normal random
variable truncated from the left at point z, which is the Inverse Mills Ratio. The IMR answers
what is the expectation of epsilon given that epsilon is greater than or equal to z? Or in other
words, what is the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, given that one has not founded a
firm already? One can calculate the expected wage in traditional employment for those who do
become entrepreneurs as:
E( w Entrepreneur = u1 + E - > (4)
= ul + Plv1 (-z)
Three Cases
Rearrange (3) and (4) to get:
E w0 Entrepreneur= u0 + POv (Z)
001 0 (z(z)
= u+ P-
0 01 1 - (D(z)
and
E wil Entrepreneur uI + plv 1 - (z)
0001 r I(z)
v Go 1 - D(z)
Where
p = as before. Define Qo = E (FoIl = 1), Qi = E (el 1 = 1). We now have three
0001
cases.
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Positive hierarchical sorting:
In this case, entrepreneurs are positively selected from the wage sector distribution and are also
above the mean of the entrepreneurship distribution: Qo > 0, Qi > 0. This will be true iff
1 > I andp _11(T
CT 0 (71
First, oI/ co > 1 implies that entrepreneurship has a higher 'return to skill' than the wage sector.
Second, p > co /o~, implies that the correlation between the skills valued in the wage sector and
in entrepreneurship is sufficiently high. If you were a skilled worker in wage work, you would
not want to become an entrepreneur with a very high return to skills if the skills valued in
entrepreneurship were uncorrelated (or negatively correlated) with skills value in wage work.
In other words, that talent is of a general enough nature to have a large component which is
transferable between wage work and entrepreneurship or that the type of talent necessary for
overcoming entry barriers is correlated with that required for higher returns once in
entrepreneurship. One way of restating this type of situation is: a wage sector with low
earnings variance 'taxes' the earnings of high skill workers and insures the earnings of low skill
workers. High skill workers may want to become entrepreneurs, accordingly. But this is not the
only possibility.
This case embodies the classic developed economy view of technology entrepreneurship: 'The
most talented leave wage work for greater opportunity (that is, higher return to skill) in
entrepreneurship.
Negative hierarchical sorting
In this case, entrepreneurs are negatively selected from the wage sector distribution and are also
below the average of the entrepreneur distribution: Qo < O0, Qi < O0. This will be true iff
0  71
- 1 ancd p > -.
This is the converse case where the wage sector is unattractive to low earnings workers because
of high wage dispersion (higher return to skill in wage employment). Low skill workers will
want to become entrepreneurs to take advantage of the 'insurance' provided by a narrow wage
structure in entrepreneurship, assuming that wages are sufficiently correlated between the wage
sector and entrepreneurship. This is the unattractive case where a compressed wage structure
in entrepreneurship (low returns to skill relative to wage employment) 'subsidizes' low skill
workers, thus attracting low skill entrepreneurs from the wage sector.
'Reverse' sorting
A third case is where Qo < 0, Qi > 0, that is, entrepreneurs are selected from the lower tail of
the wage sector distribution but arrive in the upper tail of the entrepreneurship distribution.
This can only occur if
p min( I ,a T(CO "1
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meaning that the correlation between earnings in the two sectors is sufficiently low (could be
negative).
This might occur in a number of different ways, for example, for the case of a non-market
economy where the set of skills rewarded in wage sector work is quite different from those
rewarded in entrepreneurship. Or for a group whose opportunities in entrepreneurship are
depressed by entry barriers such that performance in entrepreneurship is determined more by
the ability to overcome entry barriers than by the ability to perform in commercialization
activities. Or it may possibly occur in the case of an immigrant from a very different country.
A fourth case?
Note that there is not a fourth case where Qo > 0, Qi < 0. This would only happen if an
individual from the top of the wage sector distribution joined the bottom tail of the
entrepreneurship distribution. A situation where the bottom of the entrepreneurship distribution
is higher than the top of the wage distribution would be impossible to sustain.
Summary
The correlation between the skills valued in the wage sector and in entrepreneurship is
sufficiently high to rule out reverse sorting in the third case (see Appendix Tables E, F, and J)
and to reassure us that the second condition in the first two cases holds. To determine whether
Case 1 or Case 2 holds, one needs to know either the ratio of the variance in the returns to wage
employment to variance in returns to entrepreneurship. The Tsinghua survey asks respondents
to indicate which of 6 wage income bands they were in at the end of each job, making
inferences about the variance of wage income difficult. Yearly income from entrepreneurship
is more precisely measured, however, additional sources of entrepreneurial income such as
stock options or the value of the business are challenging to precisely measure. If the
correlation between skills in the two sectors is sufficiently high (which the data appear to
support), one may be able to eliminate Case 3 and use the clear predictions of the model in
cases 1 and 2 to infer the ratio of interest from shifts in the returns to talent in each sector. One
can infer which case holds from the model predictions of where in the wage employment
distribution entrepreneurs are being drawn from and where in the distribution of entrepreneurial
outcomes they wind up. The model also shows that the ideal experiment that the
econometrician needs is one where the variance of returns is increased (or compressed) in one
sector relative to the other. This requirement seems reasonable in this empirical setting. The
institutional reform in 1999 appears to have shifted the environment from Case 2 towards
higher returns to talent in entrepreneurship and more (Case 1) positive hierarchical sorting.
Future drafts will extend this basic model to capture the possibility of different skills (which are
correlated) in overcoming barriers to entry and in running the entrepreneurial firm. A
limitation of this model is that it assumes that the individual knows the cost to becoming an
entrepreneur, the average wages in each labor market and her skill levels in each sector ahead
of time.
225
APPENDIX B
Comparison of Key Demographic Characteristics by Survey Wave
Variable
Age
Age (founders only)
Bachelor's
Graduation Yr
Bach. Grad yr
(founders only)
Years of Education
Entrepreneur parents
Entrepreneur
Privatized
First start-up founded
Tech only
Business only
Gender
Family economic
status
High Salary
Avg. Tenure
Overseas work exp.
Number of positions
High government
Low government
Last job academia
Ever job academia
Last job business
Student Leader
GPA Rank
Bach. Grad Yr. 10th
percentile
Bach. Grad Yr. 2 5th
percentile
Bach. Grad Yr. 5 0 th
percentile
Bach. Grad Yr. 7 5th
percentile
Bach. Grad Yr. 9 0 th
percentile
Responded
before Aug.
2007
(N=2,667)
49.3
38.4
1980.9
1991.6
17.2
0.09
0.29
0.10
2000.3
0.28
0.10
0.88
3.75
3.21
6.94
0.26
2.39
0.03
0.18
0.19
0.32
0.62
0.61
2.28
1954
1965
1986
1996
2001
Responded
during/after Aug.
2007
(N=299)
54.1
37.4
1977.4
1993.2
17.0
0.12
0.40
0.05
2001.1
0.29
0.09
0.90
3.85
2.93
8.01
0.26
2.26
0.03
0.17
0.19
0.27
0.61
0.57
2.58
t-stat for
equal means
-~---
1953
1961
1979
1993
2001
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively.
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-4.216**
0.602
3.777**
0.941
2.381"*
-0.713
-2.168**
1.392
-0.661
0.757
0.235
0.901
-1.871*
3.351"*
-2.045*
-0.126
-2.012*
-0.239
0.617
-0.051
2.323**
0.348
0.874
-2.661**
APPENDIX C
Independent Variables Dependent Variable = Year start-up founded
(subjects start being at risk upon graduation)
Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios (N =
1,910)
(1) (2)
Master's degree 0.342*** (0.086)
Master's x Post-1999 2.215*** (0.664)
Doctorate degree 0.360* (0.191)
Doctorate x Post-1999 2.646 (1.566)
High Status (Gov. and
Comm. Party) 0.987 (0.243) 0.858 (0.211)
Status x Post-1999 0.924 (0.268) 1.098 (0.319)
Post-1999 dummy 0.102*** (0.023) 0.049*** (0.015)
1991-1999 dummy 0.075*** (0.011) 0.070*** (0.010)
Controls
Overseas Experience 0.806 (0.133) 0.834 (0.139)
Last job academia 0.681 (0.213) 0.675 (0.211)
Ever job academia 1.186 (0.242) 1.222 (0.253)
Number ofpositions 1.296*** (0.067) 1.297*** (0.067)
Gender 1.363 (0.388) 1.257 (0.363)
Family Econ. Status 0.900 (0.060) 0.903 (0.062)
Log likelihood -1460.714 -1466.769
Note: 317 failures; 45,021 total years at risk; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All models include region, Bachelor's dept., and
graduation year dummy variables. High Status is equal to 1 if the individual was a communist
party member or worked in a government position. The pair wise correlations between High
Status and various human capital measures are all at or below 0.101.
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APPENDIX D
Histogram of Respondents
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APPENDIX E
Income regression
Ordered Logit Dependent variable = salary
Independent Variables category (1-6)
Master's degree
Doctorate degree
Work exper. (0-10 yrs.)
Work exper. (10-30 yrs.)
Work exper. (>30 yrs.)
Gender (male = 1)
GPA quartile (1"st = top)
GPA quartile (3 rd)
GPA quartile (4th = bottom)
Overseas exper.
Academia
Business
Government
Family Econ. Status
Comm. Party
Region Effects
Bachelor's Dept. Effects
Year Effects
Cut point I
Cut point 2
Cut point 3
Cut point 4
Cut point 5
Observations
Pseudo-R squared
0.466***
(0.051)
0.905***
(0.051)
0.938***
(0.054)
1.065***
(0.047)
0.500***
(0.055)
0.498***
(0.058)
-0.199**
(0.046)
0.514***
(0.046)
0.047
(0.045)
0.407***
(0.043)
-0.943***
(0.051)
0.335***
(0.052)
-0.326***
(0.044)
-0.273***
(0.015)
-0.062
(0.045)
YES
YES
YES
24.296***
(0.026)
25.714***
(0.020)
27.111***
(0.021)
28.614***
(0.022)
30.256***
(0.028)
561
0.148
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
standard errors are used.
and 10% levels, respectively. Robust
229
APPENDIX F
Returns to Talent in Wage Employment
Ordered Logit Dependent variable = salary
Independent Variables I category (1-6)
Master's degree
Master's x POST
Doctorate degree
Doctorate x POST
High GPA
High GPA x POST
Tenure
Business
Government
Academia
Bachelor's grad year
Communist Party
Overseas
Gender (male=)
Age (at end ofjob spell)
Years 2000-07 (POST)
Family Economic Status
Bachelor's Dept. effects
Region effects
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
0.693***
(0.137)
-0.228
(0.157)
1.211***
(0.237)
-0.782***
(0.243)
-0.028***
(0.005)
0.179
(0.149)
-0.883***
(0.160)
-0.646***
(0.165)
0.073***
(0.008)
0.044
(0.084)
0.812**
(0.112)
0.542***
(0.128)
0.069***
(0.009)
1.760***
(0.157)
-0.276***
(0.045)
-0.228
(0.157)
0.69273***
(0.137)
YES
YES
3,276
0.206
0.384**
(0.170)
-0.292
(0.193)
-0.033***
(0.008)
0.24
(0.238)
-1.054***
(0.244)
-0.659***
(0.248)
0.096***
(0.012)
-0.032
(0.104)
0.995***
(0.135)
0.638***
(0.148)
0.095***
(0.012)
1.348***
(0.177)
-0.309***
(0.058)
2,043
0.171
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***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The
unit of analysis is the job spell. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are
used.
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APPENDIX G
Negative Binomial Regressions on Macro-economic Data
Dependent variable = number of firm foundings
(1959-2007)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
R&D to GDP ratio (t-1)
-0.143
(0.723)
GDP per capita (in RMB, t-) 3.43E04** 3.30E3.43E-04*** 3.30E-04***
Shanghai Stock Exchange Market Cap (t- (8.59E-05) (8.63E-05)
-2.52E-05** -2.36e-05**
(1.16E-05) (1.20E-05)
Domestic Patents Issued (t-1) 5.01E-06 -1.01e-05** -9.48E-06*
(3.60E-06) (4.82E-06) (5.04E-06)
Post-1999 dummy 4.326*** 3.856*** 2.901***
(0.652) (0.530) (0.590)
1988-1998 dummy 3.521*** 2.978*** 1.967***
(0.434) (0.421) (0.656)
Constant -1.257*** -1.376*** -0.241
(0.368) (0.360) (1.066)
Log likelihood -96.992 -90.102 -81.378
Num. obs. (years) 48 48 29
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.317 0.260
The results show that there was an increase in entrepreneurship after the two institutional
reforms even after controlling for other indicators of the economic environment. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX H
Strategic and Competitive Implications of Different Institutional Shifts
Lower Barriers to Entry Lower Barriers to Growth
Market/Commercialization * Increase in high and low ability * Unclear predictions on whether
Talent is Orthogonal to entrepreneurs increase is among high or low ability
'Bureaucratic' Talent *No prediction on the type of firms * Easier to overcome the opportunity
founded costs for entrepreneurship
* Possibly greatest increase in * Increase in high growth firms
(Bureaucratic talent refers to marginal firms which were not * More high-growth entrepreneurial
the ability to form profitable with the previously high opportunities supports venture
connections, navigate a cost of entry capital
bureaucracy, greater family * Increased competition (possibly
wealth or other factors which lower profit margins?)
enable certain individuals to
overcome barriers to entry.)
Market/Commercialization * Relative increase in low ability * Increase in high ability entrepreneurs
Talent is NOT Orthogonal entrepreneurs * Easier to overcome the opportunity
to 'Bureaucratic' Talent * Those who cannot maintain wage costs for entrepreneurship
employment can overcome the * Easier to recruit talented co-founders
(a large component is barriers to entry * More high-growth entrepreneurial
common between the two) * Relative increase in low growth opportunities supports venture
firms capital
* Increased competition, smaller, less * Increase in high-growth firms
profitable firms * Increase in innovative firms (higher
returns can support higher risk of an
innovation strategy)
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APPENDIX I
Productivity
Promoted
Log(work
experience)
Years of
Education
Ability (wage
residual)
Prior salary
Overseas
High GPA
Worked in
R&D
Controls
Log(employees
Privatized
Log(survival)
Bought
Industry
Effects
-0.118
(0.228
)
(1.230
0.986 )
(0.086
0.004 )
(0.180
0.410** )
(0.170
-0.442** )
(0.359
0.731** )
(0.232
0.308 )
(0.107
0.246** )
(0.539
-0.979* )
(0.504
(0.280) )
(0.519
0.005 )
YES YES
0.116
-2.965
0.018
-0.243
0.036
-0.804
-0.628
1.234**
*
1.293
0.606
-1.406*
YES
(0.369
)
(2.328
)
(0.149
)
(0.323
)
(0.336
)
(0.580
)(0.427
(0.427
)
(0.187
)
(0.894
)
(0.851
)0.82(0.782
)
YES
(0.211 (0.046 (0.966
0.380* ) -0.045 ) 0.042 )
2.447* (1.094 (0.214 (4.723
* ) -0.009 ) 0.668 )
(0.082 (0.018 (0.407
0.152* ) -0.008 ) 0.850** )
(0.159 (0.034 (0.837
-0.12 ) 0.007 ) 1.535* )
(0.150 (0.031 (0.727
0.173 ) 0.025 ) -0.231 )
(0.305 (0.060 (1.672
0.128 ) -0.07 ) 2.120 )
(0.213 (0.047 (0.914
-0.321 ) 0.011 ) -0.848 )
(0.925
1.639* )
0.984* (0.464 (0.107 (2.955
* ) 0.075 ) (3.365) )
(0.453
0.674 )
(0.498 (0.111 (2.138
0.666 ) (0.023) ) (2.961) )
YES YES YES YES YES YES
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City Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Founding Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Graduation
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(5.321 15.983* (7.581 (2.895 2.065** (0.620
Constant 2.369 ) * ) 3.308 ) * ) -53.413
Observations 176 156 207 234 131
R-squared 0.55 0.81 0.7 0.92 0.51
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Independent
Variables
Years of Education
Educ. x POST
GPA High
GPA x POST
Promoted
Promoted x POST
Ln(workexp)
Work exp. XPOST
Talent (Income
residual)
Residualx POST
Years 1997-99
(POST)
Years 1990-96
Overseas
Experience
Last job academia
Lastjob government
Ever job high gov.
Ever job low gov.
Everjob academia
Number ofPositions
Gender (male=l)
Family Econ Status
Communist Party
Observations
APPENDIX J
Placebo Regression
Dependent Variable = Year start-up founded (subjects start being at risk upon graduation) Note:
reported coefficients are hazard ratios
0.630***
1.082
(0.086)
(0.205)
0.726
0.716
0.218**
7.714**
0.454***
0.367***
0.160
0.206***
0.743
2.340*
1.258
1.159
0.892
0.807
1.344***
1.111
0.740***
0.939
(0.521)
(0.065)
(0.205)
(1.068)
(0.519)
(0.465)
(0.295)
(0.277)
(0.115)
(0.443)
(0.079)
(0.211)
1882
0.69
0.307***
0.619*
1.877
1.107
1.129
0.657
0.748
1.320***
1.212
0.824*
1.033
1225
(0.231)
(0.317)
(0.131)
(7.210)
(0.116)
(0.119)
(0.256)
(0.098)
(0.170)
(0.845)
(0.477)
(0.456)
(0.217)
(0.252)
(0.117)
(0.484)
(0.090)
(0.234)
0.083***
0.216***
0.703
2.299*
1.437
1.108
0.663
0.639
1.410***
1.093
0.781"*
1.014
(0.079)
(0.070)
(0.189)
(1.055)
(0.569)
(0.443)
(0.215)
(0.216)
(0.128)
(0.438)
(0.083)
(0.231)
1882
4.362*
0.258***
1.033
1.875
1.739
1.804
0.318***
0.831
1.309**
2.124
0.843
0.765
(3.346)
(0.097)
(0.338)
(0.986)
(0.831)
(0.772)
(0.140)
(0.338)
(0.140)
(1.247)
(0.114)
(0.215)
1829
0.717 (0.179)
1.333 (0.450)
0.887 (0.349)
0.479* (0.182)
0.749 (0.299)
4.526** (2.863)
0.996 (0.568)
3.835** (2.160)
0.335** (0.173)
0.546 (0.252)
1.607*** (0.231)
2.686 (1.797)
0.618*** (0.103)
0.587 (0.207)
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Note: 119 failures; 20,541 total years at risk; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All models include region, Bachelor's dept., and graduation year dummy variables.
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APPENDIX K
U.S. Data Dotcom Boom Robustness Check
Dependent Variable = Start-up founded (subjects start being at
risk upon graduation)
Independent Variables Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios
Software firms only, Software firms only, All Grads, All firms
only EE&CS grads all grads
Master's degree 0.281*** 0.767 1.226
(0.120) (0.204) (0.098)
Doctorate Degree 0.249** 0.733 1.261
(0.153) (0.333) (0.127)
Master's x Years 98-00 7.466** 1.936* 0.936
(5.844) (0.741) (0.152)
Doctorate x Years 98-00 5.560* 1.446 0.905
(5.683) (0.849) (0.185)
Non-U.S. citizen 1.866* 1.172 0.825
(0.634) (0.292) (0.078)
Gender (male=l1) 5.814* 3.305*** 1.495
(5.934) (1.302) (0.169)
Years 1998-2000 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Years 1991-1997 0.755 0.665 0.240***
(0.060) (0.194) (0.089)
Graduation year fixed effects YES YES YES
Degree fixed effects NO YES YES
Obs. 3,266 18,896 19,188
Note: Grad. Years 1980 and after (-age 40 and younger); 52 failures; 44,525 total years at risk; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All models include controls for Bachelor's graduation year (age), Bachelor's Major (academic
department).
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APPENDIX M
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Hazard Rate Coefficients for Year-by-Year
1.7 InteractionS
1.5
1.3 - Unobs. Talent(income
1.1 Residual)
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0.7
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APPENDIX N
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Indep. Vars. log(revenue) log(employees)
POST-1999 1.262** (0.744) 0.510** (0.309)
Master's degree 0.370 (0.348) 0.083 (0.164)
Doctorate degree -0.342 (0.631) 0.200 (0.305)
Privatized 1.407** (0.690) 1.409*** (0.315)
Bought -1.212 (0.751) 0.087 (0.349)
Firm Age 0.460*** (0.085) 0.278*** (0.034)
Communist Party 0.128 (0.346) 0.039 (0.163)
Overseas 0.710 (0.449) 0.328* (0.198)
Family Economic
Status -0.078 (0.179) -0.018 (0.083)
Constant 2.544** (1.208) 1.420** (0.518)
Obs. 195 267
Chapter 6:
Entrepreneurial Ventures from Technology-Based Universities: A Cross-
National Comparison
Descriptive Statistics from the MIT and Tsinghua Surveys
Understanding the differences in entrepreneurship associated with premier universities
in advanced economies and those in developing economies is important for at least four reasons.
First, it informs public policy to understand the relative intensity and types of entrepreneurship.
This is important both for policy makers in developing countries as well as those in advanced
economies seeing increasing competition on the horizon. Second, international variation helps
to inform the debate about underlying drivers of entrepreneurship and the environmental
influences on entrepreneurial behavior. Furthermore, it aids in understanding whether factors
that influence the performance of entrepreneurial firms are universal in character, or whether
"success factors" differ by international setting. Finally, focusing on entrepreneurial behavior
emerging from specific universities helps to inform university administrators regarding relevant
factors they may be able to influence to affect entrepreneurship among their students and
alumni, and perhaps faculty and staff as well.
The empirical context for our specific comparative study is a sample of alumni from a
top research/technology university in China and a top research/technology university in the U.S.
While little work has been done focusing on the university's impact on entrepreneurship among
alumni and students over the years, even less work has been done in this regard by looking at
leading research universities outside of the U.S. For its part, Tsinghua University, often
regarded as the top engineering school in China, has been widely referred to as the MIT of
China.
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MIT Survey
As indicated earlier in this dissertation, the MIT firm dataset was generated from an
individual-level dataset composed of 43,668 records of MIT alumni who responded to a 2001
survey of all living alumni (105,928 surveys were sent out for a response rate of 41.2%). This
dataset has been reported on previously (Hsu, Roberts, Eesley 2007). Of the respondents to the
2001 survey, 7,798 individuals (17.9% of the respondents) indicated that they had founded at
least one company. These individuals were then mailed a second survey in 2003 asking more
detailed questions about them and their firms. A total of 2,111 founder surveys were completed,
representing a response rate of 27.1%. Eliminating duplicates for which more than one founder
reported on the same firm brings the total number of unique firms to 2,067. One of the key
features of this dataset is its long time horizon in the cross section (graduates from 1930-2001).
We also observe wide variation in firm sizes, number of operating years, and outcomes. As in
Chapter 3, for the purposes of this chapter, all non-U.S. located firms have been dropped from
the MIT alumni survey so that we can more straightforwardly compare across U.S. and Chinese
firms.
Tsinghua Survey
Also as indicated, we have undertaken a survey of alumni from the top engineering
university in China, Tsinghua University. Since Tsinghua University is likely to be less
familiar to the reader than MIT, a brief overview of the university may be helpful. Located in
Beijing, China and established in 1911, Tsinghua University is regarded as one of the best and
most selective universities in China. In 1952 it was reorganized according to the Soviet style of
organizing universities by specialization. Rather than being involved with all disciplines,
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Tsinghua was to focus on engineering. During the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, campus
activities were disrupted as Tsinghua's campus became a battlefield. Different sects of Mao's
Red Guards fought on the campus and it was a stronghold of the radicals. The university did
not resume normal operations until 1977. In 1978, Tsinghua restored departments in sciences,
economics and management, and humanities, no longer following the Soviet style. In 1984,
Tsinghua established the first graduate school in China. The Tsinghua Science Park was
established in 1998.
As described previously in Chapters 2 and 5, a survey was sent to all Tsinghua
University alumni who had an address on record (a total of 30,000 according to the alumni
association). 97 Just as with the MIT survey, this dataset includes alumni across all schools at
Tsinghua. The Tsinghua firm dataset was generated from an individual-level dataset composed
of 2,966 records of Tsinghua alumni who responded to a 2007 survey of all living alumni
(-30,000 surveys were sent out for a response rate of about 10%). This dataset has been
reported on previously in Chapter 5. Of the respondents to the survey, 718 individuals (24% of
the respondents) indicated that they had founded at least one company. These individuals were
then asked more detailed questions about themselves and their firms.98 The response rates for
both surveys along with descriptive statistics will be described in more detail below.
97 The sampling frame for both the MIT and Tsinghua alumni databases was likely to have been fairly
accurate given the university alumni associations' efforts to maintain an accurate database, however both
the 105,000 MIT alumni and the 30,000 Tsinghua alumni records may have included old addresses and
deceased alumni. In this case the response rates should be higher than those reported.
98 In addition to the survey data, the Tsinghua study includes extensive notes from interviews with 42
people (including entrepreneurs, investors, and government officials). The interviews included 26
Tsinghua alumni entrepreneurs, 2 Tsinghua staff (TLO, Science Park), 5 Chinese venture capitalists
(VCs), 2 Government officials, 3 Other Chinese entrepreneurs (non-Tsinghua), 2 MIT Alumni (non-
entrepreneurs), and 2 Tsinghua alumni (non-entrepreneurs). Unfortunately the interview selection
procedure could not be randomized. The Tsinghua Alumni Association set up interviews for us and we
specifically asked to talk with high-tech entrepreneurs and some who were not successful. Undoubtedly
our interview population is weighted towards more successful entrepreneurs and those whose ventures are
more high-tech than the average alumni. In addition, the majority of our interviews were in Beijing,
though some were in Shanghai and Xi'an as well.
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Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons of Datasets
Hsu, Roberts and Eesley (2007) reports on basic demographic statistics such as age,
gender, and country of citizenship as well as trends over time for the MIT alumni dataset.
Table 1 shows pair-wise correlations for the MIT dataset and Table 2 shows pair-wise
correlations for the Tsinghua dataset. Tables 3 and 4 show variable definitions and summary
statistics for the MIT dataset. Tables 4 and 5 show variable definitions and summary statistics
for the Tsinghua dataset. From these tables the reader can see that there are many variables in
common between the two datasets, such as basic demographic characteristics, measures of
entrepreneurship and data on the firms such as idea and team characteristics, financing, and
innovation measures. There are also elements that differ between the two surveys both because
of the history of each country and university as well as improvements in the survey instrument
for the Tsinghua survey. Two significant differences are worth mentioning. The first is that
MIT has a much longer history of admitting foreign students and so many more of the MIT
alumni are non-U.S. citizens. The second is that the Tsinghua respondents are much younger
on average. The average year of Bachelor's graduation for the MIT alumni is 1973 while for
the Tsinghua alumni it is 1990. The difference appears to be due to two reasons. First, a
difference in the populations who were sent surveys and a slight difference in response rates by
age for the Tsinghua survey with older respondents being less likely to respond. While we
have some respondents from both universities who graduated in the 1930s, the Tsinghua alumni
association appears to have kept fewer or less accurate contact information for the older
graduates. Also, since Tsinghua was disrupted by the Cultural Revolution, admissions (and
thus alumni) fall off in the 1970s (see Figure 3). The range of coverage for both surveys is
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impressive with graduates from the 1930s all the way through graduates from 2007 (Tsinghua)
and 2001 (MIT).
Table 7 shows means and t-tests of means for differences between respondents and non-
respondents for the MIT 2001 and 2003 Founder surveys. Overall the means are very similar,
yet due to the large sample size, some of the differences are statistically significant. In only a
few instances do the differences between the sub-samples vary by three percentage points or
more in absolute value (and for which the difference is statistically significant). For the 2001
MIT survey, only the variables male, European citizen, and Middle Eastern citizen meet these
criteria. To foreshadow our statistical results, the regressions reveal only the first and third of
these variables as statistically significant after controlling for the remaining factors (Hsu,
Roberts and Eesley, 2007). We therefore further confine our discussion of possible bias to those
variables. For both male and Middle Eastern citizen, a smaller fraction of individuals relative to
the underlying population responded to the survey. Our estimates imply that belonging to each
of these groups increases the hazard of becoming an entrepreneur, and so we are likely being
conservative in our estimation (assuming a proportionate likelihood of entering
entrepreneurship). For the 2003 survey only two variables have statistically significant
differences between responders and non-responders, engineering major (more likely to respond)
and management major (less likely to respond).
Table 8 shows similar means and t-statistics for the Tsinghua survey for all respondents.
It shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed) characteristics of the
responders and non-responders are roughly the same statistically. Only the variables gpa rank,
age, entrepreneur, privatized, and high salary show statistically significant differences in
means at below the 1% level. It appears that non-respondents were more likely to be
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entrepreneurs, were slightly older, had higher salaries, less likely to have been academics, and
slightly more likely to have held a greater number of job positions, to have a higher GPA, and
more likely to come from more wealthy families. Years of education is significant, but the
means are very similar. Older founders appear to have been equally likely as younger founders
to respond. The 1 0 th , 2 5 th, 5 0th , 7 5th, and 9 0 th percentiles of graduation years were also checked
and are similar; offering some reassurance that there were not large differences over time in the
response rates. Since there is evidence of some non-response bias, for regression analysis,
weights were created using logistic regression and calculated as one over the predicted
probabilities of responding. For the previous chapter, results are robust to using and also not
using these weights.
Table 9 specifically examines the Tsinghua founders since the first part of the survey
asked whether the individual had founded a firm. Only about half of these individuals
completed the founder's section of the survey, so I test for response bias among founders as
well. On an absolute basis, the means between the two sub-samples appear to be very well
matched by observable characteristics. In only a few cases do the differences between the sub-
samples vary by large percentage points or more in absolute value. Only the variables number
ofjobs, work as a general manager, average tenure, work as an advisor, number ofpositions,
Ever job government, and gender show statistically significant differences in means at below
the 10% level. For number ofjobs, slightly fewer individuals who had held more jobs
responded relative to the underlying population who responded to the Tsinghua Founder's
survey. Our estimates imply that belonging to this group with more jobs decreases the hazard
of becoming an entrepreneur, but has no significant impact on performance, and so it is likely
that compared to our estimation, having more jobs does not decrease the likelihood of
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becoming an entrepreneur. The lack of differences between these groups gives us further
confidence that our results are not driven by respondent bias.
There is no claim that the MIT or Tsinghua datasets are representative samples from the
general populations of each country. However, to quantify just how the Tsinghua sample looks
compared to a representative sample of the Chinese population, Table 10 compares it to the
Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and the National Bureau of Statistics Household
Survey (NBS HH). The Tsinghua alumni primarily wind up in urban areas once they graduate.
The CHNS surveys both rural and urban residents while the NBS HH is more comparable to
the Tsinghua sample in that it surveys primarily urban residents. Overall, the Tsinghua
respondents are much more likely to be male (due to the university's historical admissions
rates), slightly older (50 vs. 41 or 36, much more highly educated, less likely to have
experienced a layoff, and more likely to be Communist party members. Whereas the CHNS
and NBS HH surveys ask about self-employment broadly defined, the Tsinghua survey
specifically asks about new firm founding. The entrepreneurship rate among the Tsinghua
graduates is higher than for the CHNS survey, but probably not higher once the higher level of
education is taken into account (previous studies in the U.S. find that education is a significant
predictor of entrepreneurship). Also, when one looks at the percentage of individuals who are
founders (or self-employed for the NBS) in a particular year, 1999 in this case, we find that the
rate is actually much lower for the Tsinghua alumni. This is possibly due to the more narrow
definition of entrepreneurship in our survey or to the higher opportunity costs (better wage
employment opportunities) for the Tsinghua alumni. In comparison to a representative sample
of rural and urban households from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (Popkin et al, 1993;
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china) the Tsinghua sampled alumnus/a is 8.7 years older on
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average, much more likely to be male, more highly educated, and slightly more likely to have
founded a firm. The differences in age and education most likely contribute to differences in
the entrepreneurship rates. The data were also benchmarked against a representative sample
from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 1999). The MIT data can be compared to the
Current Population Survey (asking about self-employment) or the National Longitudinal
Surveys. However, comparing national samples of entrepreneurship is challenging, as data
sampling strategies vary depending on the subject matter of study (compare, for example
studies of self-employment [e.g. Blau 1987] and manufacturing [e.g. Dunne et al. 1988]). With
these caveats in mind, we note that the percentage of individuals engaging in new firm creation
is generally significantly higher in our sample relative to the four to five percent level often
cited nationally (Dennis, 1997; Reynolds, 1994).
Figure 3 shows the histogram of Tsinghua alumni respondents by five year periods
starting with 1946 graduates through 2006 graduates. Overall, the responses by graduating
class are rather similar with the exception of the time period of the Cultural Revolution. One
can see the impact of the Cultural Revolution when Tsinghua was largely disrupted between
1966 and 1976 when regular admissions resumed. The class size at Tsinghua and admissions
numbers have increased over the years, particularly after the 1978 additions of the humanities
and sciences back to the university. This addition to the class size contributes to the increases
in the last two decades. For its part, MIT has also seen increases in the class size over time,
albeit not comparable in magnitude. The size of the MIT undergraduate class has remained
relatively constant in recent years at around 1,000 students. Each Tsinghua undergraduate class
is currently about 3,475 students. In 2002, the class size was 3,000 and between 1984 when the
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School of Economics and Management was added and 2002, the undergraduate class size
increased by 200.
Next I will discuss what variables are common between the Tsinghua and MIT datasets
followed by what is unique in each. Other differences and similarities found in comparing the
descriptive statistics will be discussed as well.
Elements Common to Both Datasets
Basic demographic information
Insert Table 1-6 here
Table 11 shows the breakdown of graduates from each university by department and
then the proportion becoming entrepreneurs from each department. Tsinghua breaks down the
academic departments by a slightly different system than MIT so I created a procedure to map
the Tsinghua departments into their corresponding MIT departments and schools. Consistent
with being primarily engineering schools, the engineering department makes up 51.3% of the
MIT alumni and 69.7% of the Tsinghua alumni. Overall, Tsinghua has more graduates from
engineering and fewer from management since their School of Economics and Management
was founded much more recently. Among the Tsinghua graduates, 59% held a Master's degree
as their highest degree and 9% held doctorate degrees (not necessarily from Tsinghua). There
are slightly more doctorate degree holders among the MIT alumni (16%) and 41% with a
Master's degree as the highest degree (not necessarily from MIT). Consistent with many years
of admitting primarily men at both institutions, 94% of the Tsinghua sample is male (compared
to 93% of the MIT sample).
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Entrepreneurs
A higher percentage of the Tsinghua engineering and social sciences graduates reported
having founded firms. These differences appear to mainly be driven by differences between
the universities in the chemical engineering alumni and the humanities.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the entrepreneurial respondents by birth year. The
Tsinghua founders are markedly younger than the MIT founders. This is likely due in part to
the labor market changes in China where earlier generations were assigned to job positions and
entrepreneurship was illegal. The cohort born in 1960 would have been 18 in 1978 when many
of the economic reforms began occurring. Consistent with the older age of the alumni
respondents, the firms founded by MIT alums are on average older than the firms founded by
Tsinghua alumni. Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms by founding year for the U.S. (MIT
alumni) and China (Tsinghua alumni). Overall, there is a similar pattern, particularly when
looking at firms founded between 1984 and 2000. The MIT sample stops at 2001 in year of
receiving a degree and the Tsinghua sample ends at 2007. We see similar upward trends over
time, in part due to more graduating classes being added each year so that the number of
individuals "at risk" for entrepreneurship increases in the sample with each year. We see a
downturn at the end due to right-side censoring (since we have fewer years to observe the most
recent graduates) and the fact that enrollment has increased over the years at each university. It
is not accurate to interpret this decline as a trend in entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, the
increase that appears between 1992 and 2000 is largely due to the fact that with each year,
additional cohorts of graduates are added to the sample and become "at-risk" for firm
foundings. Thus, more sophisticated analysis would need to be done to determine the actual
trends in the rate of entrepreneurship, net of these effects due to the sampling procedure. The
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fact is that we are not following a single cohort of graduates, but successive cohorts of alumni
graduating classes and there is typically a long lag from graduation to a firm founding. This
can be a source of confusion for those not accustomed to seeing data from alumni surveys or
similar sampling methodologies. Figure 4 shows the percentage of "at-risk" Tsinghua alumni
becoming entrepreneurs in each year. There is almost no entrepreneurial activity in this
population prior to 1982. After the economic reforms in the early 1990s and in the late 1990s,
as indicated in Chapter 5, we see increases in the levels of entrepreneurial activity.
Table 12 shows the mean characteristics and t-statistics for the founders compared to
non-founders. Overall the Tsinghua entrepreneurs are 10 years younger, more likely to be male,
from more wealthy families, have lower average tenure in each job, are more likely to have
gone overseas for education or work experience, and had a higher number of job positions.
Consistent with having higher opportunity costs, the non-entrepreneurs had higher salaries than
the entrepreneurs (pre-firm founding), were more likely to have worked in lower levels in
government or to have worked in academia, and were less likely to have been student leaders at
Tsinghua. Some of the non-founders may eventually found firms. For the MIT alumni,
founders are just slightly older than non-founders and also more likely to be male. However,
for MIT, those with a Master's or Doctorate degree are slightly less likely to found firms. Most
likely this is due to higher opportunity costs. The other work history variables are not available
in the MIT dataset.
Table 13 shows the median age at first founding for the MIT and Tsinghua firms. Since
entrepreneurship was illegal until the economic reforms of the late 1970s, for the earlier
graduation cohorts in China, there is a very long lag between graduation and their first firm
founding (if they became founders at all). Despite the fact that the MIT alumni respondents are
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older on average, the Tsinghua alumni appear to wait slightly longer to found their first firms,
though the lags are much more similar for the graduation cohort from the 1990s. While the
MIT alumni respondents are older on average (more of them come from older graduating
classes), once one holds constant the graduating class cohort, there are longer lags from
graduating to founding a firm for the Tsinghua alumni. Consistent with the younger age of the
average Tsinghua alumni respondent, overall the median age at founding for the MIT founders
is 37.5 whereas for the Tsinghua founders it is 32.
Insert Figures 3-5 and Tables 7-13 here
Serial Entrepreneurs
For both the MIT and Tsinghua surveys we asked respondents about the total number of
firms founded. In both cases we found substantial numbers of entrepreneurs who had founded
multiple firms. In the case of China, this came as a surprise since we had been told that the
distinctly American culture of founding a firm and then selling it was not part of Chinese
culture where individuals founded firms that they wanted to run themselves rather than sell and
move on. In addition, liquidity events, such as initial public offerings and acquisitions have
been more rare in China and are typical transition points for U.S. entrepreneurs. Future analysis
should determine whether the serial entrepreneurship we observe in China is more likely to be
due to first firm failures and if after a success Chinese entrepreneurs are more likely to stay
with the business. Overall, 45.7% of the MIT alumni entrepreneurs had made more than one
founding attempt and 48.1% of the Tsinghua alumni entrepreneurs claimed more than one
founding attempt in their lives. Table 14a shows the Tsinghua repeat founders (or serial
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entrepreneurs) by decade of their Bachelor's graduation. We can see that several individuals
made as many as 10 or more firm founding attempts. The most recent cohorts of graduates
from the 1990s and 2000s have lower rates of repeat entrepreneurship, no doubt due to the fact
that they have had less time since graduation for even one founding, never mind two. Table
14b displays the same figures for the MIT alumni. The MIT alumni appear to have higher rates
of repeat entrepreneurship among both the older alumni and the most recent graduates. My
interviews with Tsinghua entrepreneurs paint a picture consistent with these tables in that many
of them told stories of having founded multiple firms. Their stories also shed light on their
motivations. In some of the cases the first firm had been unsuccessful and went out of business.
In other cases, they were simply searching for a new firm idea that better fit them and their
passions. One entrepreneur had been in the business of importing electronics and told me that
this business had been so lucrative that life was too easy and became boring. He left the
business to start his current company, an extremely successful children's clothing retail
business. Table 15 shows the aggregate breakdown across the decades of the number of
Tsinghua entrepreneurs by the number of companies they have founded. Table 16 shows some
of the more specific data that we have on up to three companies founded by each Tsinghua
entrepreneur. The table shows median aggregate employment, survival, revenue and initial
public offering data for all first companies, all second companies and all third companies. The
second and third companies are typically founded more recently. 99 Similar data are available in
the MIT survey on up to five companies. The table shows that the trend of increasing median
revenues and employment figures for the subsequent firms is consistent across the MIT and
99 In the "Cutting Your Teeth" chapter the fact that the second and third firms are younger is accounted
for with a control variable for the age of the firm in the regression analysis.
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Tsinghua datasets. The increase in revenues is quite sharp for the 3 rd firms in the Tsinghua
dataset, however, there are only 17 3 rd firms reporting revenue data to calculate this median.
Entrepreneurial Firms
Figure 5 shows the distribution of industries for the MIT and Tsinghua alumni firms.
The industry breakdown is strikingly similar across the two, providing a reassuring level of
similarity in industrial sector distribution and reducing the likelihood that the results may be
driven by industry differences. Both are primarily engineering schools and the industries
reflect this fact, with software and electronics forming the first and second largest categories
(25% vs. 27% software and 16% vs. 19% electronics for MIT and Tsinghua firms respectively).
Both finance and drugs/biotech are less represented among the Chinese firms (5% vs. 1% and
7% vs. 3%) that may result from the fact that these are heavily regulated industries in China
and entry has traditionally been strictly controlled by the government.
Performance
Several variables that can be thought of as firm performance measures are included in
both the MIT and Tsinghua surveys including survival, the number of employees, revenues,
acquisitions and initial public offering (IPO). Figure 6 shows a comparison of the distribution
of firm size (measured by the number of employees) for the MIT and Tsinghua firms. Despite
the fact that the Tsinghua firms are younger on average, the distributions are fairly similar with
the exception of the 20-100 employee range where there appear to be relatively more Tsinghua
firms. There are more U.S. firms in the 500-750 employee range.
Table 17 shows a comparison of the revenues for the MIT and Tsinghua firms. All
revenues exclude financial firms and firms older than 15 years to make them slightly more
comparable. All revenues are for the most recent year that the firm was in operation (or for
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2006 for those still in operation). The Tsinghua dataset also contains the revenue numbers for
each of the first 3 years and the revenues (plus employees) for the second to last year that the
firm was in operation (or for 2005 for those still in operation). These data allow us to look at
some growth trends over time. Tsinghua revenues have been converted for the exchange rate
and for purchasing power parity (PPP). The former can be thought of as a lower bound while
the PPP conversion gives a lower bound. MIT revenues have been adjusted for inflation. We
can see that overall the MIT firms are significantly larger.100 Both surveys contain data on
acquisitions and IPOs, though these have been very rare in China until very recently. In
addition, the Tsinghua survey has a couple of unique performance measures that will be
discussed more below.
Idea and Team Characteristics
Figure 7 shows the number of different sources of the founding team reported for each
co-founded firm. The instructions on the survey were to "mark as many as apply." The figure
shows that as expected, as the number of co-founders increases, the number of team sources
shows a corresponding increase. For the MIT firms with 2 founders, just under 90% met in one
setting and 10% knew each other from two settings (for example, at MIT and through common
work experience). For the teams with 4 founders, 64% met via one source and 27% met via
two sources. For the Tsinghua firms with 2 founders, 90% met via one source and 10% via two
sources and for those with 4 founders, those numbers are 68% and 23%, respectively.
Examining the entrepreneurial teams assembled by MIT and Tsinghua alumni shows
that team size is significantly larger for the Tsinghua firms. For MIT the mean team size is
2.15 (median=2) vs. 3.35 (median=3) for Tsinghua. However, this difference is largely due to
100 There may be some concerns that the largest Chinese firms may be reluctant to share revenue data
even in an anonymous, non-government survey.
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the family business model contributing to a relative lack of single-founder teams in China with
38.03% of the MIT alumni firms being founded by 1 individual vs. 9.67% for Tsinghua.
Insert Figures 7-12 about here
Figures 8a and 8b show the number of idea sources reported by the founders. Again we
see a similar pattern in both sets of alumni that firms with larger founding teams were more
likely to report a greater number of sources for the idea. This effect seems just slightly more
pronounced for the Tsinghua firms. A larger number of sources for the idea may indicate
combining knowledge from different areas to generate the start-up.
Figure 9a shows the source of ideas for MIT alumni firms and Figure 9b shows the
same for the Tsinghua alumni firms. Both figures are divided into recent graduates (blue) and
older graduates (red). The recent graduates comprise about 20% of the sample when the 5 year
cutoff is used. Compared to Tsinghua, the MIT alumni entrepreneurs more frequently get their
ideas from work experience. This is true for both recent and older graduates. However, for
both, older graduates are more likely to get ideas from work experience and younger graduates
are more likely to get their ideas from research settings. The shift is most likely due to the fact
that these recent graduates have had less time to accumulate work experience and have had
more recent exposure to university research. For the Tsinghua alumni, compared to the MIT
alumni, they are more likely to get their ideas from social networking, fewer get ideas from
work experience and more of the ideas appear to come from research settings. Again, for the
more recent graduates, the distribution of idea sources shifts away from work experience and
towards ideas coming from socializing and research. The differences are significant at the 1%
level with the exception of the differences between recent and older Tsinghua graduates in
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getting ideas from social networking, which is significant at the 10% level. The finding that a
higher percentage of Tsinghua alumni get their ideas from research is unexpected. In particular,
it is due to higher percentages of Tsinghua alumni getting their start-up ideas while at the
university, either through conversations with visiting scientists and engineers, from the
professional literature, or through informal discussions with other students than is true for MIT
alumni. It is speculation at this point, but it may also be due to the more applied nature of the
research going on in Chinese universities compared to the U.S. where basic research is likely to
be relatively more common.
Figure 10 shows the same figures but for the team formation. The results are very
similar overall across MIT and Tsinghua. Most of the teams came from work experience,
followed by social activities and then research. Consistent with the idea sources, as graduates
get older, they tend to form their teams more from work experience and less from research or
social activities. For the Tsinghua case, it is interesting that while many of the ideas came from
research, a smaller percentage of the teams were formed in a research setting. Teams from
research were less likely among Tsinghua cofounders than for the MIT cofounders. For both
the team and idea sources, the respondents could indicate more than one source. The MIT
alumni appear to have identified slightly more diverse sources of the founding team than the
Tsinghua alumni did, despite the fact that the Tsinghua teams were more often cofounded. The
older Tsinghua alumni were more likely than the MIT alumni to identify family members as
cofounders.
Figure 11 shows the median revenues (in constant 2001 dollars) for the MIT firms
plotted by the idea source. While the revenues for firms originating from work experience
ideas are higher and those from ideas from socializing are lower, the standard deviations are
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high enough that the differences are not statistically significant. A similar figure has not been
plotted for the Tsinghua alumni because the sample sizes are smaller in each category. Figure
12 shows the standard deviations of the revenues and we see that the variance appears to be
lower for ideas from research. Similar results also hold when looking at the team sources, but
again the differences do not reach statistical significance.
Insert Table 14-18 here
Table 18 shows the responses to the question of "what was the primary source of the
idea" that led to the founding of the firm. Overall the patterns are strikingly similar with ideas
from industry and from discussions at social or professional conferences forming the largest
two categories in each sample. We observe that more of the U.S. firms resulted from ideas
uncovered while working in industry (41.4% vs. 24.8%) or doing outside-funded research
(2.1% vs. 0.8%). More of the Chinese firms resulted from informal discussions with students
at school (11% vs. 3.4%), from classes at the university (5.9% vs. 2%), and from the
professional literature or from visiting scientists and engineers. Table 19 shows the team and
idea source characteristics of the MIT firms broken out by founding decade and aggregate
sources. We see that most of the teams were formed from work or social activities and most of
the ideas came from working in the industry. The average team size appears to be slightly
larger for the Tsinghua firms at 3.35 compared to 2.29 for the MIT firms. For the firms
founded in the 2000s the numbers are much more similar with the average team size at 3.3 for
the MIT firms and 3.36 for the Tsinghua firms. Tables 20 and 21 show much more detail on
the team and idea sources for the MIT alumni. Table 20 shows the most frequent combinations
of sources for the team. The most common combinations are working in business combined
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with family or networking, MIT lab combined with MIT course, and socially while at MIT with
socially after leaving university. Table 21 shows the same table but for the idea sources. The
most common combinations are "Working in the Industry" with "Working in the
Military/Government" or "Discussions with social/professional acquaintances."
Table 22 shows a comparison of the channels that the MIT and Tsinghua founding
teams met through including family/relatives, classmates, or colleagues. The Tsinghua
responses are broken down by the first co-founder (designated by the respondent) only and then
all co-founders. We find that the MIT teams were more likely to meet via classmates and the
likelihood that the team met via family or work colleagues was similar for both the MIT and
Tsinghua founding teams. The second panel breaks out the Tsinghua data by how the
respondent met each co-founder. We see that if there was only one co-founder then there is a
higher likelihood that it was a relative than for the remaining co-founders or for larger teams.
For all alumni, the most common channel for founders to meet was as work colleagues
followed by classmates.
Insert Figures 13-19 and Tables 19-26 about here
Financing
Figure 13 shows the distribution of initial capital raised for the business (in the first
year). The figures have all been converted to constant U.S. dollars (2005) using purchasing
power parity (PPP) as calculated by the 2005 World Bank International Comparison
Program.'10 The Chinese firms appear to be raising (or reporting) considerably smaller
101 A detailed review of the methodological difficulties in constructing PPP indices is beyond the scope of
this paper (see Kravis, Heston, and Summers, 1982 for a discussion of these issues).
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amounts of initial capital. 10 2
Table 23 shows the number and percentage of companies using each source of capital
for the firms. We find that the most common source for the MIT alumni by far is the savings of
the founding team followed by venture capital and then friends and family. For the Tsinghua
alumni savings is also the most important source followed by friends and family. The Tsinghua
survey did not break out state government, cash flow or customers separately as sources.
Figure 14 shows the pattern of the breakdown of the sources of capital for the MIT and
Tsinghua firms. Across the x-axis we have the founding decades and along the y-axis the
proportion of firms using that source of capital. Overall the MIT and Tsinghua firms appear
roughly similar in their financing with savings making up the largest category. The "other"
category is made up largely of capital from suppliers. High use of supplier credit has in other
studies been used as a measure of financial constraints on firms. The Tsinghua firms appear to
use founders' savings less frequently than the MIT firms and capital from friends and family
slightly more frequently. The proportion of firms using loans from banks is similar across the
two countries. In recent decades, the proportion of MIT firms raising money from angel
investors or venture capitalists has increased and is higher than that proportion for Tsinghua
firms. We do see an increase in the use of venture capital among the MIT firms over the
decades. It is likely that this is restricted to those firms that are raising large amounts of initial
capital.
Innovation
102 For the Chinese firms, we asked about "registered capital" which is the initial capital that firms are
required to report when registering the founding of a new firm. While this is not perfectly symmetric to
the MIT survey question of "initial capital in the first year of the company," it is close and the best we
currently have available.
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One of the advantages of these data is that we have multiple measures (particularly in
the Chinese survey) of the importance of innovation in the firms. Using these data, we have a
number of innovation measures (both patent-based and non-patent based) including: whether
the start-up owned or licensed any intellectual property (IP), whether IP was considered critical
for the success of the business, if one of the co-founders was the creator of the innovation, the
source of the idea, if there were any patents (foreign or domestic for the Tsinghua firms), and
how much of the firm's revenues were spent on R&D activities. We have also linked the MIT
firms with the USPTO patent database to merge in the number of patents and the patent
characteristics.
Patents are typically used as a measure of innovation because they offer extremely
detailed and rich data that are easy to access. However, there are limitations of patents as a
measure of technical change or innovation (Comanor & Scherer 1969; Graham & Higgins,
2007). There are problems with great skewness in quality, differences in propensity to patent
across industries, countries and firm types. The range of patentable innovations constitutes just
a sub-set of all research outcomes, it is unclear whether patents should be seen as a research
input (like a working paper) or an output, patenting is a strategic decision, and not all
patentable innovations are actually patented.
Figure 15 presents the reported most recent year spending on R&D (as a percentage of
revenue) for the firms that were founded in a given year. 103 The levels are roughly similar for
both the MIT and Tsinghua firms over the years. However, the MIT alumni firms are
consistently spending more on R&D than the Tsinghua alumni firms. Further, this appears to
be due to higher R&D spending by R&D performers rather than a lower proportion of R&D
performing firms among the Tsinghua alumni firms.
103 For inactive or failed firms, this was reported for the most recent year in operation.
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Table 24 displays the responses to the questions of whether the founder was the creator
(author) of the intellectual property that the firm is using, whether the firm owns IP and
whether they consider intellectual property to be important for the venture. A higher
proportion of the Tsinghua alumni report having created the intellectual property (a finding that
is consistent with weaker IP protection in China where selling or licensing IP would be more
difficult or with a greater orientation toward starting firms that have higher IP). Similar
percentages between the schools report owning IP (53.2% vs. 59.4%) and that IP is important
for their businesses (33.8% vs. 37.9%). It is interesting to note from these responses that a
subset of the IP owners (or even the authors) consider the IP to be important for their start-up.
The bottom panel shows the breakdown of the R&D investment by the firms as a percentage of
revenues. We see very similar aggregate patterns between the two countries even broken down
by the 25 th percentile, the median and the 75 th percentile. The bottom panel of Table 24 breaks
down the R&D spending data by industry. As expected, we see higher levels of R&D spending
in electronics and software than in law and accounting (chosen as a low tech contrast). Also,
we find slightly higher R&D spending in the MIT electronics and software firms than the
Tsinghua firms in those industries.
Table 25 shows the breakdown of patenting as a measure of innovative activity. Panel
A shows that out of the sample of all Tsinghua alumni, just under 1.5% hold at least 1 foreign
(non-Chinese) patent and 15.5% hold at least 1 Chinese patent. In panel B, we report the
number of patents per firm. This includes only USPTO patents for the U.S. firms, but includes
any foreign or domestic patents for the Chinese firms. Fewer than 20 of the Chinese firms
reported holding foreign (non-Chinese) patents. The first set of columns report patents for all
firms. The results show that while only 25.1% of the U.S. firms hold at least one patent, 79.9%
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of the Chinese firms report holding at least one patent. Since many of the U.S. firms hold
many patents due to their older average firm age compared to the Chinese firms, the next set of
columns restricts the firms to only those less than 15 years old. We see that the proportions are
now 12% (U.S.) and 92.3% (China). While it may be true that there is a stronger orientation to
starting firms with IP, the Chinese firms likely have such high patenting rates because there are
many government incentives and subsidies for firms that hold patents, particularly for the
science parks. Some of these results may be due to filing a patent simply in order to qualify for
one of these benefits. If we take the response of whether intellectual property (broadly defined)
will be important for the firm, then in each country roughly 30% of the firms were innovating.
From the results on patenting, we could then conclude that patenting activity undercounts
innovating firms in the U.S. but drastically over-counts innovating firms in the Chinese context.
Patenting appears to be a poor proxy for innovating firms in an international comparison.
Many additional non-patent measures of innovation are available in the Tsinghua
survey, including responses to the question of whether the products/services offered by the firm
were available on the market three years ago.
Elements Unique to the Tsinghua Survey
Since the Tsinghua survey was done almost 4 years after the MIT survey and
subsequent to the first publication from the MIT dataset, many improvements were made on the
data collected for the Tsinghua alumni.
Unique Demographic Characteristics
Tables 5 and 6 show the means for some of the unique demographic characteristics that
the survey includes. We asked about the economic status of the individual's family relative to
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the rest of Chinese society when they were in high school. This gives an indication of socio-
economic status while side-stepping the tricky compensation issues where many individuals
were compensated through housing, bonuses or other perks rather than compensation. Rather
than giving a dollar amount, the respondents were asked whether their family was in the top
10%, the top 10-25 th percentiles, 25-50 th percentile, or the bottom 50 percent. The overall mean
response was 3.63 which would be in the top 2 5 th or 10 th percentile of Chinese society. We
also capture whether the individual was a member of the Communist party (54% of
respondents), what year they joined and if he/she was a member of other political parties (non-
communist political parties include such groups as the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese
Kuomintang, the China Democratic League, the China Democratic National Construction
Association, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the Chinese Peasants and
Workers Democratic Party, the China Zhi Gong Party). Nine percent of the respondents had
parents who were entrepreneurs. We also asked about other family members, neighbors or
colleagues and whether they were entrepreneurs. Another unique aspect of the survey tailored
to the Chinese setting was the phenomenon of graduates going overseas for educational or work
experience. Among the Tsinghua alumni respondents, 21% had overseas experience. We also
collected a wide range of variables characterizing this overseas experience in a separate
"Overseas" section of the survey to be analyzed in a future paper. The survey asked whether
the individual was a student leader in one of a number of well-defined student groups while an
undergraduate. Sixty-seven percent of the non-entrepreneurs and 90.3% of the entrepreneurs
had been student leaders. Finally, we asked for GRE and TOEFL scores as well as what
quartile of the GPA distribution the respondent was in. The distribution of GPA quartiles
appears fairly balanced, with slightly less than one quarter reporting that they were in the
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bottom quartile. Without access to the university transcripts we have no way of definitively
knowing about possible inflated reporting of all these measures as opposed to response bias.
From the analysis of response bias in Table 8, it appears that there may be some over-reporting.
Those with higher GPA levels were slightly less likely to respond to the survey.
Work History
The Tsinghua survey added a major section collecting career histories of the
respondents, starting with the first job after graduation all the way to the most recent job.
Figure 16 shows a histogram of the number of jobs reported on. The most common were one
job or five jobs and t-tests of means were performed. The main differences for those reporting
only one job was that they were younger. On average, respondents had held 2.37 different job
positions (R&D, sales & marketing, etc.) and had held each job for 7.11 years on average. We
know the salary (inclusive of bonuses) for each job by five categories of salary levels. We
captured the sector for each job (government, business, academic, or non-profit) along with
whether the individual at some point had work experience in R&D, technical management,
general management, or in sales and marketing. Twenty-three percent had worked in academia
and 21.6% had worked in government. Several phone calls were made to verify the work
history information.104 If the individual was in government, we captured the precise level.
Four percent held high positions in government at the minister, province, Bureau or municipal
levels. Seventeen percent held jobs in lower levels of government, below the municipal level.
Figure 17 shows the percentages of those in academia, business or government becoming
entrepreneurs plotted by the founding year. We find that the highest percentages come from
lower levels of government while the lowest percentages come from academia. The figures
104 During these calls it was discovered that some had counted research assistant jobs that they held during
graduate school as work experience in academia.
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separate out those who had worked previously in that sector from those transitioning directly
from that sector to entrepreneurship. Individuals were least likely to transition directly from
academia to entrepreneurship. Academic and high government jobs have traditionally been
among the most prestigious in Chinese society so this appears to make sense. We also capture
whether the individual left each job position voluntarily or if they were fired. On average
12.8% of respondents indicated they had been fired at some point in their careers.
To better illustrate the typical career histories of the Tsinghua respondents, we follow
the average career paths of a graduate from the 1970s and one from the 1990s. The typical
graduate from the 1970s majored in mechanical engineering and 63% took first jobs in business,
typically in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The median salary at the end of the first job was
reported in the lowest salary category (the 0 to 20,000 yuan category). Since salaries during
this time were set by the government, we find that 63% of the graduates (the same percentage
with jobs in state-owned enterprises) received this salary of 0 to 20,000 yuan. On average 11.2
years were spent in this first job. The shift to stop the government from setting salaries for
specific jobs occurred as part of the SOE reforms in the mid-1980s. The second job was also
most likely in a state-owned enterprise as were subsequent jobs. The most common industry
for such an alum would have been machinery or chemicals.
The typical graduate from the 1990s majored in electrical engineering or computer
science (followed closely by mechanical engineering) and 70.8% took first jobs in business,
some in state-owned enterprises, some in foreign multi-nationals and some in private firms.
The salary at the end of the first job was typically between 20,000 and 100,000 yuan, however
the variance is much higher with only 28% receiving this salary level. On average 4.8 years
were spent in the first job compared to 11.2 years for the earlier graduate from the 1970s. The
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second job was also most likely in business as were subsequent jobs. The most common
industries for such an alum would have been machinery or chemicals, followed closely by
electric utilities, electronics and architecture. Work history data are currently being merged
into the MIT dataset from Linkedln, ZoomInfo, Facebook, etc., starting with the Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science graduates.
Entrepreneurship and Privatization
In China, entrepreneurship also is interpreted to include privatizing a state-owned
enterprise. We asked about privatization separately and found that about 6% of the respondents
had privatized an SOE.
Table 26 contains self-reports of why non-entrepreneurs from the Tsinghua sample
chose not to found firms. Panel A shows that among the 685 who responded to the question,
65.1 percent reported considering becoming an entrepreneur, but in the end did not start the
project. Another 27.2 had never considered it and 7.7 percent did not view entrepreneurship as
a worthwhile activity. Of those who did not become an entrepreneur, we asked them to rate
their reasons on a scale of one to eight, with one being the most important reason. The top two
reasons were a difficulty in raising capital and a lack of good ideas. Thirty-one percent chose
difficulty in raising capital as the most important reason and thirty-seven percent rated "lack of
good ideas" as the most important reason for not becoming an entrepreneur. In the order that
they were chosen, the next most important reasons were that the risk is too great, difficulty in
finding partners, inability to leave the current job, and a handful indicated that their family was
against entrepreneurship, the government discouraged entrepreneurship at the time, and the
least important reason was that their concept was easily copied. The finding that "concept
easily copied" was the least reported primary reason for not founding a firm provides some
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evidence against the idea that inability to legally protect IP is discouraging entrepreneurship in
China.
The Tsinghua survey also contains data on several other aspects of the entrepreneurial
process including whether the founder had prior relationships with the technology, the market,
suppliers, customers, or investors, whether there were shifts in the market or technology
targeted over time. In terms of financing, we have responses on whether particular investors
were involved in management decisions and had control rights in the firm and whether
employees had stock option plans. The respondents were also asked whether they had formed a
board of advisors or directors and they were also asked about the importance of several
dimensions including innovation, low cost, and speed to market on the firm's success.
Performance
Since reporting revenue numbers is a sensitive subject (even for an anonymous survey
that does not ask the firm's name), we sought to ask other performance measures. In interviews
we were told that while accounting methods had improved, Chinese firms were known to keep
not one but three sets of books: one for investors, one for the government and one for
themselves. In the development literature it has become standard to ask about profits as a
percentage of firm gross revenues, especially when surveying micro-enterprises that do not
often keep good records. The Tsinghua survey asked this question both for the most recent
year that the firm was in operation (2006 for firms still in business) and for the year prior to
that. Figure 18 shows a histogram of this measure of the profitability of the firms. Most of the
firms are clustered at the lower (but actually quite good) end of the profitability distribution
(around 10-20%). These smaller firms appear to have grown on average from the first year
measured to the second year. The firms at the very bottom and at the top of the distribution
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appear not to have grown on average over the two-year period. In future analyses, this measure
can also provide a check on which firms are simply larger (in terms of employees or revenues)
and which firms are actually more profitable.
Conclusion
The MIT and Tsinghua surveys offer a promising and exciting methodology for cross-
country comparisons in innovation and the entrepreneurial process and outcomes. The alumni
received strikingly similar educations in terms of their major fields and the caliber of the
universities. They founded firms at roughly similar rates and those firms tend to be in very
similar industries. However, the legal, financial and institutional environments that these
individuals encountered in their work experience and in founding their firms differed
dramatically, particularly for the early Tsinghua entrepreneurs.
What is the same and what is different about entrepreneurship by alumni from MIT vs.
from Tsinghua? The results of the Tsinghua and MIT alumni surveys can be compared along
three overarching dimensions; 1) factors that affect who becomes an entrepreneur, 2) factors in
the process of founding a firm, and 3) performance outcomes for these firms. The outcomes, in
terms of survival, employees, and revenues may result, in part from the first two sets of factors
along with the influence from other differences in the legal and institutional contexts of the U.S.
and China.
Table 12 examines some of the differences and similarities. In both cases, men appear
much more likely than women to found firms. The Tsinghua entrepreneurs tend to be
significantly younger than the non-entrepreneurs. This is likely due in part to the labor market
changes in China where earlier generations were assigned to job positions and entrepreneurship
was illegal. The cohort born in 1960 would have been 18 in 1978 when many of the economic
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reforms began occurring. Most significantly, in 1988 the state officially recognized the
growing number of private businesses (known in Mandarin as 'saying qiye') with eight or more
employees (Xu and Zhao, 2008) and made them legitimate.
Another significant difference is that those earning a master's degree were much more
likely to become entrepreneurs in China compared to master's degree holders from MIT.
Chapter 5 explores one institutional change in China that led to higher rates of entrepreneurship
for those with Master's degrees. Another contributing factor may be Tsinghua alumni who
went to the U.S. for their Master's degree and then were exposed to entrepreneurship there.
Some of these individuals would have come back to China to found their firms. For both
Tsinghua and MIT, doctorate degree holders are not significantly more (or less) represented
among entrepreneurs. Both universities see the highest rates of entrepreneurship among the
engineering and management alumni. There are high rates of entrepreneurship in the
architecture graduates, however, this is due to the small firm partnership nature of that industry.
A higher percentage of the Tsinghua engineering and social sciences graduates reported having
founded firms. These differences appear to be driven mainly by differences between the
universities in the chemical engineering alumni and the humanities. It is possible that the social
sciences graduates are more less likely to found product-oriented firms, opting instead for
services. If this holds up to further analysis, it might explain some of the differences in start-up
factors and firm performance levels. Alternatively, it could be that these are the types of firms
that the Chinese business environment is more suited to building.
It was surprising to find similar proportions of Tsinghua entrepreneurs becoming serial
entrepreneurs with multiple firm foundings as has happened with the MIT alumni. We
speculate that a higher percentage of the MIT serial entrepreneurship comes as a result of
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successful firm acquisitions or IPO (simply become acquisition and IPOs have been rarer in
China). Yet, future work is needed to confirm this as well as the implications for the
availability of high quality mentors and investors for the next generation of entrepreneurs.
Another surprising result is the fact that the Tsinghua non-entrepreneurs appear not to have
been deterred by government intervention or cultural attitudes, but more by the lack of capital
or good ideas for new businesses. Similar data are not available on the decisions of MIT non-
entrepreneurs.
Next we turn to examine what affects the start-up process factors such as ideas, teams,
innovation and financing. One of the rationales for choosing to study a sample of individuals
trained at top technical universities was that these alumni are more likely to found technology-
based firms. In theory, this should impose some desired similarity on the entrepreneurial
process that the founders go through in creating their firms. Yet, in different countries, faced
with different economic, legal and institutional environments, an intriguing possibility is that
there is a different start-up process across companies. If we do see differences in the factors
related to the process of founding a firm, then the question becomes one of whether these
differences represent deviations from an ideal or optimal process. Alternatively, they may
simply be appropriate differences influenced by idiosyncratic or unique characteristics of
various entrepreneurial environments.
We begin with the entrepreneur's stated sources for the start-up idea. For both the MIT
and Tsinghua entrepreneurs, we see a correlation where start-ups founded by a single individual
tend to have one idea source and larger founding teams result in more diverse sources of the
start-up idea. When we look at the specific idea sources, we also see a lot of similarities
between the MIT and Tsinghua firms. In both countries, the most common source of the start-
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up idea was work experience in industry. For both countries, the idea sources for more recent
graduates are more likely to be from research or social networking rather than from work.
However, there are also differences in the idea sources across the two university alumni groups.
Fewer of the Tsinghua entrepreneurs got their ideas from work experience and more of them
came from discussions with other students and visiting scientists or engineers. This difference
may be due to graduate students getting ideas while studying in the U.S. or differences in the
labor market in China. Historically many Chinese graduates worked in government or in
public research institutes. While fewer Tsinghua alumni indicated getting the idea from work
experience primarily, more comparable percentages indicated work as a secondary idea source.
Another possibility is that many industries that have been present in the U.S. for many years,
have only relatively recently and rather quickly come to China. Software and the internet are
two examples that come to mind. If this scenario were true, then one could imagine that the
opportunities for work experience in these new industries were rare, but yet the individuals still
knew about possible opportunities through discussions with peers or from colleagues overseas.
The data show differences in the team sources that are interesting as well. Alumni from
both schools tended to form companies primarily with co-workers. The Tsinghua
entrepreneurs appear less likely to find their start-up ideas from work experience in industry
and more likely to use social networking as well as family members rather than co-workers or
lab members. This may be due to the nature of the state-owned enterprise system in which
many of them had worked where political factors rather than customer demand may have been
important. To the extent that teams from work experience tend to be more successful, the
smaller proportion of Tsinghua cofounding teams from work experience and the relatively
higher number from networking and family might be hurting performance. From previous
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literature, we know that successful entrepreneurship tends to be more of a team activity than an
individual activity. Examining the entrepreneurial teams assembled by MIT and Tsinghua
alumni shows that team size is significantly larger for the Tsinghua firms. For MIT the mean
team size is 2.15 (median=2) vs. 3.35 (median=3) for Tsinghua. However, this difference is
largely due to the relative lack of single-founder teams in China with 38.03% of the MIT
alumni firms being founded by 1 individual vs. 9.67% for Tsinghua. Perhaps this might be due
to cultural differences commonly referred to as individualistic vs. collective. It may also be
because the teams of Tsinghua entrepreneurs, especially those with only two cofounders appear
to still be more in the family business model than the MIT alumni firms. This was consistent
with our interviews as well which indicated that while things are rapidly changing, the family
business model is still common in China. Family is particularly entrusted with keeping the
books by some of the Tsinghua entrepreneurs we interviewed.
Some would argue that many of the MIT firms are likely to be doing work at the world's
technological frontier, whereas the Chinese entrepreneurs are mostly adapting existing
technologies to their markets. Yet the comparative data suggest that the situation may not be so
simple and straightforward. Admittedly, innovation is a difficult concept to measure
empirically. Both the Tsinghua and MIT entrepreneurs appear to be reporting that they rely on
innovation (where innovation might be defined as something new for their country's market) at
similar rates. Nonetheless, the most basic observation we found is that the levels of innovation
depend on how the question is asked and the pattern of these differences appears to match the
incentives facing the Tsinghua alumni entrepreneurs.
Perhaps most surprising, it appears that when patent-based measures of innovation are
used, little innovation is occurring in the Tsinghua firms. However, once non-patent based
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measures are examined, there is evidence for similar levels of innovation in the Tsinghua firms
as in the MIT firms. While this may not be innovation at the world's cutting edge of
technology, it nonetheless represents innovation in the eyes of these entrepreneurs and in
comparison to their home market.
Of course, good entrepreneurial teams and ideas need capital to survive and expand. At
first glance (much more detailed analysis is needed) the patterns of financing for the firms is
similar overall. The savings of the founders is the single most frequently used source of early
capital in both countries. It is clear that the Tsinghua firms raise lower amounts of initial
capital than the MIT firms. It is difficult to know whether differences in the legal environment
and financial institutions are leading to financial frictions and inefficiently lower amounts of
capital being raised by the Tsinghua firms. An alternative explanation is that the types of
entrepreneurs and firms being created do not need or merit larger amounts of capital. In our
interviews, we asked many of the Tsinghua alumni entrepreneurs about the fundraising for their
own firms and about their perceptions of the entrepreneurial finance environment in general.
Many expressed frustration that it was extremely difficult to raise capital in China, particularly
from domestic banks; however, the proportion of firms using loans from banks is similar across
the two countries. Nonetheless, the Tsinghua alumni appear to be using money from friends
and family or from supplier credit more frequently than the MIT firms. Heavy use of these
sources could be interpreted as a sign of financial constraints or perhaps reflect cultural
differences in regard to family ties. The Tsinghua entrepreneurs also tend to be much younger
than the MIT entrepreneurs, so they may not have as much in personal savings on average.
In recent decades, the proportion of MIT firms raising money from angel investors or
venture capitalists has increased and is higher than that proportion for Tsinghua firms. We do
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see an increase in the use of venture capital among the MIT firms over the decades. It is likely
that this is restricted to those firms that are raising large amounts of initial capital. Again, it is
difficult to know from these data whether these forms of external capital are as yet unavailable
to Tsinghua alumni or whether their firms do not fit the investment criteria. While we do not
have similar data on the MIT firms, the Tsinghua survey data does tell us that while 25 firms
obtained venture capital, 80 firms sought VC money. Similarly, 43 firms reported seeking
angel investor funding, but only 22 received it.
Finally, what firm outcomes are created by the Chinese environment, founders and
start-up factors as compared to the U.S. environment, founders and entrepreneurial process?
The firms created by the MIT alumni appear to be larger and more successful in terms of
revenues, employees, and liquidity events (acquisitions and IPOs). We begin by simply letting
the data speak for themselves and showing the differences in firm outcomes along several
dimensions. Then we discuss how to interpret the similarities and differences along with a few
possible explanations of why we may be seeing the differences in performance that we do. At
this stage, it is difficult to definitely trace the causes leading to lower firm performance for the
Tsinghua firms. We will draw on some of our interview notes in suggesting possible
explanations that seemed likely to the Tsinghua entrepreneurs and Chinese investors that we
spoke with in China.
In terms of employees, there are similar proportions of MIT and Tsinghua firms
represented at the very smallest sizes of 5-10 employees (and the larger 5,000 and above
employee sizes). However, there are more MIT firms in the 500-750 size range and relatively
more Tsinghua firms with 20-100 employees. However, the MIT alumni firms are significantly
older than the Tsinghua firms.
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Entrepreneurship was all but illegal in the earlier years of the Communist regime
making older private firms very rare. Even after that time, foreign-invested firms and state-
owned enterprises continued to be privileged in many ways and encouraged to grow larger than
the emerging private enterprises. However, once we stratify by age, the Tsinghua firms are not
significantly smaller in terms of the number of employees. In fact, among the firms younger
than five or 10 years, the Tsinghua firms tend to have more employees. This result may be due
to lower wage labor costs in China. Further analysis is needed to say for sure, however
interviews with the Chinese entrepreneurs also indicated that this was the case. One pair of
founders reported that they had located the firm in Shanghai rather than in the U.S. partially
because of lower labor costs for scientists and lab space and that as a result they had been able
to expand the lab much more quickly. They actually indicated that this had been a problem
because the administrative infrastructure for the firm was having trouble keeping up with the
growth in employees.
When we turn to look at revenues, the differences are even more pronounced in favor of
the MIT alumni firms being larger. Two caveats apply to these statements. The first is the
concern about the accuracy of the revenue figures. Respondents could be underreporting or
biasing results in the opposite direction, they could be not responding if they have low revenues.
Also, these results include privatized Chinese state-owned enterprises. Even though the
government "grasped the big and let go of the small," still the privatized firms tend to be larger
in terms of revenues and older than the newly founded firms.
Earlier in China's history, there were some geographic restrictions on trade across the
provinces since the government wanted to build up industrial capacity in a dispersed manner
across the country. Figure 19 shows that the proportion of out-of-state (U.S.) or out-of-
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province (China) sales broken down by industry is very similar. 10 5 It appears from the initial
evidence in Figure 19, that the Chinese firms are not significantly more geographically
constrained in their sales than the U.S. firms. If smaller demand or more constrained markets
are to explain the performance differences, the explanation would have to be for international
sales or overall customer wealth. Per capita wealth levels differ dramatically with coastal
regions and larger cities (Beijing and Shanghai) being more wealthy than inland/non-coastal
areas. Mean and median revenues do not differ significantly for firms located in coastal areas
(coastal mean= 4,378 RMB vs. non-coastal mean=5,034 RMB) or in Beijing and Shanghai
(4,196 RMB) compared to those that are not (5,158 RMB). The initial evidence indicates that
the geographic differences in individual wealth levels within China do not significantly drive
firm revenue differences, casting doubt on the extent to which such economic differences
across the countries might explain in large part the differences in firm outcomes across the
countries.
Acquisitions and IPOs have been a relatively recent phenomenon in China.
Accordingly, we see far fewer of these types of events in the Tsinghua firms. Our interviews
indicated that Chinese managers and entrepreneurs have not adopted the serial entrepreneur
style of their U.S. counterparts. Once a business is relatively successful, they would rather
continue to run it than sell it and move on to another. Many Western investors have run into
difficulties due to this cultural difference. The data show that there are similar relative
proportions of serial entrepreneurs, but they appear to be serial entrepreneurs for different
reasons and motivations.
Systematically determining the causes of cross-national differences in firm performance
105 Only a handful of the Tsinghua alumni reported the percentage of sales from outside of China, so due
to lack of sufficient number of observations, I do not show that comparison to the MIT alumni firms and
their foreign sales.
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is difficult and will require more sophisticated future analysis. However, we can begin to point
out areas that appear to be important. The differences in firm performance appear to be the
result of several factors; 1) differences in the types of individuals becoming entrepreneurs, 2)
differences in factors related to the entrepreneurial process 3) differences in the legal and
institutional environment, 4) differences in the economic environment (lower consumer
demand in China, larger markets in the U.S.). It would be overly simplistic to claim that these
four factors are independent of each other. Clearly, they are interrelated and feedback on one
another. However, for clarity of discussion, we will review them one at a time, drawing on the
previous chapters as well as the results discussed above.
First, there are slight differences in who tends to become an entrepreneur among the
MIT and Tsinghua alumni. In particular, there have been changing trends over time that have
been different in each country. As we discussed above, recently Tsinghua alumni with
Master's degrees have been much more likely to found firms. These firms have had higher
performance, but tend to be younger firms. The Tsinghua founders tend to be younger on
average as well and higher percentages of Tsinghua humanities majors found firms than is true
for MIT alumni.
Second, we found that there are some significant differences in the factors related to the
entrepreneurial process, including the sources of ideas and teams, innovation, and fundraising.
Some of the differences in the sources of ideas and teams appear to be contributing to lower
performance of Tsinghua firms. However there do not appear to be large differences in the
proportion of firms using innovation strategies (though there are higher levels of R&D
spending for the MIT firms) or specific capital sources. There is some evidence of capital
constraints for the Tsinghua firms, but there is not strong evidence that financial constraints are
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significantly to blame for the smaller size of the Tsinghua firms.
Third, we should expect that a large part of these differences are due to differences in
the legal and institutional or policy environments for business between the two countries.
Chapter 3 reviewed the massive policy changes in China related to entrepreneurship shifting
from an activity that was illegal to one that is actively supported and encouraged. Chapter 5
explored in one particular institutional change, that through lowering barriers to growth,
encouraged more highly educated individuals to become entrepreneurs and larger, more
successful firms to be created.
Finally, while our data do not speak directly to the economic differences between China
and the U.S., it is clear that these are two countries at very different stages of economic and
market development. There is a large middle class in the U.S. with significant disposable
income, whereas China has a few well-developed cities, but large rural areas where people's
livelihoods are largely the same as they have been for centuries. On the whole the GDP per
capita in China was under $5,000 (constant PPP$) whereas that figure in the U.S. was $35,000
(constant PPP$). 106 These differences in wealth and market demand should be expected to lead
to differences in the performance and size of the firms located in China (perhaps even the start-
up process factors) even if all else was equal.
To conclude, it appears that much is similar in terms of the characteristics of
entrepreneurs and the start-up process factors between the MIT and Tsinghua alumni.
Nonetheless, there are some relatively subtle differences that in combination with the
differences in the environment for entrepreneurial firms and the institutional history of China
have led to vastly different outcomes for the entrepreneurial firms from MIT and Tsinghua.
106 OECD website, accessed May 29, 2009
(http://www.oecd.ore/statsoortal/0.3352.en 2825 293564 1 1 1 1 1.00.html).
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This comparative analysis has so far left relatively unexplored the causal mechanisms through
which the factors that affect who becomes an entrepreneur can both lead to differences in
factors related to the start-up process as well as firm outcomes. Yet, it does seem clear that the
shorter time frame in which entrepreneurial activity has been occurring in China results in a
younger, smaller set of entrepreneurial firms. Similarly, the younger age of Tsinghua
entrepreneurs contributes to a different mix of idea and team sources (fewer from work
experience) that might also partially explain the differences in firm outcomes. The mix of
funding sources and proportions of firms relying on technological innovation are strikingly
similar. While firm size in terms of employees is roughly similar, the MIT firms are much
larger in terms of revenues than the Tsinghua firms. We hope that this study represents a step
towards a better understanding of international differences in technology entrepreneurship.
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TABLE 1
Pair-wise Correlations MIT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 log revenues 1.00
2 log employees 0.76 1.00
3 log years survival 0.30 0.23 1.00
4 public 0.49 0.42 0.15 1.00
5 acquired 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.27 1.00
6 funcational diversity 0.11 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.12 1.00
7 role faculty 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.06 1.00
8 role research 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.06 1.00
9 role groups 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 1.00
1
0 idea from work 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.04 1.00
1 
.
1 idea from social 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.48 1.00
1
2 idea from research 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.46 0.15 1.00
1 
.
3 idea from other 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.13 0.12 1.00
1 idea from - -
4 military/gov. 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.06 1.00
1
5 team via work 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.22 0.21 0.05 1.00
1
6 team via research 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.29 0.03 0.39 0.03 0.03 0.47 1.00
1 - - - - - - - - - 1.0
7 team via social 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.43 0.09 0
1 team via - - - - - - - 0.0 1.0
8 extracurricular 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.05 0 0
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TABLE 2
Pairwise Correlations Tsinghua
1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21
Last job
1 academia 1
Last job
2 business 0.618 1
High
3 government 0.051 0.080 1
Low
4 ,overnment 0.102 0.385 0.105 1
Ever job
5 academia 0.425 0.085 0.009 0.056 1
Number of
8 Positions 0.149 0.175 0.011 0.036 0.135 1
9 Avg. Tenure 0.047 0.088 0.036 0.077 0.117 0.060 1
10 Gender 0.046 0.047 0.029 0.007 0.008 0.120 0.032 1
Entrepreneur
11 Parents 0.041 0.002 0.018 0.004 0.058 0.054 0.048 0.016 1
12 High Salary 0.138 0.320 0.050 0.180 0.158 0.284 0.305 0.057 0.009 1
Family
economic - - -
13 status 0.030 0.018 0.004 0.030 0.054 0.081 0.098 0.154 0.115 0.196 1
Student
14 Leader 0.009 0.028 0.011 0.051 0.011 0.075 0.130 0.010 0.043 0.144 0.070 1
Communist
15 Party 0.002 0.092 0.019 0.114 0.043 0.011 0.071 0.034 0.037 0.070 0.037 0.008 1
17 Master's 0.037 0.053 0.025 0.032 0.103 0.119 0.278 0.013 0.014 0.317 0.090 0.234 0.092 1
18 PhD 0.273 0.176 0.021 0.022 0.114 0.017 0.114 0.030 0.040 0.121 0.040 0.142 0.025 0.215 1
Overseas -
19 Experience 0.029 0.088 0.013 0.101 0.030 0.093 0.083 0.009 0.059 0.240 0.097 0.076 0.044 0.147 0.130 1
Bachelor's
20 Grad Year 0.159 0.268 0.027 0.136 0.014 0.098 0.433 0.031 0.083 0.460 0.104 0.242 0.130 0.457 0.160 0.232 1
21 Age 0.154 0.273 0.028 0.142 0.023 0.099 0.438 0.036 0.087 0.475 0.117 0.236 0.136 0.471 
0.171 0.240 0.989 1
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MIT: Summary Statistics
TABLE 3
and Variable Definitions (for main sample used in analysis,
founded between 1950-1998)
VARIABLE'0 7  DEFINITION MEAN SD
Dependent variables
Public Dummy = 1 if venture went public by '03 0.16 0.37
Acquired Dummy = 1 if venture was acquired by '03 0.26 0.44
L years survival Number of years in operation 2.74 0.65
L Employees Number of employees 3.40 2.10
L Revenues Inflation adjusted Revenues in $M 1.78 1.73
Used VC Dummy = 1 if venture received VC funding 0.13 0.33
Basic venture characteristics
Year founded Year in which a venture was founded 1988.59 11.86
Number of cofounders Count of the number of cofounders 0.99 1.23
Total team sources Count of the number of team sources listed 1.34 0.61
Total secondary idea sources Count of the number of secondary idea sources 0.77 1.24
US located Dummy = 1 if located in the US 0.92 0.28
Massachusetts Dummy = 1 if located in Massachusetts 0.31 0.46
California Dummy = 1 if located in California 0.18 0.39
Human asset (team) formation characteristics
Functional diversity Count of the number of distinct functions (sales, 1.22 0.47
marketing, engineering, etc.) on the founding
team
Role of MIT Faculty Dummy = 1 if MIT faculty played a role 0.05 0.22
Team met via work Dummy = 1 if the venture team met through 0.54 0.50
work
Team met via research Dummy = 1 if the venture team met through 0.22 0.41
research
Team met via socializing Dummy = 1 if the venture team met 0.37 0.48
through social networking
Team met via Dummy = 1 if the venture team met 0.02 0.13
extracurriculars through extracurricular activities
Team met via family Dummy = 1 if the venture team was related 0.09 0.29
Num. prior foundings Count of the number of prior foundings 1.35 0.71
Num. prior acquired Count of the number of prior foundings 0.13 0.41
resulting in an acquisition
Non-human asset (idea) formation characteristics
Role of MIT Research Dummy = 1 if MIT research played a role 0.05 0.23
Role of MIT groups Dummy =1 if MIT groups played a role 0.09 0.29
Idea from work Dummy = 1 if the venture idea arose through 0.60 0.49
working
in industry
Idea from socializing Dummy = 1 if the venture idea arose 0.14 0.34
through social networking
Idea from research Dummy = 1 if the venture idea arose through 0.13 0.33
research
Idea from military/govt. Dummy = 1 if the venture idea arose 0.03 0.18
through military or government experience
Idea from other source Dummy = 1 if the venture idea arose 0.10 0.29
through some other source
Held at least 1 patent Dummy = 1 if held at least 1 patent 0.25 0.44
107 "L" preceding the variable name in the regression tables denotes natural log.
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TABLE 4
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions (MIT)
VARIABLE 08  DEFINITION MEAN SD
First start-up founded Year in which first firm was founded 1985.10 12.30
(censored if not observed by 2003)
Second start-up founded Year in which second firm was founded 1989.96 10.43
(censored if not observed by 2003)
Individual Characteristics
Graduation year Year of MIT graduation 1973. 15.04
2
Bachelor's Degree = 1 if highest degree 0.43
Master's Degree = 1 if highest degree 0.41
Doctorate Degree =1 if highest degree 0.16
Male Dummy = 1 if the individual is male 0.93 --
Academic major Set of dummies for academic major: engineering (53%), management (14%),
social science (5%), architecture (4%), and natural science (the excluded
category)
Country of citizenship Set of dummies for country of citizenship: Latin America (2%), Asia (7%),
Europe (6%), Middle East (1%), Africa (1%) or North America (the excluded
category)
First Firm Level Characteristics
Age at S" firm founding Age of the entrepreneur the year the first firm was 37.5 10.27
founded
Recession Year Dummy = 1 if the firm was founded during a 0.22 0.41
recession year as categorized by the NBER.
Lag to First Firm Lag (in years) from graduation to the first firm 14.28 9.95
founding
VCfunded Dummy = 1 if the firm received venture capital
funding 0.14 0.35
Angel funded Dummy = 1 if the firm received funding from angel
investors 0.09 0.29
L Initial Capital Capital "raised to get the company off the ground" 11.97 2.71
Acquired Dummy = 1 if the firm was acquired 0.21 0.41
Public Dummy = 1 if the firm had an IPO 0.13 0.33
L Revenues Firm revenues for a specific year 14.24 3.03
# Cofounders Number of cofounders 2.15 1.78
Out ofBusiness Dummy = 1 if the firm closed 0.33 --
Operating Years Number of years the firm has been in operation 15.27 12.01
108 "L" preceding the variable name in the regression tables denotes natural log.
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TABLE 5
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions (Tsinghua)
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN SD
Panel A: Individual-level measures (Tsinghua data, entrepreneurs only)
Work in R&D =1 if the individual held an R&D position 0.60
Work as Tech =1 if the individual held a technical manager position 0.71
Manager
Ever job in =1 if the individual has held an academic job 0.23
Academia
Overseas =1 if the individual traveled outside of China for education or 0.21
Experience work
Master's =1 if the individual was an entrepreneur 0.59
degree =1 if parents were entrepreneurs 0.09
Ph.D. degree
Graduation Year of graduation (Bachelor's) 1990.1 9.69
year Family's economic status in China during college, 4-top 10%, 3.63 1.01
Family 3=top 10-25%, 2=top 25-50%, 1=bottom 50%
economic = Individual's age 40.03 9.86
status =1 if male 0.94 -
Age =1 if member of the Chinese Communist Party 0.54
Gender
Communist
Party
Panel B: Firm-level measures (Tsinghua)
First start-up Year in which first firm was founded (censored if not observed 2000.38 5.20
founded by 2007)
Firm age Age of the firm 4.12 3.69
Employees = Number of employees in the most recent year in operation 628.43 6424.94
R&D/ Firm R&D expenditures as a percentage of revenues 22.36 37.21
Revenue
Initial Capital Capital registered with the government at time of founding 2005.88 10391.42
(China) (converted to USD and PPP, IMF 2005)
Venture =1 if funding was received from venture capital 0.07 -
capital
funded
Angel = 1 if funding was received from angel investors 0.07 -
investor
Funded = Number of cofounders 3.35 1.85
Num.
cofounders
Privatized =1 if firm was privatized 0.06 -
Panel C: Macro-economic measures (China)
stock exchange Shanghai stock market capitalization 11185.18 39921.34
market cap
VC Venture capital disbursements (Asian Venture Capital Journal) 807.29 657.77
disbursements Total public R&D expenditures (in 100M RMB, 484.36 747.96
R&D converted for PPP to constant USD, Zheng, 2006)
expenditure
total SE pubs Total number of scientific and engineering 12414 7325.87
publications in that year
GDP Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity, 109184 177895.9
IMF, constant dollars)
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TABLE 6
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions (Tsinghua)
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN SD
Panel A: Firm and Individual-level measures
First start-up Year in which first firm was founded 2000.3 5.20
founded (censored if not observed by 2007) 8
Firm age Age of the firm 3.50 2.44
Privatized =1 if firm was privatized 0.10 0.47
Entrepreneur =1 if the individual was an entrepreneur 0.26 0.46
Entrepreneur =1 if parents were entrepreneurs 0.09 0.29
Parents
Graduation year Year of graduation (Bachelor's) 1980.6 17.80
Family economic Family's economic status in China during 6 1.01
status college, 4-top 10%, 3=top 10-25%, 2=top 25- 3.78
50%, l=bottom 50% 18.35
Age Individual's age 49.82 0.32
Gender Dummy = 1 if male 0.88
Panel B: Work history-level measures
Recent Salary Most recent pre-founding salary (5 categories) 3.32 1.43
Avg. Tenure Average number of years in each job 7.11 9.45
Number of Number of different positions (R&D, sales & 2.37 1.26
Positions marketing, general manager, etc. ) that were held
High government =1 if ever had job in government (minister, 0.03 0.17
province,
Low government Bureau or municipal levels 0.17 0.38
Lastjob academia =1 if ever had job in government (below municipal 0.19 0.39
level)
Lastjob business = 1 if last job was in academia (inclusive of 0.62 0.49
Everjob academia faculty, researcher, staff, etc) 0.23 --
= 1 if last job was in business
= 1 if ever had job in academia (inclusive of
faculty, researcher, staff, etc)
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TABLE 7
MIT
Variable
Male
Engineering major
Management major
Science major
Social sciences major
Architecture major
Non-US citizen
North American (not
US) citizen
Latin American citizen
Asian citizen
European citizen
Middle Eastern citizen
African citizen
Variable
Male
Engineering major
Management major
Science major
Social sciences major
Architecture major
Non-US citizen
North American (not
US) citizen
Latin American citizen
Asian citizen
European citizen
Middle Eastern citizen
African citizen
Responded to
2001 survey
(N=43,668)
0.83
0.48
0.16
0.23
0.05
0.06
0.81
0.13
0.13
0.33
0.30
0.05
0.03
Responded to
2003 survey
(N=2,111)
0.92
0.52
0.17
0.17
0.06
0.09
0.82
0.17
0.19
0.22
0.31
0.08
0.04
Did not respond to
2001 survey
(N=62,260)
0.86
0.47
0.15
0.23
0.06
0.08
0.82
0.11
0.12
0.34
0.26
0.08
0.05
Did not respond to
2003 survey
(N=6,131)
0.92
0.47
0.21
0.18
0.05
0.09
0.81
0.14
0.19
0.24
0.32
0.07
0.04
t-stat for equal
means
10.11
-4.49
-5.75
0.37
4.07
11.82
3.77
-4.14
-1.44
1.45
-5.08
6.32
6.25
t-stat for equal
means
0.12
-3.63
4.17
1.09
1.18
1.06
-1.36
-1.34
0.13
0.73
0.38
-0.59
0.17
Note: bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.
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TABLE 8
Tsinghua
Variable
Age
Age (founders only)
Bachelor's Graduation
Yr
Responded
before Aug. 2007
(N=2,667)
49.3
38.4
1980.9
Responded during/after
Aug. 2007
(N=299)
54.1
37.4
1977.4
Bach. Grad yr
(founders only) 1991.6 1993.2
Years of Education 17.2 17.0
Entrepreneur parents 0.09 0.12
Entrepreneur 0.29 0.40
Privatized 0.10 0.05
First start-up founded 2000.3 2001.1
Tech only 0.28 0.29
Business only 0.10 0.09
Gender 0.88 0.90
Family economic
status 3.75 3.85
High Salary 3.21 2.93
Avg. Tenure 6.94 8.01
Overseas work exp. 0.26 0.26
Number of positions 2.39 2.26
High government 0.03 0.03
Low government 0.18 0.17
Last job academia 0.19 0.19
Ever job academia 0.32 0.27
Last job business 0.62 0.61
Student Leader 0.61 0.57
GPA Rank 2.28 2.58
Bach. Grad Yr. 10th
percentile 1954 1953
Bach. Grad Yr. 2 5 th
percentile 1965 1961
Bach. Grad Yr. 5 0 th
percentile 1986 1979
Bach. Grad Yr. 7 5 th
percentile 1996 1993
Bach. Grad Yr. 9 0 th
percentile 2001 2001
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively.
t-stat for
equal means
-4.216**
0.602
3.777**
0.941
2.381**
-0.713
-2.168**
1.392
-0.661
0.757
0.235
0.901
-1.871*
3.351**
-2.045*
-0.126
-2.012*
-0.239
0.617
-0.051
2.323**
0.348
0.874
-2.661**
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TABLE 9
Comparison of Key Demographic Characteristics by Survey
Variable Did Not Respond to Responded to t-stat for
Founders survey Founders survey equal means
(N=334) (N=378)
Mean Mean
Age 45.8 39.8 6.536***
Entrepreneur
parents 0.130 0.117 0.331
Gender 0.914 0.948 -1.807**
Masters 0.500 0.569 -1.830**
Doctorate degree 0.139 0.095 1.786**
Tech only 0.241 0.185 1.784**
Business only 0.139 0.169 -1.089
Family economic
status 3.692 3.581 1.370
High Salary 3.495 4.035 -4.647***
Avg. Tenure 5.673 3.976 3.553***
Overseas work
exp. 0.179 0.183 -0.121
Number of
positions 2.932 3.198 -2.594
High government 0.056 0.041 0.903
Low government 0.194 0.158 1.256
Last job academia 0.140 0.055 3.553***
Ever job academia 0.512 0.569 -1.505
Last job business 0.724 0.869 -4.448***
Student Leader 0.494 0.534 -1.055
GPA Rank 2.150 2.500 -3.449***
Left last job
involuntarily 0.028 0.040 -0.544
Ever left job
involuntarily 0.104 0.103 0.018
•**, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 10
309
Categories Tsinghua CHNS NBS HH NBS HH
survey survey
Sample Urban Rural and Urban - self- Urban - non.
Urban employed Entrep.
Male 0.89 0.53 0.56 0.50
Age 50.13 41.45 36.2 37.2
Married 0.88 0.98 83.4 84.2
Years of 17.1 9.1 9.2 9.4
Education
Household Size 3.40 3.9 -- --
Self-employed 0.26 0.14 (4% in 1999) --
(0.8% in
1999)
Experienced a 0.13 -- 0.26 0.19
layoff
Father's Educ. 4.11 -- 5.4 5.2
Mother's Educ. 4.89 -- 6.0 5.9
Parent Self- 0.08 -- 0.06 0.05
Empl.
Comm. Party 0.62 -- 0.05 0.18
TABLE 11
MIT Tsinghu
a
School Freq. Percen freq. % becoming Freq. Percen freq. %t founder founders t founders founders
Engineering 2174 51.28 3483 16.04 1771 69.72 456 25.75
Sciences 9086 21.46 1984 21.84 406 15.98 79 19.46
Management 6365 15.03 1634 25.67 100 3.94 31 31.00
Social Sciences 2838 6.70 265 9.34 163 6.42 27 16.56
Architecture 2339 5.52 487 20.82 100 3.94 27 27.00
Department Freq. Percen freq. % becoming Freq. Percen freq. %
t founder founders t founders founders
Electrical Eng. & 7445 19.18 1541 20.70 578 24.62 179 30.97
Comp. Sci.
Civil & Env. 2122 5.47 456 21.49 458 19.51 84 18.34
Engineering
School of Management 6331 16.31 1634 25.81 100 3.94 31 31.00
Mechanical 4124 10.63 767 18.60 545 23.21 142 26.06
Engineering
Chemical Engineering 4730 12.19 461 9.75 155 6.60 44 28.39
Aero/Astro 2074 5.34 358 17.26 70 2.98 14 20.00
Architecture 1554 4.00 487 31.34 100 4.26 27 27.00
Math/Physics 3877 9.99 651 16.79 187 7.96 35 18.72
Materials 1347 3.47 193 14.33 64 2.73 16 25.00
Biology/Ocean 2704 6.97 315 11.65 16 0.68 3 18.75
engineering
Humanities 2293 5.91 146 6.37 138 5.88 22 15.94
Psychology 211 0.54 23 10.90 2 0.09 0 0.00
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TABLE 12
Non-
Founders Founders
Tsinghua (n=2152) (n=670)
Variable Mean t-stat
Age 52.829 42.967 12.388***
Master's Degree 0.397 0.552 -7.161***
Doctorate Degree 0.100 0.115 -1.121
Entrepreneur Parents 0.036 0.031 0.614
Privatized 0.000 0.260 --
Gender 0.879 0.933 -3.931***
Family Economic Status 3.834 3.639 4.348***
Recent Salary 2.317 2.045 3.686***
Avg. tenure 8.074 4.813 7.554***
Overseas 0.126 0.212 -5.525***
Number of Pos. 2.115 3.109 -18.605
Ever job high gov. 0.036 0.042 -0.713
Ever job low gov. 0.242 0.176 3.574***
Last job academia 0.166 0.081 5.475***
Ever job academia 0.233 0.207 1.402*
Last job business 0.399 0.687 -13.451***
Student leader 0.674 0.903 -5.314***
Non-
Founders Founders
MIT (n=35,870) (n=7,798)
Variable Mean t-stat
Age 57.69 61.95 -20.196***
Master's Degree 0.321 0.290 5.498***
Doctorate Degree 0.082 0.066 -4.986***
Gender 0.823 0.928 -23.404***
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TABLE 13
Median Age at First Founding
Decade of Graduation 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
MIT 40.5 39 35 32 28
Tsinghua 55.5 60 42 36 30
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TABLE 14a
Tsinghua Repeat Founders by Decade of Graduation
Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Total # firms = 1 17 30 12 89 145 64
% repeat 32 54 63 58 49 26.5
=2 5 20 11 61 91 17
=3 1 7 4 38 29 6
=4 1 6 1 5 12 0
=5 1 1 4 8 4 0
=6 0 1 0 2 2 0
=7 0 0 0 0 1 0
=8 0 0 0 1 1 0
=9 0 0 0 0 0 0
=10 0 0 0 13 0 0
>10 0 0 0 2 0 0
Totals 25 65 32 219 285 87
TABLE 14b
MIT Repeat Founders by Decade of Graduation
ecade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Total # firms = 1 161 231 238 242 182 19
% repeat 44.5 46.2 52.3 43.3 38.9 40.6
=2 60 85 115 92 69 9
=3 29 47 79 49 27 3
=4 19 28 30 23 9 1
=5 10 14 16 9 6 0
=6 4 7 7 3 0 0
=7 0 5 2 3 3 0
=8 5 2 3 0 0 0
=9 0 5 2 1 0 0
=10 0 2 1 1 1 0
>10 2 3 6 4 1 0
Totals 290 429 499 427 298 32
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TABLE 15
Number of Companies Founded by Tsinghua Entrepreneurs
Number of
Number of Companies Entrepreneurs Percentage
Founded 1 Company 375 51.9%
Founded More Than 1 Company 348 48.1%
Founded 2 Companies 206 28.5%
Founded 3 Companies 85 11.7%
Founded 4 Companies 25 3.5%
Founded 5 Companies 18 2.5%
Founded more than 5 Companies 14 1.9%
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TABLE 16
Median Company Statistics for Repeat Entrepreneurs (Tsinghua)
Firm Rank 1st firms 2nd firms 3rd firms
Median Employment 20 20 36.5
Median Years of Survival 4 3 4
Median Revenues (inflation adj., PPP) 9,369 6,933 54,593
Percentage IPO (%) 3.9
Lag Between Subsequent Firms 3.44 4 6.67
(median) 9 78 3.5
Observations 223 32
MIT
Panel A - Likelihood of Exit Events and Revenues (in 2001 dollars)
5 t
h firms
and
Firm Rank 1 st firms 2 nd firms 3 rd firms 4 th firms higher
(N=556) (N=182) (N=84) (N=21) (N=36)
Employment 12 15 12 17 30
Median Revenues ('000s USD) 836 1,784 924 1,181 7,274
Percentage IPO 11.2 9.8 12.9 7.0 3.7
Panel B - Lag (from graduation and from the prior firm founding)
5 th firms
and
Firm Rank 1st firms 2 nd firms 3 rd firms 4 th firms higher
(N=761) (N=241) (N=150) (N=71) (N=31)
Median Lag Between Subsequent
Firms (years) 11 6 5 5 5
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TABLE 17
Revenues
Revenues
25th 50th 75th 99th Mean
MIT 53,742.35 465,725 2,953,308 140,000,000 10,100,000
Tsinghua (constant PPP) 345 1,241 6,893 386,014 15,710
Tsinghua (exchange rate) 788 2,836 15,756 882,317 35,909
All revenues exclude financial firms and firms older than 15 years. All revenues are for the
most recent year that the firm was in operation. Tsinghua revenues have been converted for the
exchange rate and for purchasing power parity (PPP). The former can be thought of as a lower
bound while the PPP conversion gives a lower bound. MIT revenues have been adjusted for
inflation.
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TABLE 18
Tsinghua
Primary Idea sources MIT Data data
percentage percentage
In school-doing outside-funded research
In school- graduate thesis
In school- in class
In school-informal discussion with students
In school-other research
In school-professional literature
In school- visiting scientists, engineers etc
In school-working with outside company
Other sources-discussions in social/professional
conferences
Other sources-research conference
Other sources-working in the industry
Other sources- working in the military (government
experience)
Other sources- doing outside-funded research
Other university- graduate thesis
Other university- in class
Other university- informal discussion with students
Other university- other research
Other university- professional literature
Other university- working with an outside company
Total
Number of observations
2.40
4.64
1.98
3.41
2.28
1.73
1.77
3.20
21.54
2.66
41.44
4.01
2.07
1.05
1.01
1.43
1.26
1.05
1.05
100
1284
1.66
3.96
5.88
11.00
1.92
4.48
4.86
4.86
17.65
4.48
24.81
2.94
0.77
1.28
1.53
3.45
0.90
2.05
1.53
100
110
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Founding Team /
Panel A - Team Formation (%)
1950s
Founding Decade (N=22)
Research 18.2
Work 31.8
Extracurricular
Activities 0.0
Social Activities 36.4
Other 13.6
Panel B - Source of
Founding Decade
Idea from Research
Idea from
Networking
Idea from Industry
Other
Panel C - Number of
Founding Decade
Total # of Founders
Idea (%)
1950s
(N=20)
25.0
10.0
55.0
10.0
Founders
1950s
2.3
TABLE 19
Idea Formation Characteristics
1960s
(N=55)
21.8
34.6
3.6
30.9
21.8
1960s
(N=48)
8.3
14.6
75.0
2.1
1960s
2.5
1970s
(N=108)
7.4
40.7
5.6
16.7
15.7
1970s
(N=98)
7.1
11.2
70.4
11.2
1980s
(N=204)
16.2
39.7
2.9
27.5
11.7
1980s
(N=186)
10.8
14.5
66.1
8.6
1970s 1980s
2.2 2.6
1990s
(N=309)
14.9
39.5
4.9
31.4
12.6
1990s
(N=289)
7.9
15.2
67.5
9.3
1990s
2.8
(MIT)
2000s
(N=90)
20
36.7
12.2
47.8
16.7
2000s
(N=76)
18.4
19.7
57.9
3.9
2000s
3.3
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TABLE 20
Sources of the Team (Percentages)
Diagonal Represent Only 1 Source Indicated. N=901 who reported 1 or 2
of teams with three or more sources are not represented here.
team sources. The minority
Enter MI Oth
-prise Fa MIT MIT T MIT MIT MIT Non-MIT er
Busine Foru mil Go 50 Conta Cour La Living Netwo Sociall Networki Uni Sociall
ss m y vt K cts se b Group rk-ing y ng v. y
1.5
37.34 0.00 7
0.0
0.42 0
3.4
5
0.5
0.42 0.63 2
0.0
0.00 0.10 0
0.0
0.10 0.00 0
0.0
0.21 0.00 0
0.2
0.00 0.10 1
0.2
1.57 0.21 1
2.41 5
3.1
1.15
0.00
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.31
4 0.10
3.87
Business
Enterprise
Forum
Family
Govt
50K
MIT
Contacts
MIT
Course
MIT Lab
MIT
Living
Group
MIT
Networkin
g
MIT
Socially
Non-MIT
Networkin
g
Other
University
Socially
Note: Numbers on the
3.77 1
6.9
0
0.63
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.31
0.31
0.10
1.57
0.42
0.00
0.42
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.52
0.10
0.42
0.00
1.36
1.88
0.10
0.31
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.21
0.73
0.00
0.9
4
0.0
0
0.4
2
0.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.2
1
0.2
1
0.2
1
0.0
0
0.3
1
0.84
0.00
0.21
0.10
0.00
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.31
0.00
1.15
0.52
0.10
4.60
319
TABLE 21
Combinations of Primary (rows) and Secondary (columns Ideas
**Number from Table 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 21 2 23 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 2 4
MIT-Doing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
outside-funded 00 310 0 3 0 4 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
research 0 6 7 6 3 3 5 7 6 6 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 5 6 0
MIT-Graduate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
thesis 00 503 1 4 2 0 5 4 5 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0
7 9 3 5 0 6 3 6 5 9 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 6 6
MIT-In class 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
00 . 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 6 6 2 0 0 6 6 6 6 2 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0
MIT-Informal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0. 0 0. 0
discussion with 1130 100005 06 . 37
su so ity 1 2 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
studentsorfaculty 9 5 2 9 1 0 9 6 9 9 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
MIT-Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
00 . 25
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 6
MIT-Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
research 0011200000 06 . 310 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 6 0 6 9 2 9 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0
MIT-Professional 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
literature 00 . 060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 6 0 6 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
MIT- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
Undergraduate o00 1 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Research 6 0 6 6 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 6
Opportunity
MIT-Visiting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
scientists, o o o o o o o o o o oo00 060 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
engineers,or 0 0 6 6 2 6 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
MIT-Working with 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
anoutside 106 19anoutside 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
company 2 6 2 6 5 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 6 0
Other Sources- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0. 0 0. 0
Discussions with 0 0 1 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 2 37 43
_ _i _ 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 2 7 6 6
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321
social/professional 0 0 9 9 2 1 7 2 5 9 6 2 6 0 1 2 6 9 5 2 2 2
acquaintances
Other Sources- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
Working in the 06 . 990 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 3 0
military or 0 0 6 0 9 2 6 6 0 2 6 6 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 2 1 6
government
Other University- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0. 0
00 . 00Doing outside- I 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 0
funded research 2 0 2 0 9 6 0 6 0 6 6 7 6 5 5 9 6 9 0 5 0 0
Other Sources- 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 27 1 17 2
Working in the .3 . .8
5 6 9 5 4 6 8 5 3 1 5 6 6 5 7 3 8 7 2 2 6 9 7 3industry 6 2 9 5 2 1 7 5 6 8 6 8 8 0 4 7 1 4 5 4 9 6
TABLE 22
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MIT Tsinghua
Meeting freq percent cfndl only overlappingChannels freq. percent percent percentChannels freq. freq.
Family relatives 69 7.98% 52 24.30% 9 7.76%
Classmates 395 45.66% 63 29.44% 39 33.62%
Colleagues 470 54.34% 99 46.26% 68 58.62%
Total 865 100.00% 214 100.00% 116 100.00%
cfndl cfnd4Tsinghua fndl percent cfnd2 only percent cfnd3 only percent onl percent
only only
Relative 52 24.30% 14 9.72% 8 8.51% 6 8.33%
Classmate 63 29.44% 34 23.61% 26 27.66% 14 19.44%
Colleague 99 46.26% 96 66.67% 60 63.83% 52 72.22%
Total 214 100.00% 144 100.00% 94 100.00% 72 100.00%
TABLE 23
MIT
MIT Tsinghua
Number of % of Total Number of % of Total
Source Companies Companies Companies Companies
Savings 782 53 141 42
Venture
Capital 180 12 25 8
Family /
Friends 129 9 48 14
Cash Flow 114 8
Angel Investor 112 8 22 7
Credit 70 5 28 8
Customers 42 3
Gov. Federal 25 2 25 8
Gov.-State 11 1
University 6 0 11 3
Suppliers 6 0 32 10
Total 1477 100 332 100
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TABLE 24
MIT Tsinghua
IP author? Freq. percentage Freq. percentage
Yes 578 46.24 105 62.87
No 672 53.76 62 37.13
Total 1250 100 167 100
MIT Tsinghua
IP owner? Freq. Percentage Freq. Percentage
Yes 434 53.19 107 59.44
No 382 46.81 73 40.56
Total 816 100 180 100
MIT Tsinghua
IP important? Freq. Percentage Freq. percentage
Yes 481 33.83 123 37.85
No 941 66.17 202 62.15
Total 1422 100 325 100
R&D/Revenue MIT Tsinghua
Ratio
Mean 0.09 0.12
25%ile 0 0
Median 0 0
75%ile 0.10 0.10
TsinghuaMIT
Mea Media Ob Mean Media Ob
n n s. n S.
16.7Electronics 10 279 11.09 0 652
20.1Software/Interet 10 321 18.55 10 656
Law 6.18 0 50 6.24 0 21
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TABLE 25
Panel A: Tsinghua
Alumni (entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs)
Foreign
Patents
Domestic
Patents
Number of Patents per Freq percen
Id u percent Freq.Individual t
0 2924 98.58 2565 86.48
1 18 0.61 163 5.50
2 14 0.47 90 3.03
3 3 0.10 56 1.89
4 3 0.10 24 0.81
5 0 0.00 27 0.91
6 or more 4 0.13 41 1.38
Total 2966 100 2966 100
Panel B
Firms MIT Tsinghua MIT Tsinghua
Firm AgeNumber of Patents per Freq percen Firm Age</=
NmbeFirm percent Freq. p </=15 yrs percent percentFirm tFre 15 yrs Freq.
Freq.
0 1263 74.91 66 20.12 755 78.00 20 7.72
1 112 6.64 33 10.06 73 7.54 31 11.97
2 64 3.80 58 17.68 37 3.82 49 18.92
3 40 2.37 52 15.85 25 2.58 50 19.31
4 20 1.19 56 17.07 11 1.14 52 20.08
5 16 0.95 53 16.16 6 0.62 47 18.15
6 or more 171 10.14 10 3.05 61 6.30 10 3.86
Total 1686 100 328 100 968 100 259 100
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TABLE 26
Reported Factors for Tsinghua Alumni Who Did Not Become Entrepreneurs
Panel A - Consideration for Becoming an Entrepreneur
Never Considered 186 27.2
Not a worthwhile activity 53 7.7
Considered, but did not start the
project 446 65.1
Panel B - Factors for Not Becoming an Entrepreneur
Rank(1-8) 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 6 % 7 % 8 % N/A
Difficult to raise
capital 141 31 101 23 80 21 44 14 20 7 10 3 4 1 5 2 627
Difficult to find
partners 47 10 114 26 95 25 56 17 31 10 18 6 8 3 5 2 658
Lack of good ideas 171 37 67 15 43 12 26 8 28 9 16 6 17 6 13 4 651
Concept easily
copied 6 1 30 7 47 13 60 18 76 25 48 17 36 13 21 7 708
Risk too great 55 12 73 17 61 16 74 23 57 19 19 7 19 7 5 2 669
Family against
entrepreneurship 8 2 16 4 12 3 25 8 41 13 91 31 50 17 55 20 734
Cannot leave
current job 22 5 19 4 19 5 27 8 31 10 45 15 94 33 56 20 719
Government
discouraged
entrepreneurship at
the time 9 2 17 4 20 5 12 4 20 7 43 15 57 20 122 43 732
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APPENDIX A
MIT Survey Instrument
We invite you to participate in the 2003 survey of MIT founders to expand our knowledge of You may access this 
survey online
entrepreneurship and enterprise creation. MIT graduates, students, and faculty have founded thousands of by visiting our website
companies, and this new survey will contribute valuable insights into the entrepreneurial process and its at web.nit.edu/surveys/foundr.
sources of inspiration and support. We hope that our findings will create a deeper understanding of the If you have questions, contact us by
factors encouraging discovery, innovation, and economic development and, by so doing, help encourage ermail at found.-study@nt.edu
current and future generations of entrepreneurs by informing the institutions supporting them. or by phone 617-253-3648.
We ask you to help by completing this survey even if you participated in our 1995 survey. We expect that
the process will take less than 30 minutes. Please rest assured that our findings will be reported only in
the aggregate and that the particular data you provide will be kept strictly confidential. We will be pleased
to share our results with you before the end of the calendar year. We look forward to receiving your
response by Friday, August 1st.
Your name:
What is your affiliation with MIT?
[ Alumnus/a Course(s Degee(s) _ Year(s)
O] Faculty
E staff
1. How many companies have you founded or co-founded over the course of your lifetime?
2. Please list them here, starting with the most recent:
" M i =
[] Check here if more than five. Feel free to attach a separate page listing those companies.
*Under "Operating Status", please choose from the following three options: * in operation * acquired by another 
firm * out of operation
If you have founded more than one company, we are interested in learning about the one that you think is the most 
significant. Pick one,
drawing from the criteria listed below, and use that as the focus of this survey.
Company Selected:.
Headquarters' Location: City/State or City/Country
Reason Selected (Mark only one)
O] First [ Most Sucessful
[] Most Recent E] Most Important Technology
[ Largest [ Other
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Please answer the questions that follow for the company you have selected:
3. Please tell us your position with the company when it was founded and your 
current position, if you are still active.
PresidetEO
Chairman (if not also CEO)
Chief Operating Officer
Chief Sclentist/Chief Technology Officer/Chief of R&D
Chief Finance Officer
Chief Information Officer
Vice President
Outside Director
Consultant or Advisor
Other employee (specify)
Not Active L
4. If you are no longer still active in this company, are you currently (check as many as apply):
[ Working in another company that you have founded O Employed elsewhere
E] Starting a new company ] Retired
O Consulting Other
5. In which industry would you categorize your company?
(Please mark one primary industry sector and as many secondary sectors as apply.)
Aerospace
Drugs. Biotech, Medical Devices
Chemicals Materials
Consmer Prduct
El n& Mi . C ig isi , Tel connesicstiors Devices
Other Manufacturing
Architecture
Energy, Electric Utilities
Telecommunications
Finance
Management & Finance Consulting
Publishing. Schools
Software
Law, Accounting. Miscellaneous Business Services
Other
6. For most recent fiscal year available, what were:
* Total Company Revenues S Fiscal Year
* Total Company Employment Fiscal Year
7. What percentage of annual revenues is invested in R&D? % In Marketing?
8. Where does your company generate its revenues? Please provide an approximate percentage by region
(the total should be 100%).
US .
Non U.S.
our Headquarters Country
The U.S.
Rest of the World
If available, what percentage of US sales is in your headquarters' state? %/_
9. Is your company located in Cambridge or Greater Boston (the area on or within the Route 495 belt)?
[] Yes O] No If NO skip to question 11.
10. What is your company's activity, including branches as well as headquarters, in Cambridge or Greater Boston?
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What percentage of total company employment Is in
What percentage of total company revenues originates n:
L A CwIaB iondn
~rarra~eW uff I rr
11. How rnany people founded the company?
Please list all your co-founders and mark their affiliation, if any, with MIT, and the role(s) they served in the company's founding,
EO ] 0 0 0 0
12. Where did you meet the other founders? (Mark as many as apply)
While at MIT: Before coming to or after leaving MIT:L In Class!Course O At another university (Specify)
O Doing research/lab (Specify) FO In connection with the MIT Enterprise ForumLO In your residencelliving group O In connection with MIT Alumni Association activities
(Specify) (Specify)
O In connection with the MIT $5OK Entrepreneurship Competition O Through MIT contacts
O in connection with other extra-curricular activities L] Working in business
(Specify) OL Working in government
L Networking Il Family connections
O Socially [I Networking
O Other (Specify) O Socially
[] Other (Specify)
13. What was the source of the idea for the product or service leading to the founding of the company? (Please answer even if the idea
came from one of your co-founders and not from you.) Mark one primary source and as many secondary sources as apply.
Dotng outstde-ftndrd research
Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program
Other research
In class
Graduate thesis
Informal discussion with students or faculty
Visiting scientsts, engineers, or entrepreneurs
Working with an outside company
Professional literature
Doing outside-funded research
Other research
In Class
Graduate thesis
Informal discussions with students or faculty
Visiting Scientists, engineers.....
Working with an outside company
Professional literature
Other
PiaseNate the Unrivesity H:
Working in the industry
Working in the military or government
Research conference
Discussions with social/professional acquaintance(s)
Other
14. Was intellectual property (patented or copyrighted material) a critical factor in the company formation?
L Yes [] No
15. Were you an inventor or author of the intellectual property? L Yes Ol No
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16. If yes, is the patent or other intellectual property owned by you or one of the founding team? O Yes E No
If not, did you license (or get an assignment of) its use from any of these?
OE From MIT E From another company
EO From another university From a government lab
(Specify) O From an individual inventor
17. Prior to starting the company, did you receive financial help to demonstrate feasibility and/or develop 
a prototype? E] Yes EO No
If so, how much was this? $
Did this help come from any of the following sources (check as many as are appropriate):
E From a university (Specify) El State government programs
El Federal defense research (DARPA/DOD) O Business community initiatives
[] Other federal research grant (NSFINIH/DoE) El Friends, family
El SBIR O Angel investors[] Other
Early Funding
18. How much capital did you raise to get your company off the ground? $
19. Roughly what percentage came from each of the following sources during the start-up phase (roughly defined as within the first year)
Founders' credit card or barrowirg 
* University
Founders' famles or friends Governmt federal
Venture captal Government state
Cormnercial bank) Suppliers
* Name of University
20. Which of these factors in your connection with MIT, y played a role in t rounding of your company?
Check all that were relevant.
[O Fellow students O Specific offices, groups, or activities
[] Faculty or staff 0 Entrepreneurship Center O $50K Entrepreneurship Competition
Anyone in particular? 0 Enterprise Forum 0 Technology Licensing 
Office
OE Research work 0 Venture Mentoring Service 0 Alumni Regional Club
[] Contact with entrepreneurial network 0 
Other
The entrepreneurial environment
21. Was MIT's entrepreneurial environment a factor in your choice to attend MIT or to work at MIT?
22. Did the reputational benefit of your association with MIT help you to acquire funding?
Did it enhance your credibility with clients and suppliers?
23. Does your company currently have or anticipate having an ongoing connection with MIT
(Check all that apply)
EO Recruiting new employees El Specific offices, groups, or activiti
E Licensing technology 0 Entrepreneurship Center
El Funding research 0 Enterprise Forum
] Joint research with MIT faculty and/or staff 
O Venture Mentoring Service
[] Faculty Advisors or Directors
[] Yes
E] Yes
O Yes
E Yes
O No
E No
O No
O No
es
D $50K Entreeneurship Competition
D Technology Licensing Office
D Alumni Regional Club
D Other
24. Did you start your company where you were living at the time7? Yes O No
If yes, were you living there because (check all that apply):
El You grew up there
El You had attended a school or university there
El You were employed there
OEl Other (please specify)
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25. What factors influenced the location of your company?
Access to venture capital and other funding
State and local government assistance programs
Access to MIT
Proximity to key research facilities or key researcher
Access to other major universities
Access to skilled professional workers (engineers, managers)
Access to skilled (blue-collar) labor
Access to unskilled labor
Proximity to major markets
Favorable regulatory environment
Favorable tax climate
Low business costs
Quality of life
Good network of suppliers
Network of contacts
Low-cost land and rental space
Available land for building
Ample and reasonably priced housing
That's where I lived
Other factors
Skip Questions 26-28 if you are not currently active with the company
26. When you plan for an expansion, what factors will help determine where it occurs?
Access to venture capital and other funding
State and local government assistance programs
Access to MIT
Proximity to key research facilities or key researcher
Access to other maJor universities
Access to skilled professional workers (engineers, managers)
Access to skilled (blue-collar) labor
Access to unskilled labor
Proximity to major markets
Favorable regulatory environment
Favorable tax climate
Low business costs
Quality of life
Network of suppliers
Network of contacts
Low-cost land and rental space
Available land for building
Ample and reasonably priced housing
Proximity to company headquarters or other existing company operations
Other factors
27. Do you plan a major expansion in the next two years? Fl Yes Fl No
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28. What factors are critical in giving your company a continuing competitive edge?
MuWUHIBIVK m
COMMENTS
Please share your stories and your thoughts about your entrepreneurial experiences, your connections with MIT (past and current),
your lessons learned: any comments of your choosing. Feel free to attach additional pages.
. ................. 
. ..... .. . ............... 
. ......... . .. 
., .. .- ... .. . . o......... . .........
AN APPRECIATION AND AN INVITATION
We are grateful for your participation in the MIT Founders Study 2003. We hope to share our preliminary findings before 
the end of the year.
We invite your continued involvement in our ongoing research on entrepreneurial activity. We hope that you 
will be willing to participate in
follow-on studies related to additional companies you have founded or on specific aspects of the entrepreneurial 
enterprise. Please let us know
if you are so willing.
[] Yes, I am willing to be contacted for follow-on studies
l Email Address (if available):
CONFIDENTIALITY AND RELEASE OF INFORMATION
Your privacy is our highest priority. The information you have provided will be reported only in the aggregate. From 
time to time, we are asked by
MIT administrative offices and the news media for the names of MIT-associated founders, their companies, and 
the industries and technologies with
which they are associated. We would like your permission to release that information when so requested. Please 
check below ONLY if we do not
have your permission.
[] Do not release my name or the name of my company to MIT offices.
FO Do not release my name or the name of my company to the news media.
Please return the survey in the enclosed envelope pre-addressed to the MIT Founders Survey 2003, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 
Cambridge MA 02139.
You may also fax it to 617-258-8690. Let us know if you would prefer to complete the survey through a telephone interview 
or if you have any
questions by calling the MIT Founders Project at 617-253-3648.
We thank you for your participation! oo o--
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APPENDIX B: Tsinghua Survey Instrument
Tsinghua University - MIT Survey
SMassachusettsInstitute of
T U i r -Ibtov Technology
Dear _insert name here-
This research survey carried out jointly by Tsinghua University and MIT in the U.S.
seeks to better understand what people do with an education from a research
university and the process of entrepreneurship. The survey takes approximately 30
minutes to complete.
You should know that:
* participation is voluntary
* confidentiality and/or anonymity are assured
* please fill out the survey based on your own situation
* For all Tsinghua alumni, please fill out the "Tsinghua Alumni Biographical Survey"
* For Tsinghua alumni, who own enterprise, please fill out "Tsinghua Founders Survey"
* To answer questions with "1," please mark the answer with an "x".
* To answer questions with" "please fill in the English letter for the corresponding
answer.
* For numbers needed in the survey, please use Arabic numbers.
If you would like to fill in the survey online, please go to http://tsinghua.orq.cn or
http://mit.edu/tsinghuasurvey.
We thank you very much for your cooperation. We are also very grateful to Charles
Zhang, founder and CEO of Sohu.com, for making this survey possible.
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Tsinghua Alumni Biographical Survey:
Gender: M F (circle one) Year of Birth:
Size of Birth Place: L Metropolis i] Medium City 0 Small city 0 Village
Before attending college, in which city did you primarily live in? (Please clearly indicated
the province)
Married? ol Yes El No Number of Children: Ages: Oldest) ; Youngest)
Communist party member? 1o Yes l No If yes, which year did you join?
Please list the universities you attended, educational degrees, and the subject(s):
Degree Year of University Department Major
Graduation
Bachelor's
Master's
PhD
With regard to your academic performance, your rank in the class were: a) top 10% b) top 10-25% c)
top 25-50% d) other
When you were an undergraduate or a graduate student, your highest position in a student
organization:
(Please indicate the name of the school, department, and/or class)
Do you have patents? OL Yes oE No If yes, how many? _ How many are foreign patents?
Describe your family's economic status within the Chinese society when you were in college?
Upper 10% 2) Upper 10-25% 3) Upper 25-50% 4) Lower 50-25% 5) Lower 25%
Your father's highest degree is_? Your mother's highest degree is_?
1) Masters degree or higher 2) Undergraduate 3) High School 4) Middle School 5)
Primary or lower
Please list the job characteristics of your parents when you were in the last year of your high school:
Father Mother:
Business administrator b) Government official c) Researcher or educator
Occupational: dl) Factory worker d2) Farmer d3) Military service d4) other
Please indicate whether the following groups of people have experiences in founding firms in the past.
Your Your Close Former/Current Former
Parents Relatives Neighbors Colleagues/Classmates
DOYes]o OYes]o No OYes [O No OlYes El No
No
How many companies have you founded (not including State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs))? Of
those, how many were successful?
How many companies have you privatized or bought?
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Do you have plans to found new companies in the future? o No 1I Yes, in the next 1-2 years 0 Yes, in
the next 3-5 years o Yes, at some point.
If you have not founded a company please indicate the reason why not _ (write the #)
1) Never considered it 2) Don't view it as a worthwhile activity. 3) Thought about it, but did
not start the project
12a. If you chose #3, Please rank all that apply: give value 1 to the most important factor; 2 to the
second most important factor and so on) Please leave blank any item that does not apply.
a) Funding is too difficult to find; b) - Cofounders are too difficult to find; c) I couldn't
find a good enough idea; d) It is too easy for someone to copy the idea; e) It is too risky;
f) Opposition from family members; g) My work unit did not allow me to leave; h)
Government policy was not encouraging at the moment
Please indicate your previous job responsibilities: 1 = Have held, 0 = Have not held.
General Tech. R Sales/ Finance/ Advisory Board/ Ban Governmen
Managemen Managemen & Marketin Accounti Board of ks t
t t D g ng Directors
How much do you think the Chinese economy will grow in the next 5 years?
per year
14a. Please describe the main jobs you have held since graduation,
possible, attach a resume.
% average growth rate
starting with the first job. If
A (first job after C (most
Job graduation) B recent)
Type of organization: a) Business b)
Government c) Academia d) Non-
profit
If in business, indicate the industry.
Number of years in this position
Did you leave this organization
voluntarily or involuntarily?
Ending yearly salary **
** Including bonuses. Unit: 10,000 RMB. a) 0-2 b) 2-5 c) 5-10 d) 10-20 e) 20-50 f) more than 50
14b. If you worked in the government, what was the highest position you held.
the level: province/ministry, district/department, or country/bureau)
_ (Please indicate
If you do not have overseas experience, please skip to the last section on
Page 4. If you have overseas experience, please continue to finish this
section.
If you had overseas experience lease describe it below:
Government-funded study Self-funded study Visiting scholar Business trip
abroad abroad
OYes El No OYes 11 No OYes l No olYes l No
If you studied abroad, in which year did you start? _ How many years total?
If you went abroad as a visiting scholar or on a business trip, how many trips did you make?
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Have you taken the TOEFL? o Yes D No If yes, what was your highest score?
the time: -)
(Perfect score at
Have you taken the GRE? [ Yes w No If yes, what was your highest score (as %)? Logic: %
Language: %
Do you have overseas working experience? o No D Yes, full-time 0 Yes, part-time If yes, how many
years?
If no, please skip to question "27". If yes, please continue answering the following questions.
Please mark all the organizations in which you had overseas work experiences, including internships.
(Indicate country,18b. While overseas, the main city you worked in was
province/state, city)
If you worked for a startup overseas, which category is most applicable to your experience in the
startup:
a) Cofounder; b) Early employee; c) Joined after 1 year of its founding; d) Joined after 2 years of its
founding
How would you categorize the overseas startup firm's performance?
a) Too early to tell; b) VC funding and was quite successful at IPO (or acquired at a good price); c) No
VC funding and not successful; d) No VC funding but very successful; e) VC funding but no IPO yet; f)
VC funding but failed at IPO (or acquired at a low price)
Please mark all the job functions you held when you worked overseas.
General Tech. R&D Sales/ Finance/ Advisory Board/
Management Management Marketing Accounting Board of
Directors
l Yes El No l Yes 1] No E Yes E E Yes ol No D Yes o No E Yes l No
No
Were your jobs overseas related to the Greater China Region? L Yes, very related L Yes, somewhat
related ] No
In your most recent overseas job, to what degree did your position maximize your potential? Please
choose a number between 1 and 10. - (1=not at all; 10=maximum)
Please choose a number between 1 and 10 to evaluate how much Chinese people working abroad have
been discriminated against? - (1= not at all; 10 = all the time)
While overseas, were you active in community activities or social gatherings?
a) Rarely participated; b) Participate sometimes; c) Participate often; d) Participate frequently
If you selected b/c/d, please indicate the type of activity.
1) Primarily hosted by Chinese; 2) Primarily hosted by non-Chinese; 3) Mostly hosted by Chinese; 4)
Mostly hosted by non-Chinese; 5) 50-50 hosted by Chinese and non-Chinese
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While abroad, did you publish academic papers in international academic journals? o Yes E No
If "Yes", how many were in the top 10 journals in your field?
If you are willing, would you be able to found your own company overseas? o No; E Yes, with great
difficulty; E Yes, with some difficulty; [] Yes, with no difficulty
Which of the following items best describes your situation while abroad?
a) single; b) spouse was in China; c) spouse was overseas, but did not study abroad; d) spouse
studied abroad but did not have full-time job; e) spouse had a full-time job abroad
Please choose a number from 1 to 10 to evaluate your foreign language capability. 1 = have difficulty;
10 = fluent
A) Speaking ; B) Listening ; C) Writing
While overseas, how was your communication with China:
30a. How many times did you return to China in the past 2 years? If you have already returned,
describe the last 2 years abroad.
30b. In the past year, how many phone calls did you make to your parents or close relatives? _ If you
have already returned, describe the last year abroad.
30c. How many contacts did you make with the following people in China in the past year: If you have
already returned, describe the last year abroad.
1) Government official _; 2) Scholar/ Academic Institution _; 3) Business (company) _
Intent to return to China: a) already returned (Indicate year _ ); b) plan to return in 1-2 years; c)
plan to return in 3-5 years; d) have not made plans to return
If you have already returned to China, which of the following best describes your situation:
E Returned with a group of friends; E Returned alone by invitation; E Returned alone without being
invited
If you have returned to China, did you bring any technology back with you? o Yes E No
If "Yes", which following item best describes the technology? _
a) State of the art in the world; b) Did not exist in China but had existed abroad for sometime; c)
Mature technology abroad but new to China; d) China had similar but this technology was more
advanced; e) Mature in China but this technology was more advanced; e) Not an advanced technology
but fits China's situation
If you have already returned to China, did you bring any new business models? o Yes; l No
Select a number from 1 to 10 to indicate your satisfaction with your abroad academic degree:
(1=not satisfied, 10=most satisfied)
If you have founded a new company or bought or managed a previously state-
owned enterprise, please continue to the "Tsinghua Founders Survey." Otherwise,
please skip to the last page.
Tsinghua Founders Survey
Please list your companies here, starting with the most recent one that you founded (Company A)
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Company Publicly In If Industry
traded? operation? closed/acquired, **
which year?
A (latest [ Yes [] [ Yes l No
firm) No
C (first [] Yes [ [] Yes ] No
firm) No
** Industry: a) Internet; b) Aerospace; c) Drugs; d) Biotech; e) Medical Devices; f) Chemicals; g)
Materials; h) Consumer Products; i)Electronics, Computers, Telecommunications Devices; j)
Machinery; k) Other Manufacturing; I) Architecture; m) Energy; n) Electric Utilities; o)
Telecommunications; p) Finance; q) Management & Finance Consulting;
r) Publishing, Schools; s) Software; t) Law, Accounting, Miscellaneous Business Services
Please answer the remaining following questions about your first company
(Company A)
Were the products and services to be provided by your new business available on the market 3 years
ago?
o No E Yes, but only a few 0 Yes, but not too many 0 Yes, almost everywhere
Percentage of sales in various regions:
If your company is in China, % in province, % in other provinces, % international
If your company is overseas, - % in country, _ % in China, - % other countries
Please describe the characteristics of Company A in the last 2 years
purchased. please answer for the last 2 vears of oneration'
(If the company closed or has been
If the company closed or has been purchased, answer for the last year.
** If the company closed or has been purchased, answer for the two years before.
Please evaluate how important each of the following factors in creating your business on a scale of 1-5.
(1=most important, 2=of second importance, etc)
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Company Number of Company Number of How company
cofounders address (City) employees was founded &
year *
A (latest
firm)
C (first
firm)
* How company was founded: a) founded b) bought c) privatized
Number of Profit/ R&D Marketing % of
employees Revenues spending/ spending/ profit
(%) Revenues Revenues reinvested
(%) (Unit: 10,000
RMB)
Last year*
Two years
ago**
r
a) Speed/Time to market; b) _ Intellectual Property protection; c) Partnerships with other
firms;
d) Sponsorship from the government; e) - Access to a large amount of capital; f) _ Other;
Was intellectual property (patented or copyrighted material) a critical factor in the company formation?
o Yes D No
If "Yes", how many patents does your firm have? How many were granted outside of China?
If "Yes", were you an inventor or author of the intellectual property? o Yes l No
Please indicate the source of the idea for the product or service leading to the founding of the
company? Please select the most important source. (Please answer even if the idea came from one of
your co-founders and not from you.)
7a. If the primary source of the idea was at Tsinghua please indicate one:
l Research, conference, or Grad Thesis E In class El Informal discussion with
students/faculty/campus visitors
l Working with an outside company 11 Professional literature
7b. If the primary source of the idea was at another university, please indicate one:
Ei Research, conference, or Grad Thesis l In class l Informal discussion with
students/faculty/campus visitors
E Working with an outside company l Professional literature
7c. If the primary source of the idea was from other sources, please indicate one:
l working in the industry lworking in the military /government E Discussions with social/professional
acquaintances.
Does your company have stock options? l Yes Ol No, no plan to start l No, but plan to start n the
next 2-3 years
What is the founding capital of your company? _ (Unit: 10,000 RMB)
Entrepreneurship is difficult; besides a new and innovative product, mobilizing social relationships is
also needed to get a company off the ground. The following questions pertain to social relationships.
Indicate major funding sources by type, amount, and involvement in management.
Source of Governmen Tsinghua Cofounde Chinese Other Relative
funding t Alumni r Bank company
Amount*
On Board of
Directors
*( Unit: 10,000 RMB) a) 0; b) 1-10; c) 10-50; d) 50-100; e) 100-500; f) over 500
10b. Company's revenues last year: _ a) none; b) 1-10; c) 10-50; d) 50-100; e) 400-500; f) over
500 (10,000 RMB)
Did your company ask for angel investor funding? o Yes El No
If yes, how many did you contact? How many of them invested? Total investment:
(10,000 RMB)
On board of directors? 1i Yes 11 No
Did your company ask for venture capital (VC) funding? ol Yes L No
If yes, how many did you contact? _ How many of them invested? Total investment:
(10,000 RMB)
On board of directors? ol Yes 11 No
342
If no, because:
Did not need additional financing? 0 Yes 0 No
Funding not available? o Yes l No
Not aware of their existence? 11 Yes U No
Did your company form the following? (can pick more than one) o Advisory Board 0 Board of Directors
Please tell us more about your 4 most important co-founders, if any. *Roles include R&D, Sales &
Marketing, Finance, Purchasing, Manufacture, and General management.
Co- Role in the Previous job Age at Previously founded another
founder startup * role * founding company?
A [O Yes o No
B O Yes ol No
C o Yes ol No
D o Yes EL No
E []Yes EL No
Yourself
This question is related to team building among cofounders and is important for us to understand
entrepreneurship. Please fill out the information seriously, thanks! Please indicate the relationship
between the listed cofounders with a check mark.
We only focus on the most important 5 cofounders (A-E). You are still (E) if there are less than 5
cofounders.
E-A E-B E-C E-D A-B A-C A-D B-C B-D C-D
Relative
Classmate
Alumni
Previous
Colleague
Born in same
city
How many of the cofounders had industry experience in the same industry as your start-up?
Is your company's market/technology related to your previous work experience? o No; E A little; L
Moderate; ol A lot
Select a number from 1 to 10 to indicate the relationship with the following people during the first year
of your business venture? (1=no relationship; 10=very strong relationship)
a) First Customers b) Government regulators c) Banks d) First
suppliers
In the past year, if you could obtain additional funding, how much would your company need to achieve
optimal efficiency? _ (Unit: 10,000 RMB)
If your company was founded after 2004 please only fill in the columns for 2004, 2005 and 2006.
Time Yearl Year 2 Year 3 2004 2005 2006*
Revenues (10,000 RMB) (0
if the firm did not have
revenues)
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Alliance formed for product l Yes o Yes D Yes Yes D Yes o Yes
development? [ No [ No [ No w No E No ] No
* If the company has closed, provide data for the last year the firm was open.
Please put a check mark to indicate the relationship with the following categories of people involved in
your business:
School Fellow Alumni in Social circle Co-Worker Family
Friend the same Member
industry
Investors
Initial Employees
Government regulators
in charge of your
industry
Thank you very much for your assistance in completing this survey. If you have any
questions or suggestions for this survey, please email tisghua.survey@gmail.com. If you
would like a copy of the survey results of this research, please leave an e-mail or postal
address.
E-mail:
Postal:
If the stamped, addressed envelope for returning the questionnaire has been misplaced,
please return to:Tsinghua University Alumni Association
i [ - ]f1RN, 100084
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